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“The Rhetorical Dimensions of Radio Propaganda 
 in Nazi Germany, 1933-1945” 
 
(Abstract) 
 
 The intrinsic power and subtle influence of broadcasting is not readily 
recognized by the average consumer of mass media.  This circumstance has an 
abusive potential for those wishing to use the electronic media for ulterior 
motives.  Such was the case between 1933 and 1945 when the Nazis unleashed 
their manipulative mass media campaign that helped facilitate totalitarian control 
over the German people.  This dissertation is the study of its radio component.  
Special emphasis is placed on the origins, construction, and subsequent 
implementation of Nazi broadcast rhetoric heard on domestic and short wave 
radio during the twelve-year period of the Third Reich. 
In refusing the notion that a solitary critical perspective can be used in the 
creation of political consciousness and culture, I admit to using any theoretical 
insight or concept that sheds light on rhetorical efforts.  In the practice of 
criticism, I believe this is the function of rhetorical theory. Therefore, the following 
selected theoretical methods are employed:  
 Crable’s theory of rhetoric as organization is shown as an appropriate 
means of describing the radio divisions within the bureaucratic Propaganda 
Ministry.   
Bitzer’s work on the significance of the rhetorical situation is applied to the 
simple act of listening to finely crafted radio programming in Nazi Germany.  
                                                                                                                                          - x -                               
 The speaker’s link between rhetoric and ideology is explained with 
McGee’s “ideograph” theory.   
The construction of a new language suited to the goals of the Nazis is 
analyzed by examples of Burke’s unifiers and McGuire’s close textual work on 
Mein Kampf.   
Marcuse divides the language into pragmatic and mythical layers, while 
the rhetoric and motivations of eight American “radio traitors,” who served as 
Nazi broadcasters, are investigated and tied into the overall propaganda scheme. 
The consequences of this inquiry indicate that the National Socialists, with 
Dr. Goebbels’ masterful propagandistic insights, tapped into the needs of a post-
World War I German society and rebuilt a nationalistic spirit that unfortunately led 
to war and greater devastation than had been seen some three decades earlier.  
The new medium of radio, as a major source of information or mis-information, 
played no small part in this tragic outcome. 
 
Frank Rybicki 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 This dissertation is the study of a form of rhetoric that emanated from one 
of the first worldwide electronic mass media campaigns.  Robert Herzstein’s book 
on the subject sets forth a commonly held belief, The War That Hitler Won: 
Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign.  Of course, when we speak of “mass 
media” today, the connotation falls within the inclusive realm of everything from 
print material to the Internet.  I chose to narrow this study to a particular 
“medium” that was enjoying enormous popularity in the historical moment before 
and during the Nazi domination of German society. 
 When Hitler assumed the Chancellorship of Germany in 1933, the power 
of radio as a political tool had yet to be unleashed to the extent that would soon 
become evident.  Hitler and Goebbels had witnessed the defeatist effect of Allied 
printed propaganda on German morale during the First World War.  They also 
firmly agreed on the power of the spoken word as set forth in Mein Kampf, “The 
great masses of a nation will always and only succumb to the force of the spoken 
word” (Hitler, 1939, p.136).  The political culture of post-war Germany was in 
thorough disarray and provided fertile ground for the seeds of propaganda.  
Therefore, the new medium of radio innocently became the Nazi’s newest 
weapon in an already impressive propaganda arsenal that had nourished 
National Socialism’s acceleration to ultimate political power. 
 However, as a means of propaganda, radio was somewhat different.  The 
industry was state-controlled by the Weimar government and off limits to other 
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entities prior to 1933, but the political potential was fully realized and the Nazis 
took swift action to implement their pre-ordained plans for radio broadcasting.   
 Throughout this dissertation, the methods for exploring and exposing the 
rhetoric embedded in message construction and dissemination will not be 
narrowly confined.  I will reject the notion, as did Windt and Hines in, The Cold 
War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950, that a single critical perspective 
can be used in the construction of political consciousness and culture, “We freely 
admit to using any theoretical insight or concept that will help us illuminate 
various rhetorical efforts because we believe that is the role of rhetorical theory in 
the practice of criticism” (p. xxi).  
“Rhetorical Dimensions of Radio Propaganda in Nazi Germany, 1933-
1945” is divided into the following chapters:   
Chapter 1, “Rhetoric as Organization: Radio Broadcasting in the Third 
Reich,” initiates this study with an orientation of the organizational aspects of the 
Propaganda Ministry and its radio subdivisions, which were full of colorful 
announcers and administrators who left their respective marks on the 
propaganda process.  This will serve as a grounding of sorts to familiarize the 
reader with the necessary personal, historical and political backgrounds that 
were crucial to choices in rhetorical message construction and their subsequent 
distribution.  
 Instead of following the beaten path that has led to the uncovering of 
rhetoric that is produced by the organization, I will argue, by applying Crable’s 
theory of rhetoric as organization (1990), that the organization itself was the real 
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“rhetor.”  To crystallize this point, it will be necessary to discuss Ehninger’s study 
(1968) on the “three great systems of rhetoric,” in order to lay a foundation in 
support of Crable’s work that suggests a “fourth system” where the emphasis is 
placed on the ontological nature of the rhetor.     
Crable puts forth twelve elements that form the criteria linking rhetoric as 
organization.  Each of these twelve points is theoretically explained and 
subsequently applied to particular instances inside the organizational aspects of 
the Propaganda Ministry, specifically the administration and operational areas 
that controlled radio broadcasting.  Once the political and bureaucratic broadcast 
structure was in place, the Nazis were challenged with providing news and 
entertainment that would march in step with the cloudy ideology professed by the 
Party.  The programming plans included strong elements aimed at the restoration 
of German nationalism that was thoroughly compromised by the World War I 
peace terms dictated by  the Treaty of Versailles. 
 In Chapter 2, “The Agency of Radio: A New Instrument for Propaganda 
Programming,” we become acquainted with the types of programs and their 
accompanying political rhetoric broadcast to the German people.  The new 
medium of radio made the Nazi’s carefully created messages irresistible in the 
early days of the regime.  The roots of the Hitler and Goebbels obsession with 
propaganda methods are explored, including an explanation of the infamous 
“stab in the back” theory from World War I, leading some Germans to believe the 
second war was merely a continuation of the first.  
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Bitzer’s theory on the significance associated with the rhetorical situation 
is shown to be applicable to the simple act of listening to a broadcast.  His 
thought is grounded in a philosophical and epistemological commitment to 
realism and views the rhetorical situation as having such a degree of control over 
discourse, that it should be considered as “the very center of rhetorical activity” 
(Lucaites, Condit, & Caudill,  p. 220).  His points to consider for rhetoric 
becoming situational include the notions of exigence, audience, and constraints.  
We will apply Bitzer’s rhetorical situation theory to a radio-inspired, and truly 
episodic, nationwide winter clothing drive organized by Goebbels for those 
soldiers fighting on the frigid Eastern front. 
In the interest of exigence modification, Rolo’s (1942) rhetorical discursive 
strategies help illuminate ulterior motives hidden away by the Berlin government.  
Each strategy was intended to overcome the opposition’s political objections 
through their respective and calculated implementations by the National Socialist 
Party. 
On the air, an examination of the sequential order of news stories will help 
illuminate the self-serving rhetoric employed by the Nazi announcers, whereby 
such manipulation served to divert the listener’s attention toward a more 
inclusive, self-serving narrative.  Also highlighted is the “verbal newsreel” known 
as “Front Report,” where combat soldiers were interviewed in an effort to bring 
the military and civilian populations together to share in the major Nazi radio 
theme of bearing witness and living through extraordinary times.  Also, the 
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Wunschkonzert or Request Concert, was similarly situated to bring the home 
front and war front together. 
Since news and political commentaries were outnumbered in terms of 
clock hours at the rate of 7 to 1 by music, the Nazis had to be certain that 
composers and compositions also fell in line with the ideals of National 
Socialism.  Here, the rhetorical need for racial and ethnic purity made itself 
known without elaboration as most, but not all, of the great German Masters 
were cleared for domestic broadcast.  In the same manner that music could 
move the masses and contribute to the “Volksgemeinschaft” or people’s 
community, a core concept of Nazi ideology (Michael & Doerr, 2002, p. 423), 
German society was experiencing the rise of one of the great orators in modern 
history; unfortunately, Hitler’s legacy is an undeniable personification of evil.  His 
belief in the power of the spoken word is well documented and led to the 
establishment of a Nazi Speaker System where training was provided for those 
who wished to devote their lives and talents to the cause of National Socialism.  
The inclusion of Chapter 3, “The Nazi Speaker: Linking Rhetoric to 
Ideology,” is intended acquaint the reader with the state of public speaking during 
the Nazi era in Germany and illustrate the link, via McGee’s “Ideograph” theory, 
between the construction of rhetorical discourse and the Party’s ideology.  
Veterans of the first war were overwhelmed by the implementation of Allied 
propaganda and its consequential effects on troops and civilians.  In spite of the 
volume of “printed” leaflets dropped on German front lines and cities, the Nazis 
were clever enough to not only embrace the propaganda idea, but also to 
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prepare it for mass distribution through updated “electronic” advancements of the 
radio age in order to compete with and counter the established propaganda 
methods of the British and Americans.  No longer would propaganda be 
considered “dishonorable” as the Kaiser’s military elitists previously viewed the 
subject. 
This Nazi propaganda contained words that are described by McGee as 
“ideographs.”  The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real 
discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness 
(McGee, 1980, p. 7).  With a functioning political consciousness, the Nazis 
invented a completely new vocabulary to underscore important elements of their 
ideology.  
Due to the Nazi’s desire to have the masses blindly and unquestionably 
accept their message, a deep distrust of intellectualism is also highlighted in this 
chapter.  The hope was for people to judge the emotional impact of a speaker, 
his clearness, and understandability, as opposed to an evaluation based on logic 
or philosophy.  
To this end, the Nazi Speaker System was set up as an elaborate training 
instrument and was divided into different instructional levels based on geographic 
considerations, purpose, and subject matter.  Here, the reader is introduced to 
the Nazi Rhetorician, Hans Krebs, who, by virtue of his well-received handbook, 
served as the unofficial expert on matters relating to the Nazi speaker’s methods 
for moving the mass audience to action.  We will also preview the list of books 
that Krebs believed indispensable in carrying out the work of the public speaker.  
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The chapter concludes with an insightful look at the problems associated with the 
transition from public speaker to radio announcer, where matters of style and 
technique faced immediate reappraisal.  Perhaps the most common difficulty 
among those making the move was adapting to the absence of visible spectators 
for immediate audience feedback.  We will discover most Germans agreed that 
Hitler was among this group.  However, those who made the transition and found 
themselves behind the microphone in service to the Nazis had to properly deal 
with many new situations of language usage developed within the Third Reich. 
In Chapter 4, “The Rhetorical Language of National Socialism,” we 
examine the necessity of the new language of Nazi German, which was 
supposedly initiated as a means of societal thought control.  While all aspects of 
German life were influenced, we will consider the short-range manifestations of 
language on the radio and the long-term implementation in the German 
educational system.  The latter being the home of the dreaded intellectuals with 
their feared capacity for critical thinking.  The role of radio is discussed in the 
plans for the future education of those “sub-humans” in conquered territories. 
Significant contributions to thoughts on the language of National Socialism 
come from information provided in a wartime study prepared by Marcuse (1988) 
while working under the auspices of the U.S. Office of War Information.  He 
describes a two-tiered mentality that accounts for a pragmatic and a mythological 
layer of language.  The pragmatic is characterized by elements of matter-of-
factness, efficiency, and success.  Germans were thinking in quantities, in terms 
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of speed, skill, energy, organization, and mass.  Here, we are presented with the 
familiar Marcuse warning of succumbing to technological rationalization. 
The German mythological layer of language included paganism, social 
naturalism, and racism.  Marcuse skillfully shows how the Nazis nourished these 
pre-exisitng and evolving emotions found in society by blaming the Labor 
movement and the Weimar government with its pro-Christian stance. 
The rhetorical nature of the new German language leads one to consider 
the role of Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a type of theoretical guide.  Through McGuire’s 
(1977) close textual analysis, we find mythic themes that are rhythmically 
repeated such as birth and re-birth, locating a life mission, carrying out the will of 
the gods, stagnation and decay, and a transformation of death to new birth.  
From Burke’s (1973) chapter “Hitler’s Battle,” in The Philosophy of Literary Form: 
Studies in Symbolic Action, much attention is paid to the unifying devices used in 
Mein Kampf, including the identification of a tangible enemy, the Jew, who 
functioned as a scapegoat and deflected the potential for objective thinking.  
Burke also mentions the use of “ideas as imagery” in completing associative 
mergers (pp. 200-201).  His categorization of Germany as a country in dire 
emotional need also explains the motive behind Hitler’s rhetorical appeals to 
nationalism.  
The use of this “invented” language by the Nazis was so important that the 
media were issued an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 directives on word usage 
(Townson, 1992, p. 140).  We will see how Goebbels controlled the flow of 
information at his daily Reich press conferences in Berlin, where his blatant and 
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binding orders included the substitution of “Ministry of Lies and Advertising” for 
direct references to the British Central Office of Information. 
Delicate subjects were to be carefully handled by the media, as was the 
case for newspaper and radio reporters who were forced to tread lightly on the 
crushing defeat of the German forces at Stalingrad.  Propaganda procedures for 
military reversals were unfamiliar and perhaps never formulated.  Evidence of 
this point is established by the virtual disappearance of Stalingrad from all 
newscasts during the successful weeks of the Russian counter-offensive.  In 
spite of losing over 500,000 troops in this military catastrophe, that arguably 
turned the tide of war against the Germans, we will see how the Goebbels 
propaganda machine initiated a mythic rhetoric and turned tragedy into triumph 
as the defeat at Stalingrad was transformed into the saga of Stalingrad. 
As the German apprehension of fighting a war on two fronts developed, 
efforts were intensified at keeping the U.S. from entering the war on the side of 
the British and creating a threat from the West.  In spite of massive aid being 
shipped to England and Russia, the Germans still believed their short wave 
broadcast strategies to North America could encumber active U.S. participation.   
In Chapter 5, “Rhetoric on the Shortwave: Nazi Broadcasts to America,” 
we will see strategies that were implemented by the Nazis in direct correlation to 
the fluid political situation before and after Pearl Harbor.  These strategies took 
the form of outright praise for American restraint to predictive warnings when all 
other means had not produced the desired outcome.  Winning American support 
for Germany was considered unrealistic and unnecessary by the Nazi 
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propagandists, although the amount of hard work aimed at the maintenance of 
U.S. neutrality spoke for itself.  
   The reader will also be introduced to the work of the Princeton Listening 
Center, an impressive collection of linguists, scholars, engineers, and 
stenographers whose unique abilities established America’s systematic 
shortwave eavesdropping apparatus.  This organization monitored short wave 
broadcasts from around the world, particularly those directed at North American 
audiences.  These men and women heard the rhetoric of several Americans 
broadcasting for the Nazis and subsequently indicted for treason by a Federal 
Grand Jury in 1943.  
 Numbering eight in all, a ninth was indicted for broadcasting from Rome; 
these Nazi sympathizers brought all of their deep-rooted biases and prejudices to 
their positions behind the microphones in Berlin.  Some were more overt than 
others; a few maintained their innocence under the pretext of being nothing more 
than objective political commentators.  I chose to provide some background 
information and on-air quotes from these “radio traitors,” in an effort to 
understand their individual motivations and their respective degrees of sincerity 
as they engaged in rhetorically spreading the doctrines of the National Socialists 
with Goebbels’ new weapon of mass influence, the radio. 
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Chapter 1-Rhetoric as Organization: Radio Broadcasting in the Third Reich 
 
 
Rhetorical Approach 
 
 Any discussion of the rhetorical dimensions of radio propaganda used by 
the Nazis in their twelve years of dominance prior to and during the Second 
World War in Germany must begin with an analysis of Hitler’s propaganda 
organization.  This organization, through the manipulation of the mass media, 
was responsible for influencing the actions and attitudes of millions of German 
people. 
 Of course, any discussion of propaganda inherently carries a rhetorical 
element necessary for the propaganda to function.  Since the present focus is on 
the organizational nature of Nazi Germany’s propaganda efforts through the use 
of broadcasting, we can safely make the point that most organizations are 
inherently rhetorical.  They provide their own brand or style of rhetoric to the 
audiences with which they wish to communicate in order to persuade, influence, 
etc.  
 However, I will argue that rhetoric should be defined, at least in this 
instance, organizationally.  By applying the theoretical framework of Crable 
(1990), Ehninger (1968) and others, I hope to show that the efficient radio 
broadcasting propaganda apparatus, conceived and monitored by Dr. Joseph 
Goebbels, may be explained in the context of a “fourth great system of rhetoric” 
(Crable, p. 116).  In order to understand this concept, it is helpful to review the 
 12
previous concepts upon which the “fourth” it is built.  The first three systems were 
identified by Ehninger (1968) as those we would associate chronologically.  His 
categorizations of these three rhetorical periods are based on three important 
factors: clarification of assumptions and roles, the need for pragmatic concerns, 
and isolation of conceptual difficulties (pp. 140-141). 
 
A Brief Overview of Ehninger’s Three Great Systems of Rhetoric 
Ehninger (1968) claims that the classical scholars were interested in 
making rhetoric teachable; therefore, the conceptual information available at the 
time had to be divided into separate disciplines.  The pragmatic goal was to instill 
a bias, using rhetoric, towards winning or ultimate persuasion.  The speech-act   
was the focus of this system and as Ehninger states, contained naïve notions 
about the message and the mind of the audience (pp. 133-134).  Due to the 
earliest system’s heavy reliance on fundamental categorization, Ehninger prefers 
to call it the “grammatical” system of rhetoric. 
By the eighteenth century, Kames, Campbell, and Priestly would take a 
different view of the speech-listener relationship, privileging the notions of 
speculation and intuition.  At that time, the winning of causes had been 
subordinated and the bias of rhetoric was identified by an epistemological 
orientation.  Ehninger called the second great system “psychological” (p. 134). 
With the emergence of Dewey, Richards, Burke, and others in the 1930’s, 
the third great system of rhetoric began to focus on the “social” or “sociological” 
in which the key was the understanding and the contribution to positive human 
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relations.  Ehninger explains rhetoric in this period as having an “ethical and 
aesthetic dimension” (p. 139).  Crable seems to think that the starting point had 
shifted from winning causes and epistemology to a rhetoric of axiology (p. 116).  
To this end, the Nazis tailored much of their broadcast propaganda to convey to 
the German public the value in adhering to the war effort; yet, their propaganda 
broadcasting organization itself was better suited to a critical analysis using the 
fourth system where contemporary discourse is produced by organizations not 
individuals. 
It should be noted that due to chronology, each system was built upon 
ideas expressed in previous systems.  Valuable concepts were adopted and 
carried through time.  Crable also points out that the theoretical focal points 
changed, from speech-act to speech-audience, to act-audience-society.  
Nowhere was the emphasis placed on the rhetor.  Philosophically, the three 
systems moved between starting points of pragmatics, epistemology, and finally 
axiology.  Crable thinks it ironic that in light of Plato’s influence, no system 
emphasized ontology as his theoretical “fourth” system does (p. 117). 
 Upon closer examination, these three systems of rhetoric were actually 
three “systems of rhetorical THEORY” (p. 117).  They were not systems of 
practice other than managing tasks at hand.  Therefore, since Ehninger’s study 
covered rhetorical phenomena up until the time of Burke, Crable believes that a 
void developed in the second half of the twentieth century as the pragmatics of 
rhetorical efforts were missing the mutuality of theory construction and practice 
(p. 117).   
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Crable’s Fourth Great System of Rhetoric 
 Supported by John Naisbitt’s Megatrends (1982), Crable saw that a fourth 
major system was developing.  He took Ehninger’s definition of rhetoric, “an 
organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about practical discourse” 
(Ehninger, p. 131), and Naisbitt’s analysis of “Ten New Directions for 
Transforming Our Lives” (the Megatrends subtitle) and concluded that 
contemporary discourse “is produced by organizations, not individuals: it is 
organizational rhetoric” (Crable, p. 117).  The fourth system puts emphasis on 
the ontological nature of the rhetor.  Crable sees rhetors as organizational beings 
with theoretical and philosophical links to the past.  Theoretically, the speech-act, 
speech-audience, and the act-audience-society aspects of rhetoric are 
incorporated into the system as well as the philosophical dimensions of 
pragmatics, epistemology, and axiology (p. 118).  The fourth system examines 
the rhetor and the link to the organization.  The rhetor is essential in defining the 
organization and possibly as representative of a constituency (Crable, 1986, pp. 
62-63).   
 Concerns and biases of the other three systems are incorporated into the 
fourth system where the focus becomes the nature of the rhetor in terms of the 
organizational representative or spokesperson.  This affiliation transcends mere 
attributes or characteristics of the rhetor; it is the sine qua non of identification 
and frames the fourth system as “organizational rhetoric” (Crable, 1990, p. 119).  
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Ehninger had the foresight to realize that the three systems he categorized were 
not to be carved in stone.  They would be useful as catalysts for scholars in the 
development of rhetorical foci shifts that the changing needs of the future would 
ultimately demand.  The allowance of these contemporary and future frameworks 
is seen as a conceptual introduction to the advancement of organizational and 
rhetorical theory.  This is where I believe that Crable has situated himself with his 
fourth system. 
Explaining Crable’s Verbal Model of Organizational Rhetoric 
 Based on a critique of Burke’s “pentad” model of the third system, Crable 
cautions us not to equate the rhetor with agent or actor (p. 120).  Burke’s 
framework of symbolic action through pentadic analysis includes the Agent or 
Actor and brings about or initiates an Act for a specific Purpose by way of a 
device or mechanism, Agency, which is utilized within a context or Scene (p. 
120).  In using elements of the pentad in describing his own model, we discover 
Crable’s reassessment and reassignment of meanings.  For instance, he 
disagrees with Burke’s notion of the Actor in the “organizational system” of 
rhetoric in which we find ourselves today.  Crable does not see the Actor as 
instigating anything or as being an originator to any degree.  In fact, he goes so 
far as to suggest the actual extinction of rhetors who purely expressed their own 
views, if they indeed ever existed in the first place.  Instead, the rhetor now 
becomes the representative for organized interests.  We will see this correlation 
when the application is made to the Nazis and their radio propaganda 
organization. 
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 Using the Burkean definition of the terms, the Actors do not actually use 
the Agencies.  For Crable, the Actors are the Agencies, “the instruments of 
rhetorical representation of the organizations which are themselves, in true 
Burkean terms, the Actors or instigators of the Acts” (p. 120).  To further illustrate 
this important point, one may recall the old American gangster film genre when, 
during the course of the story, the crime boss uses the metaphor of “mouthpiece” 
when describing his lawyer. 
 In actual dramatic productions, Actors speak from memorization of a 
script, which is processed through numerous entities such as writers, directors, 
and producers.  For Crable, in this overall production endeavor, the script really 
is an Agency used in the Act, although in Burkean terms, the dramatic actor is 
the Agency within the Scene (p. 120).   
 The nuances of Crable’s fourth system are demonstrated using an 
example of his perceived differences between American Presidents Carter and 
Reagan.  While claiming that Carter did not understand the fourth system, Crable 
argues that it was readily apparent the President thought too much, confusing 
himself and the nation.  He thinks that Carter “was under the misguided 
impression” that Presidents should “ponder solutions to problems,” in essence; 
they should become Actors or Agents initiating a change (p. 120).  Conversely, 
Reagan understood that he was to revert to his role as an actor in the Hollywood 
sense, but in the Burkean sense, he assumed the role of Agency for the 
“production company” which was the Reagan Administration.  This President 
learned his lines, rehearsed his scripts, and called upon his acting experience to 
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the point where he eventually became known as the “great communicator” (pp. 
120-121).  
Elements of Crable’s Model 
 
 Just as earlier theorists have borrowed ideas from their predecessors, 
Crable freely admits that his system could be viewed as merely an extension of 
Burke or something that his theory “could accommodate.”  However, as (Toulmin, 
1972) suggests, derivation should not necessarily be considered in any negative 
sense, but merely as a bridging function whereby earlier systems have and will 
continue to contribute to other systems either in development or not yet 
conceptualized. 
 Here then are Crable’s 12 elements to his fourth system model.  When 
they are functioning, we have effective, modern, rhetorical practice.  When we 
assess them, we have effective rhetorical criticism (121).  After setting forth the 
elements, I will re-visit each and connect them with my contention that the 
rhetoric of the organization of the Nazi use of broadcasting is capable of being 
examined organizationally using the fourth system: 
Production/financing organization 
Function served by the same or different organizations or a series of 
interconnected organizations 
Perceived “circumstances” as viewed by BOTH the production organization(s) 
and the audience(s) 
Includes factors of an alleged physical nature, public opinion, opportunities, laws, 
and so forth 
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Organizational “self-concept 
Including judgments, values, fears, needs, desires, images of/by the organization 
Audiences: external/internal 
Intended/unintended; and known/unknown 
“Support” as the organizational goal  
Including support for desired image, for supportive opinion, for help on decisions 
or issues, for some affect on attitude (or some combination of these from one, 
several, or many audiences/publics) 
Stage managers  
Either from within the organization or from without, as in the case of advertising 
agencies or public relations agencies 
Script writers  
The acknowledgement of which makes the question of “ghost writers” less 
interesting; may be drawn from the ranks of the stage managers 
“Set” or “forum”  
Becomes the apparent context within which the message is to be understood; 
may be the White House rose garden, the Camp David lawn, a ghetto corner, a 
press conference, etc. 
Media delivery systems  
Interpersonal, public, mass, or more likely in combination 
Message intermediaries
Gatekeepers, opinion leaders, etc. 
Spokespersons or “representatives”  
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Actors in the Hollywood sense; those who “make appearances” to gather support 
 
Perceptions and evidence of impact
Feedback, response, etc., (pp. 121-122). 
 
Even though the terminology associated with “rhetor” is implied in many of these 
elements, we must not lose sight of the fact that Crable argues for the valid 
rhetor as not the individual but the organization itself as an entity.  This model is 
helpful when studying the combination of actions that construct rhetoric, which is 
eventually “represented” to the audience(s).  We will fail in our attempts at 
completely calculating what may be called organizational rhetoric when elements 
of this model are consciously ignored or mistakenly overlooked (p. 122). 
 
Production Functions and Interconnectedness 
The organizational chart of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment 
and Propaganda appears to be a page out of any organizational communication 
textbook extolling the virtues of Fredrick Taylor’s “Scientific Management” theory 
with its unconditional concerns for hierarchical deportment and scalar chains of 
command.  Even the title of the organization itself is exhaustive.  Goebbels found 
the use of the word “propaganda” to be problematic.  He repeatedly called for the 
word to be used in a positive sense by the Germans, although when used by the 
enemy, “propaganda” would be substituted for the highly negative overtone 
associated with the word “agitation” (Irving, 1996, p. 576).  However, German 
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broadcasting actually came under the control of not only the Propaganda 
Ministry, but also the National Socialist Party, and the Reich Chamber of Culture.  
Whereas the Propaganda Ministry was responsible for content, the Nazi Party 
component organized and supervised the listeners.  The Chamber of Culture was 
regarded as the professional organization.  Its sub-division was the Chamber of 
Broadcasting where the “Professional Association for Broadcasting” was situated 
(Hardy, 1967, p. 264).  The mandatory membership in this organization consisted 
of those unique, artistic individuals with hands-on involvement in the relatively 
new medium of radio (Kris & Speier, 1944, p. 52).   
Moreover, the coordination or “interconnectedness” of these organizations 
was virtually assured when one realizes that the key positions in all three main 
divisions were held by the same Nazi Party officials.  Goebbels was the Minister 
of Propaganda, President of the Reich Chamber of Culture, and Director of the 
Party Propaganda Department.  Hans Fritzche, who played a major role in the 
radio broadcasting apparatus of the Third Reich, headed two departments in the 
Propaganda Ministry and served as chief of the Chamber of Broadcasting within 
the Reich Chamber of Culture (pp. 52-53).  Within the Ministry of Propaganda, 
there were three sub-divisions that were identified with broadcasting activities; 
the Radio Division, the Propaganda Co-coordinating Division, and the Troops 
Entertainment Division.  
 There was a publicity section in the Chamber of Broadcasting along with 
a special Listener Research Section that gathered informative data from radio 
wardens and formed associations with German universities that were conducting 
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research in this significant, yet undeveloped facet of broadcasting at the time (p. 
54). 
Radio on the national level also came under the jurisdiction of the 
Propaganda Ministry and the administrative management fell within the Radio 
Division.  There, it was further supervised by a Director General and divided into 
programs of political relevance such as news reports, commentaries, broadcasts 
to foreign countries via short-wave, and counterpropaganda.  The Program 
Division dealt with musical programs, features, and general entertainment for the 
home front and the troops.  This Program Division was also in charge of 
coordinating links and exchanges between the 26 stations that made up the 
Greater German radio, a non-commercial government institution (p. 54). 
The technical organization of radio transmitters facilitated a national hook-
up that could come from any of the thirteen regional sites.  For instance, a 
program from Hamburg may be followed by one from Munich.  However, all 
regional stations could be linked together to insure nationwide distribution.  Non-
political or children’s shows along with cultural broadcasts were the only program 
materials designated for regional distribution to facilitate provincial differences 
and interests (p. 54). 
From 1933, when the Nazis were officially in power, until the end of the 
war in 1945, the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry grew from three to 
twenty-one departments, ultimately employing a staff of about two thousand 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, 1997, p. 9).  During these twelve years, Radio became the 
Ministry’s largest division and second in importance only to the Propaganda 
 22
Division.  Goebbels made it clear at the outset of the war that the Radio Division 
had the responsibility for maintaining the political direction of the German radio 
operation and that all suggestions or ideas were to be brought to its attention (p. 
9).  Of course, the Propaganda Ministry had the final say in all matters of 
broadcast material superceding the opinions of regional directors, supervisors, 
and editors (p. 9). 
 
Circumstances Perceived by the Organization and the Audiences 
Crable’s second element in his “fourth great system of rhetoric” model 
enables us to examine some of the shared perceptions of circumstances 
associated with German listening audiences and the Nazi Party’s use of radio 
that constructed the historical moment. 
In her introduction to The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt 
reminds that in spite of blatantly open criminality, totalitarian governments still 
rest upon mass support and argues that scholars and statesmen alike often 
refuse to recognize it.  Academics were taken by the fascination with propaganda 
and brainwashing, while political leaders such as Conrad Adenauer repeatedly 
denied it (vii).  With respect for awareness, a publication of secret reports on 
German public opinion during the war years, issued by the Security Service of 
the SS Meldugen aus dem Reich.  Auswahl aus den Geheimen Lageberichten 
des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1939-1944,  Neuwied & Berlin, 1965, edited by 
Heinz Boberach, reveals that most of the so-called secrets were actually well 
known by a remarkably well informed German public.  This includes the 
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massacres of Jews in Poland and the preparations for the invasion of Soviet 
Russia.  In addition, the reports indicated that in spite of propaganda efforts, 
many Germans had been able to form independent opinions (Boberach pp. XVIII-
XIX). 
Steinert (1977) divided these German civilian “opinion holders” into five 
groups: 1. those considered members of the public or the all-encompassing 
masses; 2. those interested members of the public; 3. the informed public; 4. the 
opinion elite or opinion-makers, i.e., communications elite; and 5. the political 
elite.  As a result of this division, Steinert argues that most opinion research 
concentrated its efforts on the first two categories and occasionally the third.  
This becomes somewhat problematic when one considers the complex 
composition of the majority, from the disinterested, uninformed masses to the 
interested and lesser-informed segments of society (p. 17). 
What becomes clear is the existence of a national opinion during and after 
the political ascension of the Nazis; however it was not openly manifested.  The 
talent of Goebbels was found in his understanding of the German psyche and in 
his sense of the problems that individuals and families faced (Baird, 1974, p. 18).  
His perception helped the Party to uncover what was important to the average 
citizen.  This “finger on the pulse” of the Weimar Republic is what helped the 
Nazi Party grow and gradually acquire seats in the Reichstag.  
There is no shortage of shared issues to discuss, but for the purposes of 
linking a concrete shared perception to the second element in Crable’s model, 
the organization (broadcast propaganda) and the audience (the German people) 
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shared a concern for the fate of Germany in the post-war era.  Both groups 
sensed the decline in nationalism that ensued from the humiliation imposed on 
their country by the Treaty of Versailles.  Journalist William L. Shirer was an 
eyewitness to a major link in the oppressive chain being shattered that had held 
down the nationalistic spirit of the German people for the sixteen years that 
followed the Treaty.  This observation is taken from an entry dated March 16, 
1935 in his famous Berlin Diary: 
Today’s creation of a conscript army in open defiance of 
Versailles will greatly enhance his (Hitler’s) domestic position, 
for there are few Germans, regardless of how much they hate 
the Nazis, who will not support it wholeheartedly.  The great 
majority will like the way he thumbed his nose at Versailles, 
which they all resented, and, being militarists at heart, they 
welcome the rebirth of the army.  (p. 31)  
Shirer’s observation is important since it helps illustrate the point that public 
opinion was not thoroughly manipulated with respect to the issue of nationalism 
and therefore becomes a more credible point when applied to Crable’s model as 
a shared concern. 
 The Nazi propagandist was able to deal with national unity in a way that 
radically differed from a democratic government’s appeal to patriotism.  
Nationalism was seen as an opportunity to further the Nazi cause.  When 
speaking to the German people about the German people, the main task was to 
keep the man in the street from knowing himself and was accomplished through 
 25
the use of a collective identity (Kris & Speier, p. 163).  The individual was non-
existent and melded into the larger collective notion of “Germany.”  One’s 
greatest virtue was to think, feel, and act like every other member of his or her 
race.  It was hoped that the radio would make the people believe what he or she 
was being told about “the German people” and consequently begin to think, feel 
and act as the propagandist suggested.  By this power of suggestion, the radio 
worked on the public’s everyday perception of itself to create a different reality, or 
an ontological sleight of hand to suggest that everyday life was not as it 
appeared (p. 163). 
 Kris & Speier go on to say that suffering was born with a heart made of 
iron because it was a prelude to a future measured in centuries.  Germans were 
not governed; they were led.  They demanded every new law imposed upon 
them.  Indoctrination was actually enlightenment.  The people did not read books 
or like music; they had culture.  The German did not have a good time; instead it 
was enthusiasm, boundless and national (p. 164).  Of course, the trends of the 
war dictated the message construction and this component of Nazi Party rhetoric 
shall be examined later. 
Organizational self-concept 
 Hans Fritzsche was a leading Nazi political broadcaster during the war.  
His sharp, sarcastic wit helped him gather a large following of faithful listeners.  
In a 1933 broadcast speech entitled “Dr. Goebbels and his Ministry,” Fritzsche 
outlined the new Ministry’s direction and goals while heaping unrelenting praise 
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upon his superior.  Fritzsche’s remarks will help connect Crable’s third element, 
the organization’s self-concept structure. 
Goebbels was characterized as a martyr who had beaten all the odds and 
suffered much indignation in his political battles.  At Hitler’s command he had 
conquered the Communists in Berlin and saved the Nazi Party, which had been 
on the verge of collapse in 1926.  The French and the separatists in the Ruhr and 
the Rhine also proved to be no match for him earlier in his career.  In short, 
Goebbels was revered second only to Hitler in Party circles.  Associate Press 
correspondent, translator, and editor of The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, Louis 
P. Lochner, confirms this belief in Goebbels stature.  “I believe it is no 
exaggeration to say that at the time when Goebbels diaries were written the little 
doctor was the most important and influential man after Hitler, not even excepting 
the seemingly all-powerful Heinrich Himmler” (p. 25).  The non-Party, average 
citizens were also well aware of this fact.  
 In his speech, Fritzsche denied the Propaganda Ministry’s role as a 
bureaucratic or administrative component of the state; his organizational self-
concept was described as “rather a spiritual center of power that stays in 
constant touch with the whole people on political, spiritual, cultural and economic 
matters.  It is the mouth and ear of the Reich government” (Fritzsche, 1934). 
 He also spoke favorably of the Radio Division’s role in uniting the entire 
radio system.  Characterized as once a collection of private broadcasters where 
the Reich, political parties, the states, and private interests co-existed, this new 
technology had been cleansed, united, and organized.  Fritzsche also spoke of 
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radio’s power to draw the nation together for vicarious involvement in festivals 
and ceremonies.  He noted that while the Führer would speak to an assembled 
audience of a few thousand, the radio was carrying the event to millions.  By 
today’s standards radio’s potential to reach the masses this is common 
knowledge.  However, we must keep in mind that electronic communication in 
the form of broadcasting was still in its early stages.  Therefore, the claim of 
reaching “millions” of listeners was no small boast.  Fritzsche went on to say that, 
“Without exaggerating, one can say that there is no country in the world where 
radio is anywhere near as intensive an intermediary between the government 
and the people as in Germany” (Fritzsche, 1934). 
 In his first address to the new managerial staff of German radio in March 
of 1933, Goebbels told his gathering, “I hold radio to be the most modern and the 
most important instrument of mass influence that exists anywhere.”  He 
continued, “I am also of the opinion, and one shouldn’t say this out loud, that in 
the long term radio will replace newspapers” (Welch, 2002, p. 39). 
 
Audiences 
 The Germany of Hitler’s day was a modern mass media society.  Millions 
of news consumers were found in newspaper readership, in newsreel film 
audiences, and of course in the new medium of radio with its advantage of 
immediacy, if and when Goebbels decided to use this benefit.  Germans listened 
at home, in public places, and even at work.  The element of the audience is 
 28
Crable’s fourth in the model of organizational rhetoric as the “fourth great 
system.” 
 The Nazi broadcasters were careful to provide the right mix of programs 
that included news, entertainment, and specials, the latter being the category of a 
Hitler speech.  Under the watchful eye of the local Party radio warden, it was 
actually forbidden to leave one’s desk at work until a broadcast of a political 
nature had concluded.  Inexpensive radio sets were mass-produced and were 
capable of receiving a limited number of state controlled stations.  By 1939, three 
million of these sets had been sold (Gellately, 2001, p. 185).  As was and still is 
the case in most of Europe, radio license fees were also imposed on the 
audiences with installment plans in place to facilitate listenership.  Communal 
listening was encouraged and compared to the experience of church worship.  If 
one had a problem with paying for the receiver or the accompanying six dollar 
per year license fee, there were massive loudspeakers set up in public places 
(Kris & Speier, p. 57).  
The law prohibited listening to any type of foreign broadcasts, which 
required special care at times since, in at least one instance, the wavelength of 
the BBC’s German language transmissions fell between a German regional and 
national station.  Known as “black-listening,” the act was punishable by jail, hard 
labor, or death and fell under the radio warden’s jurisdiction (Burleigh, 2000, p. 
206).  Statistically, there were about four million radio listeners when the Nazis 
came to power in 1933.  This number would quadruple and peak during the early 
war years when continuous military victories was common, however, “black-
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listening” to a variety of foreign broadcasts would become a mounting problem 
for Goebbels as the war progressed beyond the German army’s debacle at 
Stalingrad (Gellately, p. 185). 
Support as an Organizational Goal 
 In March of 1933, Goebbels gave a speech before the German press to 
introduce the rationale behind the new Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda.  He took a carefully calculated approach with his audience to gain 
their support, which is Crable’s fifth element in the rhetoric as organization 
model: 
Goebbels ingratiated himself by flattering his audience, referring 
to them as the ‘seventh great power that is better suited than 
any other to shape and to influence public opinion’.  By 
presenting himself as ‘one of them’ he hoped to gain a 
sympathetic understanding for some of the measures he was 
about to outline.  (Welch, 2002, p. 172) 
On the subject of radio, Goebbels promised a “modern tempo.”  Claiming 
that the process of creating a mood need not be boring for the listener, he cited 
the fine work done by his charges in the few weeks since January 30th, the date 
of Hitler’s official takeover in 1933.  References were made to those who 
believed that listeners would be driven away in droves by the new organization.  
Instead, Goebbels claimed that millions of new listeners were welcomed, in spite 
of concrete research, because the Government was producing its propaganda in 
the “atmosphere-laden halls of mass gatherings” (Welch, p. 178). 
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He then elaborated on the vicarious involvement theme by stating that 
radio will be aware of its great national responsibility and that individual listeners 
will have the opportunity to be involved in great forums of nationalistic 
celebrations: 
I think it is an impossible situation if a national event, such as 
the opening of the new Reichstag or the Thanksgiving Service 
in the churches of Potsdam or a parade by a Potsdam regiment 
in front of the Reich President, has an audience numbering only 
10,000 or 15,000.  That is completely out of date.  A 
government that permits that has no need to wonder why 
nobody above and beyond that 15,000 has any interest in the 
national event.  On the contrary, I regard it as essential that the 
whole nation, for nowadays we have the technical means, must 
listen in to and play a direct part in these kinds of events.  (p. 
178) 
 Goebbels also alluded to the banning of broadcasts in the old Reichstag 
sessions of the Weimar Republic.  This would no longer be the case since the 
new Government had nothing to hide.  The sessions would be held in a manner 
befitting the “honor and dignity of the German people.”  The people would know 
everything that the Government was doing and the reasons for the ways in which 
it was behaving.  Radio would therefore offer participation in great events and 
“serve the conservation of German art, German science and German music, and 
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not only objects from the past but also objects from the present when they have a 
future” (p. 178). 
          The organizational support was petitioned within a context of trust and 
nationalism.  Gaining and maintaining the confidence of the people was crucial 
for the future plans of the Party and the radio was seen as an excellent 
communication tool to help achieve their objectives. 
 
Stage Managers 
 The physical nature of the Nazi propaganda apparatus was intended to be 
hidden from public view.  The illusion was never to be connected to the 
illusionists.  On one rare occasion, “Goebbels had a fit of blinding fury” when he 
discovered that a magazine had published a photo of a radio production worker 
putting an album on a turntable which contained a track of a triumphal bell chime 
heard after special announcements.  At a Berlin press conference, journalists 
were instructed that “problems of stage management, Regiefragen, should not in 
principle come before the public.  All that goes on behind the backcloth belongs 
to stage management” (Zeman, 1964, pp. 39-40). 
 In all, there were five heads of the Radio or Broadcasting Division during 
the life of the Propaganda Ministry.  We will briefly examine these men as the 
sixth element of Crable’s model of rhetoric as organization, stage managers. 
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Dressler-Andress. 
Horst Dressler-Andress was actually an actor trained at the prestigious 
Reinhardt school at the Deutsches Theatre in Berlin and became Goebbels first 
appointee in July of 1933.  His interest in the impact of radio broadcasting as it 
related to the theatre led to his pamphlet Radio as a Propaganda Instrument for 
the Arts.  Goebbels became familiar with his work and Dressler-Andress became 
involved in formulating Nazi Radio policy.  Party officials saw him as a left-wing 
socialist.  He was dismissed in the spring of 1937 due to his narrow belief in 
radio’s ability to spread culture, disguised as Nazi ideology, to the masses.  It 
would have served Goebbels better had this “stage manager” regarded 
propaganda as much more of a vehicle for the Party (Bergmeier & Lotz, 1997, 
pp. 9-10). 
Kriegler. 
Hans Gottfried Kriegler joined the Party in 1926 and three years later, 
played a noticeable role in Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg’s Campaign for 
German Culture.  Kriegler also spent a brief stint as a Storm Troop leader, which 
likely helped secure his appointment as director of the regional radio station at 
Breslau.  His “serf-like diligence” and Party connections may have been factors in 
his promotion to the leadership role of the Radio Division of the Propaganda 
Ministry.  Kriegler was credited with a strong increase in listenership during his 
tenure; however, he was a much better follower than leader and subsequently 
held the post until shortly before the invasion of Poland in September of 1939 (p. 
11).  
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Berndt. 
Goebbels next choice, Alfred-Ingemar Berndt became his close colleague.  
Berndt had the pedigree that the Minister of Propaganda had been searching for, 
coming over from the leadership of the Ministry’s Press Division.  Trained as a 
journalist, Party members were amazed at his talent for “slyness and cunning, 
fabrications and lies.”  Berndt’s reputation was such that it eventually surfaced 
years later at the Nuremberg trials.  His work included a plan for occultist 
propaganda, which Goebbels thought the English and Americans would fall for 
rather easily (Goebbels, 1948, p. 220).  After only a few months, he surprisingly 
announced that he had completed his task and had placed “the German 
broadcasting system on a wartime footing.”  With this, he declared his intention to 
enter active combat since he believed the experience was essential to the role of 
the propagandist.  A few months later, Berndt returned to his Broadcasting post 
and approximately one year later was promoted to the highly regarded leadership 
role of the entire Propaganda Division.  Goebbels was forced to dismiss Berndt, 
honorably, near the end of 1944 when he was found shooting at downed Allied 
pilots on the open road.  Weeks later, Berndt was killed in action while serving 
with an SS unit (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 12-13). 
Diewerge. 
In Berndt’s absence from the Broadcasting Division, Wolfgang Diewerge 
was left with much of the routine work and assumed the leadership after his 
superior’s promotion.  He joined the Party in 1930 after completing a law degree.  
Diewerge became a fanatical Nazi and anti-Semite “expert” (p. 13).  He worked 
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his way through the ranks of the Propaganda Ministry from its very beginning.  
Unfortunately, for Diewerge, he became a victim of a massive reorganization that 
further centralized power.  This move was headed by another intimate of 
Goebbels, Hans Hinkel who became one of the most feared operators in the 
Propaganda Ministry and its highest-ranking SS-officer (p. 13). 
When morale was at an all-time low in the fall of 1942 as the country 
prepared for the second winter of the Russian campaign, Goebbels alluded to the 
“inadequacies of German propaganda methods” and Diewerge paid the price.  
He was transferred for special assignments by the Minister’s office (pp. 15-16). 
Fritzsche. 
Hans Fritzsche would hold the position as head of the Broadcasting 
Division until the end of the war.  The former head of the Ministry’s German 
Press Division was trained as a journalist and did not share the Nazi fanaticism 
of his predecessors; however, he was a much better administrator and Party 
member since 1933 (p. 16).  Fritzsche was also very good behind the 
microphone and found himself on the air almost daily prior to and during the early 
part of the war.  It is tempting to compare the audience perception of Fritzsche to 
the Allies’ Edward R. Murrow, but under the circumstances of Party domination, 
Fritzsche’s tainted objectivity would prevent such association.  In fact, he towed 
the Party line to a degree that earned him the nickname “His Master’s Voice” (p. 
16). 
 This is not to say that many Germans found his style less than appealing.  
Instead of provoking the people, he used a reassuring, intelligent tone in his 
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“analysis” of situations.  The propaganda unit of the Sixth Army welcomed him for 
a short time prior to Stalingrad, but Goebbels knew he needed Fritzsche in 
Berlin.  Upon his return, he was named “Reich Commissioner for the Total War 
Effort,” and Goebbels informed him that he wished to be involved only in key 
issues pertaining to the Broadcast Division, in other words, Fritzsche assumed 
considerable power right up to the war’s conclusion (p. 17).  Ironically, as the war 
was winding down, Fritzsche was on the rise as a star Nazi.  On April 21, 1945, 
he delivered his last broadcast and was shortly thereafter taken prisoner by the 
Russians (p. 17).  At the Nuremberg trials, he was the highest-ranking surviving 
member of the German propaganda organization.  His carefully conceived and 
rehearsed defense centered upon being misled by Hitler and Goebbels 
concerning their war policy.  Despite protests from the outvoted Soviet judges, he 
was acquitted of all war crimes and released in October of 1946 (p. 18).  
However, Fritzsche would subsequently be forced to face his own country’s 
prosecution.  A German de-nazification court ignored his rhetoric and pleas of 
innocence, sentencing him to ten years hard labor and the loss of his pension (p. 
18).   
Speech Writers 
 It was the Reich Propaganda Minister’s ambition to become a respected 
writer.  Goebbels studied history, philology, and the history of art and literature.  
Eight noteworthy German institutions of higher learning welcomed him as a 
young student; Bonn, Freidberg, Wuerzburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Berlin 
and Heidelberg where he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1921.  He immediately wrote 
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a novel, Michael, and two plays, Blutsaat or Blood Seed and Der Wanderer or 
The Wanderer which were all coolly received by producers and publishers 
(Goebbels, 1948, pp. 4-5).  However, it was a stroke of luck for the Nazis that 
Goebbels was merely misdirected in his choice of genre.  His skill in propaganda 
writing provides an excellent example of Crable’s seventh element of rhetoric as 
organization, script writers. 
 Goebbels was a master showman who understood techniques for 
manipulating audiences.  In February of 1943, he gave one of his most 
memorable speeches at the Sportpalast in Berlin.  It was also broadcast 
nationwide to the German people (Riess, 1948, p. 249).  The subject was a call 
to the concept of “total war” as a response to the German military disaster at the 
hands of the Soviets at Stalingrad, a major turning point in the war.  
 On this occasion, Goebbels worked on the speech for a few days.  He 
wrote it out in longhand instead of the customary dictation method employed for 
such purposes.  Then threw most of the speech away and revised it until four in 
the morning on the day it was to be delivered.  As his secretaries typed the 
speech page by page, he was beaming with confidence.  He practiced before a 
mirror in his silk lounging robe making mental notes where to pause or add 
emphasis.  Hans Fritzsche was working in the room next door and watched 
Goebbels read a line or two and then comment, “Here they will go wild with 
enthusiasm” (p. 249). 
 He then went back to the mirror, outstretched his arm and gesticulated 
with his hands.  Fritzsche heard him laugh, whisper a few lines, and then scream 
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out the next.  The bizarre rehearsal continued until his colleague asked Goebbels 
what would happen if the audience did not respond as anticipated: 
Goebbels was dumbfounded.  “You forget that by that time I will 
have spoken for almost an hour.  From there on I can make them 
climb trees if I feel like it,” he replied.  Fritzsche was silent.  He also 
knew that Goebbels would have a few hundred men stationed as a 
claque, as was done during all of his speeches.  (p. 249) 
The Minister’s work paid off when the speech was immediately rated a 
tremendous success, stirring the somewhat fabricated audience.  The extreme 
manipulation he sought and his loathing for the masses are underscored in his 
ungrateful comments that followed one of the most auspicious events of his 
career: 
On the shoulders of the frenzied people, Goebbels was carried 
triumphantly off the platform.  Madga [wife] and half a dozen of his 
closest associates were waiting for him.  He was so hoarse that he 
could only whisper: “What unprecedented, nightmarish lunacy!  If I 
had commanded them, ‘Go jump out of the window of your 
apartment,’ they would have done it” (p. 252)! 
 Using his talent as a speechwriter, Goebbels became the puppeteer and 
millions of German people in the listening audience responded or were satisfied 
with what they heard.  However, one must understand that there were many 
other tools in the propaganda arsenal that were well suited to the new medium of 
radio.  The collective identity of the nation’s population, “Germany” would have 
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the ability to become one with the Party via the carefully produced celebrations of 
the mass meeting. 
 
The “Set” or “Forum” 
 At the height of Germany’s military victories in 1941, Goebbels related to 
officials of the Propaganda Ministry that he was quite proud the “style and 
technique” of the orchestrated public ceremonials, where massive 
demonstrations were linked to the myth and ritual of the Party occasion.  He used 
these ceremonies for years to build up the people’s faith and confidence in Hitler, 
who was unquestionably the most essential legitimizing force within the Nazi 
political system (Welch, 2002, p. 111).  In this context, we apply Crable’s eighth 
element of rhetoric as organization, the set or forum from where the message is 
to be understood. 
 The Nazi torchlight parades, bands, uniforms, insignia, flags, and other 
theatrical elements were all intended to compliment the impact of Hitler’s strong 
words with strong deeds.  Such was the rationale with the weekly movie 
newsreel Deutsche Wochenschauen and most notably the documentary 
commissioned by Hitler, Triumph des Willens, or Triumph of the Will, released to 
the world in 1935.  Filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl used a great deal of footage from 
the Nuremberg Reichsparteitag of 1934.  Hitler was portrayed as a “statesman of 
genius” who re-built the nation from the disastrous consequences of World War I 
and defended homeland territorial claims from foreign intervention (pp. 114-115). 
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 These rallies were not enough for the Nazis who understood the 
importance of national unity; therefore; it was on these occasions that Hitler’s 
speeches were broadcast throughout Germany inviting vicarious involvement.  
Life came to a standstill as individuals melded into a national community that was 
mesmerized by Hitler’s message and rhetorical skill.  This audience 
transformation was described by Goebbels as moving “from a little worm into part 
of a large dragon” (p. 115). 
 The mass meeting was also became an essential element in Hitler’s 
speeches due to “a flood of complaints” received after he had tried his hand at 
broadcasting from a typical radio studio.  The perception was that of an 
ineffective speaker vocalizing too quickly with slurred elocution.  Unlike his 
adversary, Franklin D. Roosevelt who mastered the calming, interpersonal 
technique of the “fireside chat,” Hitler was uncomfortable in this type of 
environment since no immediate audience was present to provide a stimulus.  
Also missing was a background or “acoustic backcloth” to strengthen the 
message such as cheers, applause, and the rhythmic chants of the iconic “Sieg 
Heil!”  In fact, from 1933 when he announced Germany’s departure from the 
League of Nations, until the summer of 1944  when he addressed the country 
following an assassination attempt, no further studio broadcasts were made by 
the Führer (Zeman, p. 51). 
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Media Delivery System 
 As the political nature of Nazi radio broadcasting was taking shape, 
Goebbels saw to it that everyone had the realistic opportunity to receive the 
message by means of some sort of media delivery system, Crable’s ninth 
element in the model of rhetoric as organization.  This was accomplished in 1933 
through the mass-production of the “People’s Set” or the Volksempfänger. 
 These sets were minor propaganda items themselves since the prototype 
model commemorated the date earlier that same year when Hitler came to 
power, the VE 301, or Volksempfänger 30. Januar (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 8).  
They were also one of the cheapest wireless sets produced in Europe, selling for 
75 marks, with an improved version available for 65 marks in 1936.  By 1938 a 
cheaper model, the DKE 38 or German Mini Receiver, Deutscher 
Kleinempfänger, was also mass-produced for the price of 35 marks and was 
made available with the option of installment payments (Bramsted, 1965, p. 74).    
 These sets were capable of receiving the nearest regional station 
Reichssender by means of medium wave and the national station 
Deutschlandsender on long wave.  Of course, the provision of short wave 
reception was not provided due to the inherent temptation of tuning into a foreign 
broadcast grounded outside the lines of Nazi ideology (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 8). 
 The Propaganda Ministry issued an advertising poster for the 
Volksempfänger that depicted one of the sets surrounded by thousands of 
people with a caption that read: “All Germany listens to the Führer with the 
People’s Radio.”  By the beginning of the war 70% of all German households, the 
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highest percentage in the world, had a wireless set of some sort (Welch, 1983, p. 
42).  By 1941, the 15 million receivers in use reached approximately 50 million 
listeners (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 9).  As the war progressed, those who had grown 
weary of hearing the same worn out Party line and were able to afford a better 
quality set, had the advantage of the short wave feature. 
 Radios were not only useful for the crucial dissemination of Nazi ideology; 
they were also sought after as a high profile personal possession for the 
household or office.  The Minister of Propaganda knew this and exploited this 
need with his own rhetorical act:  
Goebbels used his ministerial position to gain popularity among 
those who served in the mass media and fine arts.  He created the 
Dr. Goebbels Radio Donation, the purpose of which was to give 
free radios to those in need.  From 1933 to 1942 he collected many 
thousands of radios from men involved in the broadcasting industry.  
During the war Goebbels gave the radios-an item in short supply-to 
wounded soldiers and to the survivors of men fallen at the front.  
On one day in 1942 Goebbels donated five thousand radios in this 
manner.  (Herzstein, 1987, p. 132) 
 
Message Intermediaries 
In a totalitarian society, there is little room or patience for voices of dissent 
in the form of opinion leaders.  Zeman points to the fact that during the six years 
of peace prior to the war that the Nazis allowed themselves, they interfered with 
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public and private life to an extent unknown in the history of Germany (p. 52).  
The ideology of the Nazis was, of course, completely dominant.  As an extreme 
example, through a complicated intermingling of messages and interpretations, 
Nazi ideology was even upheld to a large extent by The Concordant of July 20, 
1933 with the Vatican and Pope Pius XI (for the entire text see Stackelberg & 
Winkle, 156-161).  Theoretically, Hitler was assured the support of millions of 
German Catholics, in return for the state’s respect for the Church’s 
independence, especially in matters of education. 
However, there were elements of the Party situated squarely between the 
radio listeners and the broadcasting apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry.  The 
Propaganda Department of the National Socialist Party exercised control over 
local-level Party officials known as “radio wardens,” who now serve as Crable’s 
tenth element in his model of rhetoric as organization, message intermediaries. 
Nazi radio wardens were charged with reporting on technical aspects of 
broadcast reception, public reaction to broadcasts, and the uncovering and 
subsequent reporting of groups or individuals referred to as “black-listeners.”  
Identified as those who had mistakenly strayed from the Nazi monopoly of 
information by listening to short-wave foreign broadcasts, these subversives 
were charged with serious crimes punishable by heavy sentences (Boelcke, 
1970, p. 108).  Goebbels compared “black-listening” to a soldier administering 
self-mutilation to avoid combat.  The radio wardens were also well aware that 
citizens of the Reich knew that no such ban on foreign listening existed in Great 
Britain during the war (Zeman, pp. 176-177).  Remarkably, to the German “black-
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listener” or Schwarzhörer, the English actually admitted their shortcomings as 
well as their moments of victory.  These types of news disclosures acted as 
seeds of credibility for foreign broadcasts as the tide of war slowly turned against 
Germany after Stalingrad, making the Nazi propagandist’s job increasingly 
difficult.  The people were hungry for war news, which was hard to find on 
homeland radio during periods of military reversals.  Enemy broadcasters in 
Russia exploited this fact by periodically airing the names of those German 
soldiers being held captive with the intent of reaching hopeful loved ones, further 
compounding the appeal of “black-listening” being dealt with by the radio 
wardens (p. 178). 
These wardens also were involved in organizing collective listening, highly 
sought after since subordination of the individual’s will to the assembled 
community kept the group members from thinking for themselves, especially on 
solemn occasions.  Thinking was not necessary; action was the goal.  As Ellul 
(1965) points out, action is the means in which propaganda’s effect becomes 
irreversible; once obeyed there is no going back.  It is this past action that 
necessitates belief by acting as justification and authority for subsequent action.  
Without these elements, the leap to action would seem unjust, absurd, and 
intolerable (p. 29).  Therefore, the assemblies of groups or an innocuous activity 
such as the physical positioning of loudspeakers to facilitate community listening 
were by no means minor activities in the minds of the Nazi hierarchy.  Generally, 
radio wardens would see to it that every citizen had the means to be reached, for 
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whatever purpose, by his leaders in the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda 
Ministry. 
Spokespersons or Representatives 
 Crable’s next element in the model of rhetoric as organization is the use of 
spokespersons in the “Hollywood sense” to make appearances and gather 
support.  Obviously, an “appearance” on radio was comparable to the familiarity 
an audience had with the unseen voice of the commentator.  Goebbels, thee 
master spokesperson, polished his technique.  There were a few other elites 
among the ranks of Nazi announcers whose talks were regarded highly enough 
to be re-broadcast in support of international short wave propaganda efforts (Kris 
& Speier, 77). 
 As noted, Hans Fritzsche was the most significant German broadcaster 
during the war, speaking perhaps a thousand times to the German people.  His 
appealing ridicule of the Allies was punctuated with a wit, and sarcasm, which 
endeared him to millions of listeners.  After Stalingrad, Fritzsche took on a more 
polemical style, peppered with a “know-it-all cynicism” that was less popular with 
audiences than his prior rhetorical technique utilized in earlier wartime 
broadcasts (Herzstein, p. 183). 
 Other notable commentators included those who used the broadcast 
medium to speak on military topics to the citizens of the Reich.  The three 
branches of the German armed forces: the Luftwaffe (Air Force), the Wehrmacht 
(Army), and the Kriegsmarine (Navy) all had one regular day of representation 
per week. 
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 General of the Air Force Quade had a regular series known as “Our Air 
Force” emphasizing the traditions of the Luftwaffe going back to the First World 
War.  He avoided political topics, although he was inclined to praise the Nazis for 
their support in the dramatic build-up of the Luftwaffe he commanded.  Air 
Marshall Quade was attributed with popularizing the dive bombing Stuka aircraft 
among the German youth with his vivid descriptions of air operations in the 
French campaign of 1940 (Kris & Speier, p. 75). 
 Rear Admiral Friedrich Luetzow, a staff officer at U-boat command in 
World War I, represented the Kriegsmarine.  His aim was to teach the listeners to 
think in terms of world strategy from the naval standpoint.  Dwelling on strategy 
instead of tactics, Luetzow used geopolitical commonplaces to ground his 
worldwide historical perspectives.  A German colonial empire was seen through 
his eyes as a need and a right.  His assimilation into the Nazi culture was rooted 
in loyal collaboration as one whose beloved Navy was restored, as opposed to 
Party affiliation in the role of a fanatical anti-Semite (p. 75). 
 The Propaganda Ministry’s chief spokesperson for the Wehrmacht was 
Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar.  His talks, or lectures as he preferred to call 
them, were to military explanation as Goebbels talks were to political explanation.  
Eschewing politics, General Dittmar looked at the progress and development of 
the war with the remarkable detachment of a military student and the expertise of 
a professional strategist.  As a means of inspiring listener confidence in his 
ethos, Dittmar’s rhetoric called for a refrain from verbally abusing the enemy.  
This aspect of addressing his listeners was apparently important to the General, 
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who more than any other celebrity on the air at the time, cautioned the people not 
to underrate him (p. 76). 
Perceptions and Evidence of Impact 
 The manipulative underpinnings of the radio organization in the Third 
Reich necessarily meant a method of evaluation was needed to measure 
effectiveness.  Divergent opinions have been the result of scholarly debates on 
the merits of Nazi radio propaganda.  It is not my intent to choose a side in this 
argument.  Instead, I believe an assessment of the origins of information 
gathering becomes necessary in applying Crable’s twelfth and final element in 
the model of rhetoric as organization, perceptions and evidence of impact. 
 In totalitarian societies, the absence of free expression and threats of 
retribution upon the citizenry makes the measurement of propaganda efficiency 
inherently problematic and becomes furthered complicated when studying the 
Nazi regime.  There were two sources from which reports emanated and both 
reporting bureaus were drowning in ulterior motives.  
 The first source we shall examine is that of the Party officials, both 
regional and local, who rarely overcame the public’s reluctance at expressing 
their doubts and criticisms of the Nazis themselves: 
The party operated in the open.  Its members and officials were 
known or recognizable (by the obligatory badges or uniforms), and 
the views expressed to them or in their presence were rarely of a 
kind likely to place in doubt the fundamental national socialist 
loyalty of the person expressing them.  (Unger, 1965, p. 571)  
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 The average, non-Nazi German citizen was well aware of what had 
happened to those individuals whose staunch belief in their right to freedom of 
speech, i.e., criticism of Nazi policies, had led to disastrous consequences for 
themselves and their families.  Therefore, the flavor of these Party reports was 
generally based on remarks from a complimentary, or at the very least, compliant 
public.  Another ingredient that prompted regular positive feedback to Goebbels 
from Party officials was the knowledge that these reports were also providing 
evidence of their own effectiveness within their region or district.  Ironically, the 
level of propaganda success that one reported was directly correlated to one’s 
own success in discharging a fundamental duty (p. 573).  However, the ultimate 
pressure came from the Führer himself, “Let no one come and report to me that 
morale in his region, his district, his group or his cell could ever be bad.  You are 
the bearers, the responsible bearers of morale” (pp. 573-574). 
 From these observations, we can deduce that friction was rarely noted.  
When Party officials did report criticisms, they were generally of a subject matter 
whereby no personal responsibilities or connections were readily perceptible.  
For instance, one district leader bemoaned the repeated broadcasts of jazz 
music because they “let in through the back door a kind of culture or ‘art’ which 
had been ‘officially’ dismissed and branded as Americanism” (p. 569).  Another 
report from the summer prior to the invasion of Poland found that an increasing 
number of people from low-income groups were purchasing higher quality radio 
sets.  This district leader attributed these actions “to the desire to listen to foreign 
stations” (p. 570).  Unger makes the convincing argument that the Party’s 
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situation reports on public reaction to propaganda were “utterly” consistent in 
times of victory or defeat (p. 571). 
 On the other hand, reports filed by the Sicherheitsdienst or the SD, the 
security service of the SS charged with the collection of internal intelligence, 
were much more plausible since this reporting agency had no stake in concealing 
popular discontent, but quite the contrary was true.  The effectiveness of the SD 
could be measured by the number of “hostile acts” or “subversive statements” 
they were able to uncover.  Consequently, “the power and prestige of the security 
services as a whole depended to a large degree on how indispensable they 
could make themselves to the regime” (p. 578).  Public opinion reports played 
right into the hands of the SD and contained information that was diametrically 
opposed to that of the Party officials. 
 In January 1943, the SD reported of “the general prejudice against all 
propaganda” and linked it to an “overbearing and boastful character.”  Later that 
summer, SD reports contained passages such as “the people feel tired and often 
nauseated by the overplayed instrument of the anti-Jewish campaign and other 
elaborate political essays” (p. 579).  In March of 1943, an SD report on listener 
reactions to a broadcast speech by German Labor Front leader Robert Ley 
caught the attention of Nazi Gestapo chief Heinrich Himmler and prompted a 
subsequent report to the attention of Hitler’s secretary and director of the Party 
Chancellory, Martin Bormann.  The SD report quoted these illustrative listener 
responses: 
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“As it was audible that he found speaking difficult, one could not 
resist the suspicion that he was drunk or tipsy.”  “Once again, he 
has spoiled our lunch hour.”  “When there is nothing else to say, 
one can always abuse the Jews.”  “I am often overcome by quiet 
fear of how matters are to go on if such people continue to remain 
in leading positions.”  (p. 572) 
 Since honesty in reporting was insisted upon by the Nazi elite, it is difficult, 
as Unger suggests, determining which reporting source was deemed most 
reliable to The Reich.  Circulation of reports to various Propaganda officials was 
curtailed as the war progressed.  It is safe to say that Goebbels’ ego would not 
acknowledge such criticism of his propaganda as reported by the SD.  As his 
diary entry of April 17, 1943 suggests such criticism was refuted in order to suit 
his own reality: 
The SD report is full of mischief.  Its recent issues displease me 
deeply.  It is entirely unpolitical and is sent to the various offices 
unsifted.  That involves a certain danger, for most readers of these 
SD reports haven’t the faculty of political discernment to distinguish 
between side issues and main issues.  Above all these reports 
contain too many details.  (Goebbels, 1948, p. 333)  
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Chapter 2-The Agency of Radio: 
A New Instrument for Propaganda Programming 
Radio’s Political Impact 
 Ellul has stated that an appeal to the emotions at the expense of reason 
can be facilitated by any means of human communication.  However, opinion 
cannot form itself in entire societies without the existence of a mass media for 
communication.  Without it, there can be no modern propaganda (p. 102).  Printed 
material was utilized in this manner for centuries.  However, technological 
advances in radio and the influence wielded by the National Socialists in Germany, 
intersected, and created a unique historical moment for political propaganda.  
 As a unique, story-telling species, we have the ability to define ourselves in 
the types of narratives we compose.  The process involves the accumulation of 
external stimuli mingling with our internal expectations, in varying degrees, in order 
to satisfactorily complete the narrative to our liking (Levinson, 1997, p. 86).  The 
voice of the storyteller, personally unknown, is welcomed into the privacy of the 
home as a pseudo-family member through the agency of radio.  These narratives 
created by personally unknown others take the form of news, entertainment, or 
political address. 
 National Socialism of course preached the doctrine of Aryan supremacy, 
yet the blond hair, blue-eyed stereotypical personage that they envisioned did not 
match the physical description of Hitler himself.  Therefore, mass rallies with 
thousands of people in attendance were effective since the large crowds 
prohibited a close-up view of the speaker unlike today’s technology with massive 
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wide-screen visual accompaniment.  Film could be skillfully edited and produced 
as evidenced by Leni Riefenstahl’s calculated documentary, Triumph of the Will.  
Her camera angles and various other cinematic techniques created the 
propaganda masterpiece the Führer had required.  According to McLuhan, the 
medium best suited for Hitler’s “explosive polemic” was the radio.  In addition, had 
it been available, he would have been too “hot” for any close-up shots employed 
by television (Levinson, pp. 261-262).  
 Hitler’s affinity for the spoken word, easily facilitated by this new medium of 
radio, is clearly expressed in Mein Kampf: 
For let it be said to all knights of the pen and to all the political 
dandies, especially of today: the greatest changes in this world have 
never yet been brought about by a goose-quill!  No, the pen has 
always been reserved to motivate these changes theoretically.  But 
the power which set the greatest historical avalanches of political 
and religious nature sliding was, from the beginning of time, the 
magic force of the spoken word alone.  The great masses of a nation 
will always and only succumb to the force of the spoken word (p. 
136). 
He then goes on to explain, in terms similar to the Socratic critique of writing in the 
Phaedrus, that the orator has the ability to visualize reaction and adjust his 
message or delivery based on the reactions of the immediate audience.  Whereas 
the writer does not have the same luxury with his unseen audience of readers 
(Levinson, p. 88).  Of course, we must consider the fact that speakers on the radio 
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also have no such visual audience.  Therefore, how could Hitler trust the agency of 
radio and still place so much value on the faces of feedback in his public 
speeches?  
Levinson points to a Hitler biographer, Joachim Fest, who sees two different 
Hitlers.  One as the young man formulating radical political ideas in Landesberg on 
the Lech Prison of the Fortress where Mein Kampf originated in 1924, and the 
other after assuming power in 1933: 
…no conversation was possible in his presence…either Hitler talked 
and all others listened, or all the others talked, and Hitler sat lost in 
thought.  His mind had hardened into theses he neither expanded 
nor modified, but merely gave a sharper cutting edge (p. 522). 
Since his views were “well beyond correction,” radio and its one-way 
communication channel provided the agency that suited Hitler’s needs.  He 
appreciated the visceral appeal of his words and the “instant community” that radio 
afforded him when it was deemed necessary by a situation.  Such was the case in 
July of 1944 after being slightly wounded in a bomb blast assassination attempt.  
Goebbels quickly arranged for a radio address to the nation by the Führer that 
same evening.  The impact was twofold; the threat of political insurgency was 
extinguished and, in Levinson’s opinion, the speech actually perpetuated the war 
(p. 88). 
 An assessment of radio’s impact during this volatile phase of world history 
is unquestionably dramatic.  In Germany, citizens tuned into carefully calculated 
messages from strangers belonging to a new political party calling themselves 
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National Socialists.  The skill at which Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry 
crafted these messages gave the people hope and built up a sense of commitment 
to nationalism that had been all but destroyed by the Treaty of Versailles.  
Gauging these messages as ethically right or wrong, according to Levinson, 
mattered little at the time: 
Because the sound and impact of the human voice in such close 
personal radio quarters cut through and around detached rational 
analysis, exciting emotional levels of bonding, which, like all appeals 
to our adrenaline, have little to do with reason (p. 89). 
It is important to stress the novelty of this means of communication in the historical 
moment.  Ordinary, home radio reception in other countries of the world was 
enchanting; the National Socialists initially made it irresistible.  
 
German Origins of Propaganda’s Significance 
 The implementation of propaganda as a means of influencing action was 
critical to the Party and the accomplice to expedite the dissemination of their views 
was the new medium of radio.  In order to trace the evolution of propaganda’s 
prominence on the list of Nazi weapons, we must return to the first war, when the 
Germans fell victim to the effectiveness of Allied propaganda at home and at the 
front.   
The lack of interest in implementing this type of modern warfare against the 
Allies in World War I is grounded in the dishonorable association with “poisoning 
enemy minds.”  As late as 1917, the Imperial German Armed Forces under the 
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command of Field Marshall von Hindenburg considered propaganda methods as 
unsoldierly and disgusting (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1).  Fighting was to be done with 
physical weaponry and not with psychological fraud and deception.  Frustrated by 
the armed forces and the War Ministry’s blasphemous perception of the mere 
mention of any type of propaganda implementation, “the military brain behind the 
German war effort,” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1), General Erich von Ludendorff, was 
forced to wait.  To his displeasure, just two months before the war ended in August 
of 1918, a German airplane dropped the first overtly propagandistic leaflet over 
Allied troop positions.  By October that number had risen to 876,169 leaflets, a 
mere drop in the bucket compared to the British, French, and American combined 
total throughout the war of a staggering 65,595 million (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1).  
 Ludendorff, a future Nazi and Hitler associate, credited the successful 
achievements of Allied propaganda after the war, “We were hypnotized by the 
enemy propaganda as a rabbit by a snake.  It was exceptionally clever and on a 
great scale.  It worked by mass suggestion, kept in the closest touch with the 
military situation and was unscrupulous as to the means it used” (Bramsted, 1965, 
pp. xxii-xxiii).  
 German propaganda would further be influenced by a seemingly innocent 
exchange between Ludendorff and a British general in the preliminary negotiations 
prior to the World War I armistice that would “haunt German politics for the next 
thirty years” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2).  General Sir Neill Malcolm, eavesdropping 
on a conversation in which Ludendorff expressed a highly critical attitude towards 
certain German politicians and civilians, was heard to remark, “You mean that you 
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were stabbed in the back?” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2)  Ludendorff sensed the 
propaganda potential in this statement and together with Hindenburg perpetuated 
that assertion in German military circles.  Approximately one year later, in their 
testimony before a parliamentary committee seeking the causes of Germany’s 
military capitulation, Ludendorff and Hindenburg swore, “as a British general has 
said, the German army was stabbed in the back” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2). 
 This feeling permeated the ranks of post-war German nationalists who felt 
the collapse of the nation was due, in large part, to the neglect and ultimate failure 
of their own propaganda coupled with the Allied success at subverting the German 
war effort.  This remarkable Allied propaganda achievement was attributable to a 
combined use of the mass media for the first time in history as political affairs were 
manipulated using publicity and advertising methods (Ellul, p. 233). 
Herzstein believes that Allied propaganda had mastery over the German 
soldier to a much greater degree than it did over the German home front.  
Nonetheless, defeat could be leveled at a scapegoat for all to implicate:   
This belief, so dear to the German right, was closely related to the 
“stab in the back” legend, according to which Germany had not lost 
the war in 1918, but had collapsed because of subversion, both 
domestic and foreign. (p. 73) 
Militarily, the German army was by no means in a precarious position when the 
war ended.  It was still maneuverable and capable of fighting.  This led to the 
nationalistic theory that the struggle started in the first war was only interrupted 
and was subsequently picked up again in the second war. 
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Many German writers at the time lost objectivity and failed to recognize the 
“home front” situation in their praise of the successful Allied propaganda campaign 
against their citizens.  The war weariness of the nation and the divisions within 
German society combined to create a serious vulnerability to the carefully 
constructed messages originating from France, Britain, and America (p. 73).  The 
influential power of the written word and the equally powerful narratives of film, 
were thoroughly underestimated by the Germans in the First World War to the 
extent that the National Socialists vowed it would never happen again.  
 Hitler’s belief in the significance of propaganda can be traced to his own 
war experiences and to his earliest days in the Party.  Mein Kampf discusses the 
subject: 
After my joining the German Worker’s Party, I immediately took over 
the management of the propaganda.  I considered this section by far 
the most important.  For the first it was less important to rack one’s 
brain about questions of organization than to impart the idea itself to 
a greater number of people (p. 846). 
These views were most likely beginning to take shape while fighting in the 
trenches with his Bavarian regiment in World War I.  Hitler expressed his thoughts 
on the more direct subject of “war propaganda” which, as noted, was visibly 
absent at the time from Germany’s war arsenal.  Once again, from Mein Kampf, 
we discover a deep-seeded respect for not only propaganda expertise, but for that, 
which was instigated against the Germans by the combined Allied powers: 
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For what we failed to do in this direction was made up by the enemy 
with really unheard-of skill and ingenious deliberation.  I learned 
infinitely much more from the enemy’s war propaganda.  But time 
marched on without leaving an impression on the brains of those 
who most of all should have taken this as a lesson; partly because 
they deemed themselves too clever to take lessons from others, and 
partly because the honest will to do so was lacking.  Was there any 
propaganda at all on our side?  To my regret, I can only answer no.  
(p. 228) 
Of course in Goebbels, Hitler found a mastermind in the field whose 
influences reached well beyond what the future Ph.D. had witnessed during the 
war as a university student.  Among Goebbels’ personal list of the most notable 
propagandists in history were; Christ, Buddha, Zarathustra, Robespierre, Danton, 
Mussolini and Lenin (Bramstead, p. 29).  Politics aside, Goebbels objectively 
admired the oratory and organizational merits of both Fascism and Bolshevism.  
While publicly denouncing the political aspects of Marxist parties and their leaders, 
Goebbels privately praised the skill and crude language of the agitators who wrote 
for the Communist and Socialist newspapers that were rampant in Berlin during 
the Nazi’s formative years (Bramstead, p. 29).  It was Goebbels’ belief that the 
masses eagerly read these publications because the “brutal and crude ideas” 
expressed therein were easily understood by the average person.  To this end, the 
National Socialists would model their propaganda on the negative criticism 
paradigm utilized by the Marxists for sixty years (Bramsted, p. 29).  Following 
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Hitler’s lead, Dr. Goebbels found that, he too, was not above learning invaluable 
lessons from the enemy, as the means to an end which would eventually serve the 
Party’s cause. 
The Public Endorsement of Radio 
Shortly after Dunkirk, June of 1940, Goebbels became outraged at the 
published magazine picture of a radio technician with a record album of the 
“Special Announcement” theme music.  This blatantly points at the Propaganda 
Minister’s obsession with obliterating the public’s ability to engage in rational 
thought.  Goebbels wanted the German people to “surrender themselves to the 
spell of the medium and be carried away by the elation of the moment without the 
disillusioning intrusion of reality” (Gombrich, 1970, p. 3).  Radio was the perfect 
agency for this method.  Walter Lippmann said that the only feeling a person can 
obtain about an event in which they do not participate is the feeling aroused by 
their mental image of the event (Lippmann, 1922, p. 9). 
The importance of the spoken word and the utilization of mass meetings 
were hallmarks of Nazi theory and practice in the field of propaganda.  Therefore, 
an orator-audience relationship is a conceivable model applicable to many 
National Socialist propaganda principles.  In transferring the orator situation to the 
press, Goebbels hoped that his readers would get the impression that the writer 
was actually a speaker attempting to sway the reader’s opinion (Lazarsfeld & 
Stanton, 1979, p. 248). 
In the case of radio, the mass meeting component could be applied 
nationwide with only minor alterations.  On August 18, 1933, Goebbels spoke in 
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glowing terms of the revolutionary aspect of radio.  Here is a small part of his 
speech that was given at the opening of the Tenth German Radio Exhibition: 
Napoleon spoke of the “press as the seventh great power.” Its 
significance became politically visible with the beginning of the 
French Revolution, and maintained its position for the entirety of the 
19th Century.  The century’s politics were largely determined by the 
press.  One can hardly imagine or explain the major historical events 
between 1800 and 1900 without considering the powerful influence 
of journalism.  The radio will be for the Twentieth Century what the 
press was for the Nineteenth.  [italics added]  With the appropriate 
change, one can apply Napoleon’s phrase to our age, speaking of 
the radio as the eighth great power.  Its discovery and application are 
of truly revolutionary significance for contemporary community life.  
Future generations may conclude that the radio had as great an 
intellectual and spiritual impact on the masses as the printing press 
had before the beginning of the Reformation.  (Goebbels, 1933) 
Goebbels was actually setting up a rhetorical situation for the unsuspecting public 
through his glorification of radio’s varying potentialities.  By making this technology 
desirable as an extraordinary new cultural device as well as affordable to the 
German populace through a nationally sponsored mass-production effort, he 
actually envisioned radio as a richly rewarding resource to be used in furthering 
Nazi ideology, maintaining social order, and monopolizing information and news. 
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Bitzer’s Rhetorical Situation 
 Until the late sixties, little attention was given to the rhetorical situation as 
an important subject.  Theoretical emphases were traditionally focused on 
process, creation, and presentation of discourse.  Other topics given weight within 
this jurisdiction of the discipline included the nature of rhetorical discourse and the 
interactions between speaker, audience, subject, and occasion.  Orator method 
and judgements of the discourse itself seemed to be of principal interest to 
rhetorical scholars. 
In launching the new journal, Philosophy and Rhetoric in 1968, Lloyd F. 
Bitzer’s essay “The Rhetorical Situation” shed light on the “working assumptions” 
of rhetorical critics throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Lucaites, 
Condit, & Caudill, 213).  His thought is grounded in a philosophical and 
epistemological commitment to realism. 
Bitzer explained that human relations occur in the context of rhetorical 
situations where exigencies invite discursive responses.  These exigencies may 
take the form of social, political, economic, and ethical concerns.  Consequently, 
rhetoric occurs when a speaker responds to the perception of a pressing need by 
addressing an audience where his or her persuasive method could conceivably 
lead to exigency correction.  The type or degree of urgency dictates the 
appropriate response (214).  With these elements in mind, here is Bitzer’s 
definition of rhetorical situation: 
…a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially 
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removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain 
human decision or action as to bring about the significant 
modification of the exigence.  (p. 220) 
He is quick to point out that oratory and utterance are applicable as discourse, yet 
the difference between elocution and primitive utterance is not a difference in 
function.  Both are also similarly situational whether it is a cave dweller’s 
communicative grunts to members of his hunting party or Quintilian addressing a 
public gathering of Roman citizens.  Bitzer sees the situation as having such a 
degree of control over discourse, that it should be considered as “the very center 
of rhetorical activity” (p. 220). 
 
Points to Consider for Situational Rhetoric 
 We will re-visit the following seven points and incorporate them into specific 
circumstances surrounding state-controlled radio broadcasts during the twelve 
years of Nazi supremacy: 
1. rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to 
situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence 
in response to a question; 
2. a speech is given rhetorical significance by the situation, just as a 
unit of discourse is given significance as answer or as solution by 
the question or problem; 
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3. a rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of 
rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a necessary 
condition of an answer; 
4. many questions go unanswered and many problems remain 
unsolved -- similarly, many rhetorical situations mature and decay 
without giving birth to rhetorical utterance; 
5. a situation is rhetorical insofar as it needs and invites discourse 
capable of participating with situation and thereby altering its 
reality; 
6. discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions (or seeks to function) 
as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it; 
7. the situation controls the rhetorical response in the same sense 
that the question controls the answer and the problem controls 
the solution.  Not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the 
situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity.  (p. 220) 
There are also three components of the rhetorical situation that Bitzer 
mentions preceding the creation and presentation of discourse; exigence, 
audience, and constraints.  Anything considered imperfect, defective, an obstacle, 
or waiting to be done is an exigence.  It is also marked by urgency and is not 
necessarily rhetorical if it cannot be modified by discourse.  Bitzer’s examples of 
non-rhetorical exigencies include death, winter, and natural disasters.  At least one 
exigence controlling the rhetorical situation is always present and acts as an 
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organizer by specifying the audience to be addressed and the change to be 
effected.  The strength or weakness of the exigency is variable. 
The second pre-existing constituent is the audience which rhetoric always 
requires even when engaging oneself as audience.  Rhetorical discourse must 
produce change through decisions and actions of people acting as mediators of 
change.  Membership in a rhetorical audience necessitates that you are capable of 
being influenced by discourse and of being a mediator of change. 
A set of constraints is present in every rhetorical situation and may be 
comprised of people, events, objects, and relations within the situation.  
Constraints prohibit decision and/or action necessary for modification of the 
exigence and may take the form of beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, 
images, interests, motives, etc.  As the speaker enters the situation, constraints 
must be dealt with effectively and the speaker must realize that his persona, style, 
and logical proofs act as additional constraints. 
In addition to exigence, audience, and constraints, Bitzer adds the orator 
and the speech.  These final two are contingent upon the speaker being invited by 
the situation, entering it, and presenting discourse (pp. 220-222). 
 
National Socialist Radio as the Rhetorical Situation 
In the winter of 1941, the German army was suffering from the bitter cold of 
the Russian winter.  Up to this time, all victories had occurred in warm weather 
months and the troops were not equipped nor trained for fighting in harsh, freezing 
climates.  There was not enough woolen clothing to protect the soldiers from 
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dangerous frostbite or worse.  Reports from the Leningrad front indicated the 
soldiers were unable to burn frozen firewood.  They were desperate for 
newspapers to burn, not to read.  One report contained this holiday highlight, “the 
main attraction of Christmas Eve was the arrival of a barrel of beer, frozen hard.  
Every man tried to melt his piece of beer in his mug” (Kris & Speier, p. 415). 
Goebbels began organizing a nationwide campaign to collect warm winter 
clothing to be sent to the frigid Eastern front.  From the end of December to the 
beginning of January, the publicity extended to this clothing drive superceded 
news about the fighting in Russia.  Hitler put his personal seal of approval on the 
campaign as only he could by issuing an order broadcast on December 23, 1941, 
“Whoever converts to his own use articles collected or destined for collection by a 
person entitled to do so, or whoever in any other way diverts such articles from 
their proper purpose will be punished by death” (pp. 415-416). 
Goebbels discourse came as a response to the Party’s feeling that an 
overall drop in home front morale might occur as a result of initiating something as 
drastic as a civilian clothing drive for the supposed government supplied troops in 
the field.  The following excerpt from Goebbels was broadcast on New Year’s Day, 
1942: 
When two weeks ago we appealed over the radio for the collection of 
winter equipment for the Front, the address was not yet ended when 
a stream of telephone calls began to pour in from all over the Reich 
which for hours blocked all the lines of the Ministry…The next 
day…we were interested to see that London was once again 
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expecting the German revolution, the first symptom of it being the 
collection of winter things for the Front.  We leave the English to it as 
they enjoy it so much.  Anyhow, they know as much about the 
German people as a cow about X-rays.  (Lazarsfeld & Stanton, p. 
253) 
Goebbels was employing a misdirection technique, which diverted the audience 
focus from the soldier’s dire situation and their need for warm clothing to the hated 
British propagandists and their BBC inspired false prophecies of an internal 
uprising against Hitler’s government. The situation bestowed rhetorical 
significance to Goebbels’ discourse as the story mushroomed through the skillful 
elaboration of Nazi radio star Hans Fritzsche.  On January 3, 1942, he gives a 
detailed account of the British radio reporting, “a procession of demonstrators had 
stormed the Anhalter Station in Berlin to prevent the transport of woolen comforts 
to the Eastern Front” (p. 254). 
 In the next few days, the campaign widened and took a new direction as 
foreign radio transmissions were reporting the existence of preventative measures 
to quell the uprising in Germany.  As Lazarsfeld & Stanton indicate, the origins of 
the story for the foreign press were rumors leaked by German agents in 
Stockholm.  This action combined with unwitting neutral correspondents 
propagating the stories, served the rhetorical function of “planting the news” to 
assist in the creation of the rhetorical situation. 
 Bitzer’s fourth point concerning the maturation and decay of missed 
rhetorical situations where rhetorical utterance was possible is valid, but hardly 
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befitting the “Wool Revolution” of 1942.  By actually planting the story in the 
foreign press, a strategy not germane to the Nazis alone, the rhetorical situation 
and accompanying rhetorical discourse invited by such situations, were planned 
and anticipated.  The seed was planted and grew into the opportunity to unfold as 
full-blown anti-British and anti-American radio propaganda. 
 Rhetorical situations, according to Bitzer, also need a type of discourse that 
is capable of working within the situation and altering its reality.  The popular 
Fritzsche loved to employ cynical exaggeration and had this to say on January 8: 
Just imagine, my dear listeners!  Just as I wanted to go to the 
microphone I was phoned and told that, according to Radio 
Schenectady in Spanish, machine guns have been put in position to 
prevent a coup d’état against the Hitler government-so they say.  I 
asked where the machine guns have been set up.  I was told, on the 
Wilhelmsplatz.  I went to the Wilhelmsplatz -- I have just come from 
there -- I looked and looked; two policemen helped me; I have not 
yet been able to find those machine guns; but I shall go on looking 
later.  (p. 254) 
At this point, the discourse of Fritzsche further alters the reality of the situation, 
that of winter clothing being collected for the ill-equipped German soldier in 
Russia, by tying together previous events of the campaign and enlarging the 
fabrication of revolt in Germany: 
But these machine guns on the Wilhelmsplatz which Roosevelt’s 
radio invented are not isolated phenomena-no, the most silly things 
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have been invented for days.  On the Anhalter Bahnhof, which first 
the English and then the Bolsheviks asserted they had destroyed 
and which is still standing, wild excesses are said to have occurred, 
which also could only be stopped by machine guns . . . Finally, 
admirals or generals-just as it comes -- have planned coups d’état 
here -- planned them or carried them out.  (pp. 254-255) 
Fritzsche concluded his counterattack on the foreign reports of political upheaval 
within the Hitler government by characterizing these enemy embellishments as a 
combined effort of the British and Americans.  The wild exaggerations of the Allies 
become stories that actually have the ability to refute themselves:  
The finest report of all, however, came from Radio New York on 8th 
January; Party emissaries; it said, have had 25,000 officers executed 
at the Front, and the Armed Forces are thirsting for revenge.  The 
BBC for four days apparently searched its mind whether or not to 
bite the tempting bait.  It did, on 12 January, though cautiously; for 
instead of claiming that 25,000 officers were shot, it only mentioned 
62 as having been overtaken by this dreadful calamity; not 60, 
perhaps, nor 65, but precisely 62-oh, aren’t they accurate!  (p. 255) 
 The Propaganda Minister, whose technique was somewhat similar to 
Fritzsche’s style, also saw the opportunity for irresistible satire.  Goebbels wrote a 
regular piece for one of the Nazi newspapers, Das Reich.  His column was read 
and featured, on the air as his personal commentary during a regularly allotted 
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time slot within the weekly schedule.  Here, he too mocks the exaggeration of the 
enemy reports: 
With brazen impudence Churchill’s press falsified the results, saying 
that only 4,000,000 articles had been collected, while there were 
actually more than 67,000,000.  And how these four million were 
collected!  The police literally tore them [the clothes] off the backs of 
pedestrians in the streets, leaving them exposed to the winter cold, 
naked and bare, swearing, and trembling.  Is it surprising that the 
women of Berlin assembled for protest demonstrations, 
remonstrated against the transport to the Front of garments torn from 
their backs, lay down on the railway tracks and stopped the 
departure of the trains?  Or perhaps they harboured the suspicion 
that the hardships of the Russian winter were nothing but an 
invention of the Nazis, whose only aim in this collection was to steal 
their winter clothing to decorate their own bodies.  (Kris & Speier, p. 
417) 
In leaving no stone unturned, it was Fritzsche’s turn to address the naïve listener 
of the home front who might have still been confused by the flurry of this 
campaign’s sustained accusations.  This broadcast piece of rhetorical discourse 
may be the most direct example emanating from the “Wool Revolution” of 1942: 
The German people at home live their lives; they go about their work 
and grapple with the problems and troubles naturally arising in this 
third winter of the war-problems which will be mastered in view of the 
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goal for which many a German soldier has made a heavier sacrifice 
than the homeland.  Then suddenly British propaganda raises the 
cry: “There is revolution in Germany!”  The people of Germany know 
nothing about this cry, while the few who are compelled by their 
profession to take note of it only react with an inward “You know 
where you can put it!”--without interrupting their work. (Lazarsfeld & 
Stanton, p. 257) 
The rhetorical situation needed a response and invited it, but was it a fitting 
response?  Allowing for the fact that most propaganda is rhetorical, one must 
answer in the affirmative.  By approaching this question from a purely 
propagandistic point of view, it can safely be said that any response capable of 
redirecting the phenomenological focus of attention away from the troops suffering 
in Russia due to political problems at home, would have been a fitting response.  
Rhetorically, the exigencies were modified, on an emotional level, for both Nazis 
and non-Nazis listening to this episodic chain of events.  The faithful Party 
member made the deduction that everything was fine and proceeded with a 
“business as usual” attitude since there were no worries.  The German citizen 
growing weary of the political situation controlled by the National Socialists also 
reacted emotionally, but their reaction was one of disappointment since a 
revolution or unrest of any degree would be considered a positive occurrence.  
The important point is that both groups exhibited a conviction through their 
response that everything was fine, regardless of whether they hoped for a change 
or not.  Creating this conviction, with significant contributions from rhetorical 
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discourse, is the unannounced goal of the propagandist.  These powerful 
ingredients hold rational thought in check and any possibility of comprehending of 
the facts is outmaneuvered and plays no part in the situation.  In short, we are 
referring to thinking reduced to perception where only two answers are possible, 
yes or no (pp. 257-259). 
 
Rhetorical Discursive Strategies for Modification of Exigence 
 Charles J. Rolo believes that Nazi propaganda existed as a component of 
their overarching philosophy of nihilism.  He categorizes several strategies that 
were employed by the National Socialists in the execution of their radio war 
propaganda abroad.  Each was patiently and persistently directed toward a limited 
objective.  An examination of these strategies used in shaping rhetorical 
discourse, serves as an aid in uncovering the ulterior motives that were well 
concealed by Berlin during the Second World War.  
 
Strategy of Division 
 As the name implies, the procedure here is to drive a wedge between allies 
by attempting to proclaim that there are implied interests that they actually do not 
share as one.  This tactic was employed against France prior to the German 
invasion in 1940.  Nazi radio broadcasts to the French people adopted slogans 
such as “Where are the English?” and “The English give machines, the French 
give their lives.”  The fact that the two nations had a long history of armed conflict 
was also a resource for the propagandists.  The French were reminded that it was 
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the English who had sent Joan of Arc to the stake, and more recently had forced 
the French to bear a disproportionate burden of fighting in the last war (Rolo, 
1942, pp.18-19).  Indignant German announcers commented on the contempt 
harbored by all Englishmen for the French people.  It was the “Tommies” who 
relaxed in fine Parisian hotels by day and frequented the nightclubs in the evening.  
Broadcasts beamed to France would ask soldiers if they had seen any British 
military personnel occupying positions in the Maginot Line, and then proceed to 
remind them that the “Tommies” were behind the lines and with their wives (p. 19). 
 While abundant evidence exists that this strategy was employed in the 
foreign language broadcasts aimed at Anglo-American relationships, it seems that 
Goebbels treated this alliance with more of a “hands-off” approach, with regard to 
potential propaganda, inside his own country.  Possibly, he was waiting for the two 
nations to provide evidence of a political controversy that he had no need to invent 
or fabricate.  Here is part of Goebbels’ diary recorded on February 16, 1942: 
The differences between England and the United States are growing 
quite naturally and so quickly that we shall desist from trying to 
increase them by our commentary.  The English might otherwise 
take up some of our comments and use them to prove to the 
Americans how undesirable such conflicts are.  A precious plant like 
this must be allowed to grow with the aid of natural rain and natural 
sun under God’s free sky.  I expect a lot from these differences of 
opinion, but the time has not yet come for making them grow by 
artificial means.  (Goebbels, 1948, p. 90) 
 72
No more than two months later, Goebbels found evidence in the British press that 
confirmed some of his thoughts on the anticipated strain effecting the harmonious 
affiliation of the British-American coalition that opposed him.  Still, on April 18, 
1942, he decided to hold back on an all-out domestic campaign aimed at an 
apparent discrepancy between his adversaries: 
The Daily Express has published a report on sentiment in the United 
States.  According to it, people in the United States are at present, 
anything but friendly to England.  England is blamed for having let 
the United States slide into this war.  The British correspondent 
states with resignation that one can hardly discover a single friend of 
England in the United States.  I believe on the whole, that is true.  
The Americans will be hopping mad at the British who concocted this 
soup and now ask the Americans to eat it.  I am taking no notice in 
the German propaganda of these controversies between England 
and America.  They should develop of themselves. (Goebbels, 1948, 
p. 175) 
The subject reappeared in Goebbels’ diary approximately one month later on May 
22, 1942, only this time the source of information was an American newspaper 
that, in his mind, had been an innocent political by-stander for quite some time: 
The difference between the Americans and the English conception of 
how the war is to be waged are becoming more pronounced from 
week to week, at least judging by press commentary.  The Chicago 
Tribune for the first time launched a very heavy attack against the 
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English war leadership and especially against the meddling of the 
London press with internal American affairs.  This newspaper, which 
was always isolationist and would have nothing to do with the war, 
has exploded in a manner hitherto unknown.  As we have no interest 
in causing the little plant of Anglo-American enmity to wither by 
turning our sun lamps of publicity on it too officiously, we shall take 
no notice of this editorial in our news and propaganda services.  (p. 
225) 
This reference to omission was meant for the home front.  The German short wave 
broadcasts to London were doing their best to expose problems between Britain 
and American interests.  After the unsuccessful attempt at halting the stream of 
U.S. military supplies to the English by way of U-boat warfare, the Nazis took a 
different approach towards the British-American relationship, which had been 
forged because of the Battle of the North Atlantic.  One of the most notable 
commentators on German foreign radio at the time was the British defector, 
William Joyce, better known to his impressive following as “Lord Haw-Haw.”  
Joyce’s voice was so recognizable that in the end, it betrayed his identity, 
heretofore naturally hidden so well by radio’s anonymity.  He was arrested in 
Berlin after talking to some British soldiers, was found guilty of treason, and 
sentenced to death.  His broadcast discourse to London was intended to implant in 
the minds of his former fellow citizens that they be wary of the Yanks.  In other 
words, he worked to modify the exigencies of harmony and cooperation: 
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The United States Government is intent only upon the speediest 
acquisition of a maximum number of British possessions. . . There is 
only one thing worse than standing alone, and that is to rely on 
support which will not be made effective.  America will fight to the 
last Englishman . . . Germany, as the Führer has said a dozen times, 
has never coveted the Empire.  She has even offered to guarantee 
its defense.  Not Germany, but your so-called friend the United 
States, is the real enemy.  (Rolo, 1942, p. 20) 
 
Strategy of Paralysis 
 Prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States had officially been a neutral 
country, which was the preference of the Nazi Party.  German radio was given the 
assignment of preventing a reoccurrence of 1917, when the United States entered 
the First World War, turned the tide in favor of the Allies, and contributed to the 
complete collapse of German morale.  This time, radio would do all it could to 
prevent U.S. military intervention and prevent vast stores of American aid from 
reaching the shores of Great Britain and Russia.  This strategy included 
discrediting the Roosevelt administration and the press, smearing the 
interventionists, and praising the isolationists (Rolo, pp. 20-21).  
 German shortwave broadcasts to the U.S. reminded the Americans that the 
Germans had not started the war, the sea blockade, or were interfering in any way 
with American commerce.  Even when the Germans were rolling through the 
French countryside with their Panzer columns heading towards Paris in mid-1940, 
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Berlin radio assured the Americans that there was no German territorial interest in 
the Western Hemisphere.  In addressing his remarks to U.S. Senator Key Pittman 
of Nevada, American turncoat propagandist Fred W. Kaltenbach, who began 
broadcasting across the Atlantic before the war, was adamantly defensive: 
I challenge you to produce one iota of evidence that Germany has 
any designs on any territory covered by the Monroe Doctrine!  Both 
the German government and the German people have only the 
friendliest of feelings for the government of the United States, the 
home of so many American citizens of German descent.  (Graves, 
1941, p. 35) 
The Americans were also reminded that Germany would be a lucrative market for 
the exportation of consumer goods after a Nazi victory and staying on good terms 
with the winners would be a wise and profitable decision (Rolo, 1942, p. 21).  
German leaders were portrayed in terms the Americans could understand.  
Listeners were told that Germany’s leaders were fighting the same type of fight 
that George Washington had fought.  In the spring of 1941, a new radio program 
series traced the roots of American development that had been initiated by those 
“patriots of German birth” (Graves, 1941, p. 36). 
 
Strategy of Confusion 
 Borrowing a term from the Spanish Civil War, German propagandists began 
referring to a “Fifth Column” of subversives operating in America.  Broadcasts 
claimed that the FBI was wasting time going after loyal German-Americans.  
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Instead, the focus should be on the British propagandists operating within the 
country, “darkly plotting Uncle Sam’s ruin” (Rolo, 1942, p. 22). 
 No sooner had the Germans stated their case than the propaganda tactic 
switched to a Fifth Column scare of those holding conflicting opinions with the 
Administration.  However, it was portrayed as typical “Rooseveltian duplicity” 
meant to justify containment of those citizens opposing FDR’s “insane war policy.”  
The “real” Fifth Column was actually composed of “highly placed persons in the 
White House.”  The merry-go-round of confusion next assailed the newest “real” 
Fifth Column, “Jews, Free Masons, and international financiers.”  Finally, Berlin 
proclaimed that there was no Fifth Column at all; it had been a hoax, a figment of 
the American imagination.  This was attributed to the “hysterical war fever” 
sweeping the country and was cleverly contrasted to the “calm sanity of a warring 
Germany” (p. 23). 
 The Nazis were also well versed at broadcasting conflicting news reports of 
the same event.  The BBC announced on September 2, 1940 that a British 
steamer with refugee children bound for America had been deliberately torpedoed 
without notice and sunk with significant loss of life.  This incident was noted the 
following morning in the minutes of the Reich “ministerial conference” which 
included Goebbels and his closest propaganda associates.  Not certain of the 
report’s authenticity, the Nazis nonetheless decided on broadcast retaliation 
through their foreign language service.  The emphasis and blame would eventually 
be placed on the irresponsibility of the British for exposing children to the dangers 
of sailing through hostile waters (Boelcke, 1970, p. 84).  The Germans replied 
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quickly through a progression of confusing statements.  Initially, they claimed the 
British were lying.  Next, it was said to be British propaganda aimed at American 
interests.  Third, it was actually an “atrocity fame-up” since the British themselves 
had sunk this ship in much the same manner as the sinking of the Athenia.  Their 
fourth reply was that the German Naval forces had not sunk any ships on the date 
in question.  Finally, Berlin admitted the action but, as planned, scolded the British 
for immorally playing with the lives of their orphaned children (Rolo, 1942, p. 23).  
In reality, Churchill had voiced concerns about such an event occurring just 
months before.  The evacuation of children by sea was suspended for the war’s 
duration after September 17, 1940 (Boelcke, 1970, p.84). 
 The dissemination of false news through foreign media was another tactic 
employed by the Nazis.  For instance, news of a serious disagreement between 
Hitler and one of his subordinates would be leaked to innocent reporters by 
“trustworthy” German agents.  Eventually the BBC would pick up the story second 
hand and broadcast their account while Berlin, backed with the indisputable facts 
of the matter, waited in anticipation for the opportunity to accuse the British of lying 
(Rolo, 1942, p. 24).   
 
Strategy of Alternatives 
 The “thoroughness” of the Nazis manifested itself with the spreading of a 
widespread assortment of arguments.  This “shotgun principle” was meant to 
please all who heard the message: 
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For Nazi sympathizers abroad, admirers of strength and efficiency, 
and fascist-minded listeners in general, as well as for pacifists and 
defeatists, German broadcasts depict the Reich as all-powerful, 
ruthless, irresistible, a country of iron men and women, inhumanly 
selfless in their devotion to the Führer’s ideals.  (Rolo, p. 25) 
Other individuals, for whom the propagandists had specific message construction 
in mind, were those growing weary of anti-Nazi messages, the credulous, and 
those hanging onto a “business as usual attitude.”  For these folks, Germany was 
depicted as a land of art and culture with peace-loving citizens devoted to family.  
Nostalgic references were made to Goethe and Schiller, walks in the Black Forest, 
easy-going scholarly life at Munich and Heidelberg, and foaming steins of Lager 
beer.  In addition, there was another group siding with underdogs in all cases, the 
“incurable sympathizers.”  These listeners were the recipients of Berlin’s grand 
version of a “martyred Germany,” a nation that had been forced to endure 
centuries of English aggression and “encirclement” (p. 25). 
 
Strategy of Diversion
 As in the Winter Clothing Drive at the beginning of 1941, the Germans 
earlier employed the diversion strategy against the British during the period of 
World War II known as the “phoney war,” the months of inactivity in the West after 
the surrender of Poland.  In anticipation of military action, the British were 
portrayed as having the desire to extend the war to wherever the Germans knew 
they themselves had no plans of conquest in the spring of 1940.  British 
 79
aggression was reportedly imminent in the Balkans, Scandinavia, and the Low 
Countries (Kris & Speier, p. 298).  This approach created uncertainty as Berlin 
diverted attention from the intended targets.  Three days before the Nazi invasion 
of Belgium and Holland did come, the German foreign radio broadcasts were 
flooded with reports of impending doom for the Balkans at the hands of the British: 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania are being mentioned as 
objectives of the Western powers, although the possibility is 
prominently brought to the fore that these measures may be 
deceptive and designed to throw a cloak over the real intentions of 
England and France.  (Kris & Speier, p. 298) 
Three hours after German troops had crossed the border into Holland, the German 
home network radio, the Deutschlandssender, specified that no demands or 
ultimatums were delivered to the Dutch.  Again, the British were accused of 
conjuring up another lying maneuver by which unrest could be wickedly spread 
among Germany’s neighbors (Rolo, 1942, p. 26). 
 
Strategy of Terror
 This method of radio warfare is most valuable during moments of crisis 
such as the engagement of large armies in major battles, and before and during 
aerial bombardment.  During their invasion, the Nazis set-up radio stations that 
appeared to be operating within Poland.  These “fake” stations broadcast reports 
of panic and indiscriminate destruction to the Polish people during the course of 
Hitler’s first Blitzkrieg action.  The technique was also used against the British 
 80
when the Luftwaffe air attacks were at their height.  German broadcasts in English 
were deliberately garbled in an attempt to add realism to the transmission of “code 
instructions” to subversive elements operating within the country (pp. 26-27). 
 The terror tactics directed at England came on strong in the summer 
following the capitulation of France.  Here is an example of the broadcast 
discourse aimed at British and American listeners by the famous Lord Haw-Haw, 
William Joyce: 
The psychological tension resulting from the imminence of the 
German avalanche is becoming almost unbearable…The 
atmosphere is one of depression and despair…There is panic and 
the worst kind of panic, too…The British Isles are pervaded by a 
mad, deep fear.  (p. 27) 
In the darkest hours of the Battle of Britain, Joyce once again proceeded to “chill 
his listeners’ spines,” as London and other major British cities were ablaze from 
violent and indiscriminate air bombardment.  A favorite tactic was to cite a neutral 
observer: 
A Swedish correspondent, still under the influence of what he has 
experienced, writes, “Once sulphur and fire poured on Sodom and 
Gomorrah until only 77 just people remained.  Now sulphur and fire 
are raining down on London, but one does not know whether 77 just 
people will remain this time.”  (p. 27) 
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Another account of the terror and chaos in London was credited to an American 
reporter.  Broadcast on August 19, 1940, these are the words of Joyce quoting the 
correspondent: 
Ghostlike figures wander about the streets of London, shrieking 
fanatically at the mere sight of a plane.  Britain is lying awake in long, 
sleepless nights and thinking of nothing but one thing-how to get rid 
of the pain.  (p. 27) 
Simultaneously, Berlin, through the North American radio service, was relating 
similar details to their uneasy listeners abroad: 
England’s capital is being buried under a veritable cloudburst of fire 
and iron.  As if to add insult to injury, German sky-writer planes, 
using smoke as a medium, paint huge swastika crosses in the skies 
above the city . . . Panic is reigning among the population of 
Scotland.  There is a veritable stampede . . . The inhabitants are 
fleeing from city to city, head over heels.  (p. 27) 
Joyce categorized the actions of the Luftwaffe in the skies over Britain as 
“scientific work to be carried out with deadly precision.”  He reminded listeners that 
“The Channel is merely a moat…Dover is practically German territory” (p. 28), and 
that Britain was alone and defenseless against the invincible German onslaught. 
 Even though verbal terror tactics were most effective during the crisis stage, 
they were also used by Nazi broadcasters in times of comparative peace or lulls in 
the fighting as a means of sending a message to neutral countries.  The neutral 
country of greatest concern to them was obviously the United States.  Shortly after 
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the fall of France, a Berlin radio reporter allegedly conducted a walking tour of field 
hospitals in the conquered territories of the Low Countries and France where he 
described the experience for his American listeners whose first-hand experiences 
of war were limited to those witnessed during 1917-1918: 
What impressed me was the nearness of Death.  One could see 
evidences of his passing everywhere.  That relentless mower of 
youth in his prime played no favorites.  He was as quick to stretch 
out his long, bony fingers and snatch away the heir to riches, as he 
was to call to himself the humble product of a tumbledown shack.  
He was as eager to seize in his clammy embrace the proud scion of 
a noble house, as he was to rob a widow of her only son.  (p. 29)  
His uninterrupted remarks then originated from a French hospital: 
…a number of men had thick bandages around their heads.  “Blind,” 
said the hospital orderly.  I thought, “God!  What a tragedy!”  Other 
men were lying there with ghastly wounds . . . The place smelled 
unbearably with strong antiseptic.  Many of the poor fellows had had 
an arm or a leg amputated.  Some of them will never walk again.  (p. 
29)  
 Terror can also result from the impression of enemy omniscience.  This 
situation presented itself to the French infantry units stationed in the Maginot Line 
during the winter of 1939-1940.  German loudspeakers located across the former 
“No Man’s Land” of the first war, broadcast everything there was to know about the 
French units including their strength, place of origin, even the names and 
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information on all the officers.  These troops were completely demoralized and 
were subsequently removed from these front line positions.  On a more whimsical 
note, it happened again during a VIP visit by Churchill.  Just as he and his 
distinguished guests were sitting down for a luncheon, the German loudspeakers 
correctly named all menu items to the last detail (p. 30). 
 
Domestic Radio Programming  
 Goebbels and the National Socialists saw the potential for radio in 
spreading their gospel.  However, the directness of Nazi propaganda was 
necessarily limited and had to co-exist in conjunction with other critical elements of 
German life such as the progress of the war, forms of entertainment, and the 
redevelopment of a strong sense of nationalism.  Goebbels’ task was to justify the 
Nazi policy as one of peace and defense.  His presentation of the National 
Socialist interpretation of the war to the 80 million people of Deutschland was his 
priority.  German victories and enemy losses were given special emphasis.  
Morale had to be kept high; workers had to be productive, and the future of a 
better world after emerging victorious in war had to be promised (Herzstein, 1987, 
pp. 15-16).  Numerous references to Goebbels characterize him as a “genius” in 
his field.  He undoubtedly was the best educated of the Nazi elite and understood 
the German psyche.  This talent for interpretation and the analysis of audiences 
contributed greatly to his success in the majority of his propaganda endeavors.  
We will now examine how propaganda was interwoven into the presentation of 
radio programs broadcast to the German domestic audiences.  
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 Everything heard on the air was planned to give the listener a sense of 
living through great moments of history, and radio was the vehicle by which the 
German people became witnesses to these exciting events (Gombrich, 1970, p. 
5).  Early in the war, such events as major German military victories were framed 
by the dramatic Special Announcement or Sondermeldung (Herzstein, p. 179).  
Prior to its debut, Goebbels took a personal interest in this technique and 
conducted his own listener research, with stopwatch in hand, and waylaid whoever 
was available at the time.  He gathered opinions from such diverse sources as his 
own family members, actors and actresses, and office secretaries.  The 
Propaganda Minister’s attention to detail is evident in these sample questions 
posed to his research subjects:  
How long should the interval between the preliminary “Attention!” and 
the first fanfares be?  How many seconds would it take for the 
mother to rush out of the kitchen to the radio?  What was to be the 
interval between the first fanfares and the actual announcement?  
How much time would pass before the mother called the father and 
children?  Should the fanfares be blown once, twice, or three times?  
(Riess, p. 185) 
Goebbels even found the music for the fanfare, his own composition based on a 
variation of a Liszt composition, Les Preludes.  From his palace on the 
Wilhemsplatz in the presence of Prince von Schaumberg-Lippe, Goebbels stood 
up from his piano, drew a deep breath and said, “Thank God -- I have found the 
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best.  This is it and this it will remain!  What do you think?”  (Baird, 1974, pp. 24-
25) 
From time to time listeners were alerted that a Special Announcement was 
forthcoming.  The suspense would build, as marching music would be punctuated 
with orders to stand by.  All broadcast transmissions were interrupted, the fanfare 
of trumpets was heard, the Special Announcement was read, and a specially 
written campaign or theme song was played: 
If the victory was scored against England or the United States, the 
tune played is “We Sail against England”; if the victory was scored in 
the East…the tune was “From Finland to the Black Sea, Onward, 
Onward.”  When the victory is one of outstanding importance, these 
songs are preceded by the national anthem and the Horst Wessel 
song, and are followed by the solemn announcement: “We shall now 
have a total air silence.”  (Kris & Speier, p. 60) 
Also, the seriousness of the Sixth Army’s defeat in Russia could not be 
ignored.  The situation required a dignified approach.  The news of course was the 
topic of discussion in the media for several days as the heroic “defensive” struggle 
to hold back the Bolsheviks, was elevated to mythic proportions.  The clever 
Goebbels had organized national mourning into a “Wagnerian celebration”; 
another misdirection technique applied to fend off public scrutiny of a fatal flaw in 
Hitler’s wartime planning (Kris & Speier, p. 432). 
 The ringing of the ‘Lutine Bell’ invited audience participation.  Nazi 
broadcasters used this method to inform the public of new Allied ships that had 
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been sunk.  The bell’s somber tone was heard once for each recent torpedoed 
fatality.  The “real” bell from the H.M.S. Lutine, sunk in a storm off the Dutch coast 
in 1799, was later salvaged and is actually housed in the boardroom at Lloyd’s of 
London.  The ship’s bell was never utilized for any type of propaganda (p. 61). 
 News programs were an important feature of daily listening.  Starting at 
5:30 AM and ending at midnight, nine news bulletins were broadcast each day 
over German radio.  The lengths were between 5 and 20 minutes and contained 
about 15 to 20 newsworthy items.  The 8:00 p.m. bulletin had the largest audience 
and was often longer and more complete (p. 61).  It must be noted that the content 
of the German news bulletins were not concerned with the latest happenings; 
instead, the people were directed to subjects that the propagandist deemed 
important.  This type of reporting would then be augmented with additional 
comments on the same subject by neutral or Axis leaders in an attempt to magnify 
the importance of the propagandists’ chosen topic.  Stories were presented in a 
sequence that served the propagandist and had little to do with their importance as 
news.  Reports on military news during the timeframe of the Battle of Crete, were 
interspersed with other news stories on eleven of the thirteen days.  This afforded 
the propagandist the opportunity to combine all of the news content in a desired 
sequential manner to manipulate the listener’s attention toward a more inclusive, 
self-serving narrative (p. 66). 
 This method and the majority of other presentations of Nazi propaganda, 
fall under the category of what Walter Fisher called “manipulative rhetoric” in his 
discussion of narrative fidelity.  All rhetoric, especially propaganda discourse, has 
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manipulative elements as a means of making the best case for one’s position.  
Message design and composition are definitely such elements.  However, Fisher’s 
conception of manipulative rhetoric supposes evidence that a communicator is 
using the audience for his or her own ends.  One such category of evidence is that 
which exposes the communicator’s motives to serve personal ambition, rather 
than allowing for an audience’s unimpeded transition to self-discovery, public 
action or social knowledge (Fisher, 1987, pp. 117-118). 
 A few elements of manipulative rhetoric were incorporated into the radio 
program, Front Report.  This program extolled the virtues of the German soldier at 
the sharp edge of combat and can best be described as a “verbal newsreel” that 
attempted to bridge the gap between the home front and those serving abroad 
(Kris & Speier, pp. 66-67).  The manipulative elements included the use of audio 
editing and scripting of answers to interview questions, therefore actuality 
programming was out of the question.  On a contrived occasion, listeners were led 
to believe that Herman Goering had just happened to be passing by the 
microphone.  Different pieces of the show were transitioned with war and military 
marches contributing to a total program length of about twenty minutes.  Front 
Reports aired nightly at approximately 7:15 p.m., which was suppertime for the 
German worker.  On the weekend, a “best of” show for that week aired Sundays at 
10:00 p.m. (pp. 66-67). 
 Front Reports was produced by Propaganda Companies attached to 
military units.  These correspondents and technicians were also Party members 
who were under the ultimate supervision of Goebbels and, more immediately, 
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exposed to discipline from the unit’s commanding officer.  Their battle casualties 
were as high as 10% and naturally spotlighted for propaganda purposes (p. 67).   
 Front Reports was a shining jewel in the crown of Nazi propaganda.  Hans 
Fritzsche was among those who praised the program for its quality: “I believe there 
is no German who will ever forget those broadcast reports sent to the homeland 
from German planes during attacks on English cities.”  The following is an 
example of what the public heard from Propaganda Ministry official, Eugen 
Hadamovsky, who allegedly recorded this dramatic description directly from a 
Luftwaffe bomber over London on September 11, 1940: 
We can see an endless chain of lights, in fact, it looks as if London 
were lit up by one gigantic system of illumination, but it is not an 
illumination ordered by Churchill.  Unheard by us, without respite, the 
most ghastly scenes must be occurring down there, beneath our 
machine…We see the blazing metropolis of England, the centre of 
plutocrats and slave holders, the capital of world enemy number 
one…Here go the bombs, they have found their mark but we still 
circle over the city a few times, so that those below should hear that 
we are here.  (Gombrich, 1970 p. 9) 
This program was also contrasted with the dull, lifeless interviews conducted by 
the BBC and praised for the speed in which records and tapes were rushed to 
transmitting stations enabling timely accounts of victory to be shared with the 
listeners (Kris & Speier, p. 67). 
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  Potential elements for a program were determined by their capacity for 
touching emotions and dulling rational thinking.  Imagination and vicarious 
involvement were most desirable in this union between civilian and soldier.  In the 
spring of 1940, the German Battleship Bluecher met its fate off the Norwegian 
coastline.  Front Reports correspondent Heinz Laubenthal broadcast the story of 
the ship’s final descent to its watery resting place as he had heard it from an 
alleged German Lieutenant Colonel: 
Suddenly the stern reared up, seven to nine metres straight into the 
air, and we see it clearly, there stands a man, upright and erect, his 
armed lifted in the German salute.  I have seen statues, medieval 
knights of shining metal, carved figureheads of legendary fame, but I 
shall never forget this living symbol of a German soldier standing like 
this in his hour of death…we on our island were thrilled to the 
marrow, a German soldier who knows how to die, a hurrah broke 
loose, and our fervent hearts welled over in the song “Deutschland, 
Deutschland über alles.”  (Gombrich, 1970, pp. 7-8) 
  Terse military communiqués read on news programs from the German 
High Command were given a personal feel from eyewitnesses to these same 
events only days later on Front Reports.  After towns were occupied by German 
troops, civilians allegedly greeted them with flowers.  Sometimes townspeople 
were paraded to the microphone to thank their liberators.  Troops capturing enemy 
soldiers reported that their foes were glad to be taken prisoner (Kris & Speier, pp. 
67-68).  All program elements were consistent with National Socialist ideology.  
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The war was dramatized but never given a description in its entirety because Front 
Reports associated with only small groups of soldiers or individuals in action.  The 
program served as a manipulative propaganda instrument to create the preferred 
image of the German fighting man (p. 68).  
 The style, however, of the program changed after Stalingrad.  Since 
glorious victories were no longer prominent, the propagandists aligned the show 
with Goebbels’ new philosophy of realism.  Thus, the themes of endurance and 
sacrifice embodied in the very existence of the frontline soldier, now served as the 
exemplar for the civilians and their ever-increasing hardships cropping up at home.  
In June of 1943, the Propaganda Ministry lifted the ban on descriptions of 
devastation caused by air raids that had taken place in the western cities of 
Germany.  Propaganda Companies were dispatched to interview the inhabitants.  
As they told their stories, these ordinary citizens became instant heroic figures in 
the Rhineland (pp. 68-69). 
An extremely popular diversion from political and military programming was 
the Wunschkonzert or Request Concert, (Michael & Doerr, 2002, p. 447), which 
aired from 1936 to 1939.  Listeners were asked to request a song and accompany 
their letter with a donation for the Winterhillswerk or social program for the poor 
(Bathrick, 1997, p. 116).  Shortly before the war in 1939, the program had 
collected in excess of one-quarter million marks.  The popularity of the program 
prompted the inclusion of soldiers listening on the front lines and was simulcast 
twice a week before a live audience in a concert hall (pp. 116-117).  
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The ideological implication of this program was the inclusion of high and low 
culture bringing the war front and the home front together in a feel-good translation 
of the Third Reich as a national family (p.117).  The mood was one of 
sentimentality and domestication invoking a deeper type of Volksgemeinschaft, or 
People’s community, the central concept of National Socialist thought according to 
Michael & Doerr (p. 423).  In 1940, a film based on the radio show enjoyed similar 
success in German movie theatres: 
And like the radio program which is so central to its plot-line, this film 
also participated in a discourse which claimed to overcome the 
separations between home front and war front, private and public, by 
an assertion of the healing powers of a benevolent, all domesticating 
Nazi public sphere.  (Bathrick, 1997, p. 119) 
 Voice of the Soldier was the forerunner of an ethical appeal to German 
audiences but only aired between January 28, 1940 and August 23, 1942.  The 
program’s themes were national unity and an adherence to a sense of duty, both 
suitable ideals espoused by the National Socialist government.  Perhaps as some 
strange substitute for a religious broadcast, Voice of the Soldier was permitted to 
discuss usually taboo subjects.  Interviewees spoke of pity, anxiety, and fear.  
Moreover, this was occurring at a time prior to Stalingrad when the Russian 
campaign’s privations were rarely mentioned in other broadcasts (Kris & Speier, 
pp. 69-70). 
The descriptions and justifications of government actions were discussed 
on Mirror of the Times.  This half hour show regularly aired at 6:30 p.m. on the 
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national radio network.  Its simplified production of explanations was deemed 
necessary for the mass audiences and intended to prepare them for changes in 
action or policy.  Home front achievements were privileged and attempts were 
made to unite these realizations with traditional German culture.  As the war 
progressed, political commentary was eventually replaced with travel discussions, 
descriptions of the “New Europe,” images of idyllic scenery, and lyrical 
monologues.  It seemed that Mirror of the Times was losing its political focus in 
favor of segments aimed at entertainment (p. 70). 
All programming discussed up to this point was broadcast on the national 
level.  There were also approximately thirteen regional stations serving local 
interests by varying their broadcasts for provincial, less political tastes.  Morning 
farm reports were common as well as talks targeted towards women.  These 
programs appealed to feminine interests of the period, which included household 
advice, childcare, health, social conditions of women, professions for women, and 
fashion discussions. However, the fashion conversations were increasingly 
concerned with mending worn clothing due to material shortages.  In January of 
1941, a Leipzig station warned future mothers of the chances of becoming sterile 
by using tobacco (p. 77). 
When women were drafted for wartime production duties, the topic of 
motherhood became less noticeable on the air.  The morale of the German 
homemaker turned factory worker was of special concern to Nazi broadcasters.  
Therefore, a new radio program, Here Starts Another Week, was originally aired 
on Monday mornings and its popularity eventually dictated a move to Monday at 
 93
6:00 p.m. to reach a larger audience.  With the exception of a nationally broadcast 
fairy tale read on Sunday afternoons, programs for children were entirely in the 
hands of the administrators at the regional level (p. 78). 
 
Rhetorical Music 
One must not lose sight of the fact that for every hour of radio programming 
involving news, talk, and other features, there were approximately seven hours of 
music.  Light music was prominent as well as Italian, Finnish, and occasionally 
Japanese selections, obviously all initially allied with the German cause.  Other 
specially written war songs included the March of the Germans in Poland for that 
particular campaign, and Bombs on England or Bomben auf Engelland played 
during the Battle of Britain.  Other campaigns in the Balkans and North Africa 
produced the Balkanlied and the Afrikalied.  However, the most popular by far was 
the march mentioned earlier, We sail against England, or Wir fahren gen 
Engelland, written by famed bandleader Herms Niel (Herzstein, p. 180).  The 
Propaganda Ministry, under the guise of giving the tune official status, actually 
prohibited the song from being played or sung in public except on suitable 
occasions as determined by the Reich (Kris & Speier, p. 80).  
In the opening phases of the Russian offensive in the summer of 1941, 
martial music was broadcast against the background of booming artillery and the 
frightening drones of Stuka dive-bombers.  These symbolic representations were 
well received by fanatical Nazis and members of the impressionable Hitler Youth 
organizations (Herzstein, pp. 180-181).  
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 The music of the great German composers was also incorporated on the 
radio, but only if these artists fit the propagandist’s profile.  They had to be of 
legitimate German racial stock, in support of Nazi principles in some interpretive 
manner, and creators of powerfully inspirational music applicable to pageantry 
(Dennis, 2002, pp. 275-276).  Wagner was considered the central composer and 
embodied National Socialism to the fullest.  Associated with the Romantic phase 
of music history, his views on culture, society, race, economics, and the military 
resulted in the “nazification” of his hometown of Bayreuth (p. 276).  None other 
than Adolph Hitler had a personal fascination for Wagner and his music. 
  As the starting point of great German musical development, the Nazis 
praised Bach as the greatest German musician and the first master of the canon.  
All aspects of his classical work contained “Germanic sensibility and perception” 
and above all, his music expressed a “volkish feeling for life.”  Wagner greatly 
admired Bach for his music’s richness, sublimity, and universal significance.  
Metaphorically, it was noted that Bach was the German composer who “stands 
guard over the Reich of music” (p. 278). 
Beethoven was said to have represented National Socialist virtues that 
included Hitler’s scrutiny of qualifications.  He had the will to greatness, the will to 
conquer his deafness, plus the “imputed desire” to fight against alien Frenchmen 
and for German unity.  Beethoven was also blessed with aesthetic excellence.  His 
music was the archetype of nineteenth century Romanticism on which all Nazi 
composers based their second-rate works in defiance of atonality or the formats of 
the Second Vienna School (Kanter, 1997). 
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The Nazis had a slight problem with the “Germaness” of Handel due to his 
permanent relocation to London in 1712.  The strategy of reclamation was the 
launching of a polemic to disassociate his life with English art and culture.  Handel 
had remained a “consciously nationalistic artist” and was the “earliest and most 
effective champion of German music in foreign lands.”  He was still referred to as 
“the great Saxon” despite his half-century spent on English soil.  The Party 
intensively tried “to wrench Handel’s Messiah from its ostensibly British origins and 
transform it into a German nationalistic instrument.”  Of course, they claimed that 
such a masterful composition was made possible by Handel’s spiritual return to his 
artistic roots in the Fatherland (Dennis, p. 283). 
The National Socialists believed that fate chose Haydn, in 1796, to write the 
melody for what was to become the German national anthem.  The Nazis called it 
a “spiritual weapon against Napoleon’s triumphant advance.”  However, as the 
French occupied Vienna for the second time in 1809, Haydn called his servants 
into his room, was taken to the piano, and banged out his Volk hymn three times 
with such expressive force, that all who witnessed the event were utterly shocked.  
He died five days later and the Nazis subsequently ignored over one thousand 
other Haydn compositions (pp. 285-286). 
Discrepancies had to be addressed concerning even Mozart’s “blood 
heritage.”  Both parents were German, but they originated from diverse regions 
making Mozart a racial Blutmischung, or “blend.”  Therefore, the Nazis considered 
this uniqueness a prelude to his life of creativity.  His relevance to National 
Socialist culture was grounded in his music’s simplicity or “underlying volkish 
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quality.”  Mozart was also credited with writing the first German opera, performed 
in 1791.  To the Nazi Party, he was considered positive for overall morale because 
he “fulfilled the great mission of art: to raise the spirits of a tormented humanity 
and remove it to a better world” (pp. 286-291). 
The Nazi examination of music for broadcast, or any other purpose, was 
inclined to minimize formal or constructive aspects and dwell on the less tangible 
features of spirituality, passion, and mysticism.  The last stop on the converging 
paths of German musical development was the formulation of music drama, so 
clearly expressed in Wagner’s “Iron Romanticism.”  From this cultural base, the 
National Socialists thought it possible to unite the community and strengthen the 
volk for the upcoming struggles they were certain to face (p. 273). 
A discussion of music on German home radio would not be complete 
without mentioning American jazz.  The Nazis did employ it considerably for 
propaganda purposes in their foreign broadcasts.  However, Kanter illustrates four 
fundamental reasons that jazz was at odds with National Socialism.  First, the 
improvisational nature of the genre represented musical freedom.  This concept 
was an abomination in the eyes of a totalitarian system intent on squelching free 
will while manipulating subjects for outcomes desired by the state.  Of course, 
when the Nazis look at the originators of jazz, their racial biases saw degenerate 
blacks and Jews.  On the European continent, this view was extended to include 
licentious Gypsies.  Also at odds with the Party was the syncopation of jazz.  One 
could not march to it, nor was it the type of music that was useful for the 
dissemination of a repetitive propaganda message, which required measured 
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regularity.  The Nazis also trivialized jazz due to its individualistic structure.  For 
this reason, the racial, communal, nationalistic, and otherwise lofty objectives of 
the Nazi elite were also theoretically incompatible (Kanter, p. 13).  Finally, 
Goebbels summed it up for the public in discussing German radio policy in March 
of 1942:  
We want to speak openly about the question of whether the German 
radio should broadcast so-called jazz music.  We can flatly reject 
jazz if by it one understands a kind of music that entirely ignores or 
mocks melody and depends only on rhythm, and in which the rhythm 
is carried primarily by unpleasant sounding instrumental squawks 
that pain the ear.  (Goebbels, 1942) 
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Chapter 3-The Nazi Speaker: Linking Rhetoric to Ideology  
 
 
German Oratory 
                         
 Before the emergence of Hitler, one might experience difficulty in locating 
a tradition of notable oration in German history.  Goebbels admitted in 1939 that 
the Germans never had the oratorical eloquence of the Latin countries.  He wrote 
that Germany, “produced many statesman, poets, and scientists, but at all times 
lacked great oratorical talent” (Bosmajian, 1960, p. 365).  
 The Managing Director of the Hanse Press, Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen 
believed that there was an abject neglect of public speaking inside Germany 
during the 19th century, particularly the persuasive element of a speech resulting 
in minimal effect on the audiences.  In his book Germany Speaks published in 
1938, he asserts there was no “Gladstone, no Joseph Chamberlain to arouse the 
people at election times” (Bosmajian, p. 366). 
In his 1936 dissertation written at Heidelberg on the political propaganda 
of the NSDAP, Franz Six stated that all of the great revolutions such as the 
French, the Russian, and those attributed to the Fascists, were led by great 
speakers capable of driving the people to action: 
Danton, Marat, Lenin, and Mussolini…have ruled the masses 
through the hate in their words and the passion in their criticism.  
Germany has in its more recent history no speakers who stepped 
out of the drawing room or club or later the parliament toward the 
masses of the Volk.  The emergence of Hitler and the spoken word 
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was raised to a valued and feared weapon of politics. (Bosmajian, 
p. 366) 
As the Nazis continued to make up for lost time, they recommended books 
for those who wished to submit for training as Party speakers.  In 1935, Hans 
Krebs wrote Redner-Fibel, considered a speech handbook of sorts, echoed the 
thoughts of those citing the lack of German oratorical tradition: 
The art of speaking was rarely found among us Germans.  Only few 
commanded the language and its means of expression to such an 
unlimited degree that it would have influence.  Only with the 
National Socialist revolution did great orators and statesmen 
appear. (Bosmajian, p. 366) 
 Rede und Redner was written by Emil Dovifat in 1937 and was 
recommended by the Nazi periodical Der Hoheitstraeger “to political leaders who 
already have gathered the practical experiences of a speaker” (Bosmajian, p. 
366).  From the chapter entitled “Speech and Speakers in Germany,” Dovifat 
recognized that no German talked to the times of the historical moment, again 
that of the 19th century: 
The revolution of 1848 brought forth in Germany no speaker of 
political power like Mirabeau, no speaker of suggestive power like 
Danton, and no speaker of such natural behavior and effect as the 
Irish freedom fighter O’Connel (p. 366). 
Dovifat also cites the lack of an effective speaker, “when Germany was thrown in 
1914 into the most perilous struggle for existence in her history, even in that most 
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fateful hour, no speaker appeared” (p. 366).  He compares the enemies’ 
speaking skills of Clemenceau and Lloyd-George to the void found in Germany.  
The subsequent emergence of the new young speakers after the war 
concentrated on moving from parliamentary speech to that of the Führerstaat or 
Führer state, where parliament and opposition parties were eliminated.  Dovifat 
explains why these speakers were more effective than their predecessors were: 
From the beginning, they spoke to all the Volk, and while doing this 
they molded a new form of speech; they created terror and 
rejection among those who up to now had cultivated speech only 
for certain groups, circles, and parties.  (p. 367) 
Although plenty of discourse was present in the 19th century, Hitler 
believed it was mainly of the parliamentary variety, for discussion and 
explanation, not intent on moving men to action.  In his first visit to the Austrian 
Parliament at the age of twenty, he was amused at the exhibition before him:   
It was a gesticulating mass, shrieking in all keys, wildly stirred, 
presided over by a good-natured old uncle who, by the sweat of his 
brow, tried to re-establish the dignity of the House by violently 
ringing a bell and by alternately kind and earnest remonstrances.  
(Hitler, 1939, p. 98) 
 There was no pretense on the part of the Nazis to rhetorical scholarship; 
in fact, it seemed to matter very little to them.  While speakers received 
enormous measures of advice and instruction, as evidenced by the eventual 
development of formal speaker training, rhetorical theories or oratorical 
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achievements were seldom studied.  However, Hans Krebs did acknowledge 
speaker training provided by the Roman Catholic Church for their priests.  He 
suggested Nazi speakers study sermonic techniques as an example of what 
could be gleaned from formal training.  Moreover, Catholic treatises on rhetoric 
were of no use or consequence to the Party.  “If the ages had gathered and 
refined a wisdom about persuasion in speech, that was a matter of no concern to 
the Nazi rhetorician” (Scanlan, 1951, p. 431).  These specialized speakers who 
spread the Nazi ideology, always operated within the basic guidelines 
established early on by the Führer who believed in delivering a simply 
constructed and understandable message with energetic frequency. 
 
Hitler’s Belief in the Spoken Word 
 In Mein Kampf, an entire chapter is devoted to the power and 
effectiveness of the spoken word.  Hitler was criticized by those he considered 
members of the “bourgeois intelligentsia” for ranking speech over the written 
word in the context of political movements.  Of course, in his own mind, these 
critics did not share his energy or talent for mass influence through his chosen 
communicative vehicle and were therefore jealous of his natural abilities. 
 Hitler explained that those who were forced to rely on writing as a means 
of persuasive discourse were lacking a fundamental psychological understanding 
of mass effect and mass influence.  [his italics]  The Führer had great contempt 
for the masses, looking upon them as sluggish and unmotivated.  While holding 
this conviction, he obviously felt that people would only read what they already 
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believed and therefore the political pamphlet would be dispensed with as soon as 
it was understood to be at odds with the reader’s viewpoint.  This also applied to 
intelligentsia-inspired written media: 
The whole flood of newspapers and books that intellectualism 
produces year by year run off from the millions of the lowest 
classes like water from oiled leather.  This can prove only two 
things: either the incorrectness of the contents of this entire written 
produce of our bourgeois world or the impossibility of penetrating to 
the heart of the masses merely by literature.  True, especially in 
cases when this very literature is so little psychologically oriented 
as is the case here.  (Hitler, 1939, p. 707) 
 Journalists and writers were referred to by derogatory expressions such as 
“knights of the pen,” “the average sparrow-brain of a German scribbler,” 
“intellectual babble,” and “bourgeois simpletons.”  (pp. 704-716) 
Much of Hitler’s orientation to the value of public speaking came from what 
he witnessed in the Marxist movement in Germany.  His grudging admiration for 
the Communist modus operandi is reflected in his reference to “the colossal 
wave of propaganda that took possession of the masses in the course of the 
years.” (p. 707) The Communist technique of agitation taught Hitler and other 
influential Nazi propagandists that the speaker was the supreme weapon in the 
arsenal of persuasion: 
What has won millions of laborers for Marxism is less the literary 
work of Marxist patriotic writers, but rather the untiring and truly 
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enormous propaganda work of tens of thousands of untiring 
agitators, beginning with the great apostle of harassment down to 
the smallest labor union official and the confidant and discussion 
orator; these are the hundreds of thousands of meetings where 
these popular speakers, standing upon the table in a smoky tavern, 
drummed upon the masses and thus knew how to obtain an 
unsurpassed knowledge of this human material, something that put 
them all the more in the position to choose the most correct 
weapons for the attack against the fortress of public opinion. (p. 
708) 
 
British and American Propaganda Influences 
 The success of Allied propaganda in World War I was acknowledged by 
Hitler and more closely scrutinized by authors such as Dietz, author of 
Redekunst als Kampfmittel beim Engländer or The Art of Speaking as a Weapon 
among the English, Stuttgart, 1938.  Wolfgang Schmidt’s essay “The Political 
Speech in the Decisive Hours of the British Nation” found its way into the journal 
Neusprachlicher Unterricht, 38 (1939).  Also praiseworthy in this categorization is 
Friedrich Schönemann’s Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten 
Staaten or The Art of Influencing the Masses in the United States, Stuttgart, 1926 
(Scanlan, 1949, p. 85). 
 Eugene Hadamovsky was considered a leading Nazi theorist in the field of 
propaganda and held the title of Reichssendeleiter or programming head for 
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German radio.  His book, Propaganda und nationale Macht or Propaganda and 
National Power, Oldenburg, 1933, examines the major role of the speaker-
system in America.  He claimed that until the emergence of Hitler, the American 
pool of speakers was unmatched in spite of the political press and all of the 
influences brought to bear by churches, schools, and universities.  Citing the 
American prominence of publicity, Hadamovsky believed a plethora of 
professional, political speakers developed in the U.S. that successfully carried 
out all great political action.  He specifically speaks to the effort that manifested 
itself in the American reaction to the First World War: 
The vast floods of propaganda mechanisms (brochures, handbills, 
placards, newspaper articles, etc., such as would be used here) 
were more than topped by the elaborate speaker system.  This 
speaker-system quickly found a unique place for itself 
corresponding to American proportions and ability.  (p. 85) 
This close, personal contact between the speaker and the people was regarded 
as one of the mainstays of American propaganda.  Hadamovsky also cited 
volunteerism in the form of the seventy-five thousand member “four-minute-men” 
and believed this movement to have been a major contribution in exciting the 
public’s war spirit, leading to American entry into the three year old European 
conflict in 1917 (pp. 85-86). 
 The Nazis learned from their enemies that a certain psychological element 
could not be ignored in addressing the mass audiences in the twentieth century.  
They considered this element to be the persuasive speaker, with Hitler acting as 
 105
the standard by which all would be measured.  Although rhetorical elements were 
largely ignored, they performed an unsuspecting, yet crucial role in the important 
link to Nazi ideology.  
 
McGee’s Link between Rhetoric and Ideology  
 The Burkean preference to “philosophy of myth” in describing mass 
consciousness led others in the Dewey, Mead, and Lippmann traditions to the 
development of alternative ideas used to explain the concept of ideology.  
“Symbolic” and “dramatistic” references of mid-twentieth century contemporary 
writers have challenged raw political definitions such as “dogma” and “doctrine.”  
It has even been sarcastically suggested that the word ideology “is widely 
perceived as being encrusted with the ‘intellectual baggage’ of orthodox 
Marxism” (McGee, 1980, pp. 1-2). 
 Despite the camouflage created by one’s theoretical inclination, there is an 
undeniable certainty that people massed into group settings conduct themselves 
and begin to think differently than they would in isolation.  Collective identity has 
a mind of its own.  Marxist philosophy would argue that the only possibility of 
“mind” lies within the individual.  When we behave, act, or think like the group, we 
have been duped and manipulated into a subsequent recognition of “public 
opinion,” “public mind,” or “public philosophy” (p. 2). 
 McGee, in the introduction to his theory of the “ideograph” as a link 
between rhetoric and ideology, explains how this “trick” is perceived by various 
orientations.  The symbolists, where he situates Hitler and the Nazis, believe that 
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the trick is not a trick at all.  Instead, this phenomenon is a type of transcendence 
or intentional conformity of participating and believing in a myth such as the 
appealing infallibility of the National Socialists: 
Nazi propaganda was ingenious enough to transform anti-Semitism 
into a principle of self-definition, and thus to eliminate it from the 
fluctuations of mere opinion.  It used the persuasion of mass 
demagogy only as a preparatory step and never overestimated its 
lasting influence, whether in oratory or in print.  This gave the 
masses of atomized, undefinable, unstable and futile individuals a 
means of self-definition and identification which not only restored 
some of the self respect they had formerly derived from their 
function in society, but it also created a kind of spurious stability 
which made them better candidates for an organization.  Through 
this kind of propaganda, the movement could set itself up as an 
artificial extension of the mass meeting and rationalize the 
essentially futile feelings of self-importance and hysterical security 
that it offered to the isolated individuals of an atomized society.  
(Arendt, 1966, pp. 356-357) 
Materialists, particularly Marxists, see the deception as a reified form of a 
lie, eventually becoming interpretations directed at the people and emanating 
from the voice of the ruling class.  The people’s task involves the location of the 
dialectical tension between reality/truth and ideology/falsehoods.  Burkeans 
would be more concerned with motive structures than the consequences of the 
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imposed state of affairs placed upon those searching for a political 
consciousness (McGee, p. 2).  
 It is useful at this point to look at McGee’s emphasis on falsity as it applies 
to myth and ideology.  Both subscribe to a hollowness pertaining to the actual 
existence of a social organism but the difference lies in their respective 
exposures of the falsity.  Ideologies take the position that exposure of falsity is a 
moral act.  Philosophers may argue the existence of a “true consciousness”; 
however, it is theoretically accessible.  Therefore, McGee contends, “we are 
morally remiss if we do not discard the false and approach the true.”  On the 
other hand, the falsity presupposed by the myth is amoral since there is a type of 
legitimate poetic license at work in the form of a “suspension of disbelief.”  The 
symbolist calls for great objectivity in the move toward denying that a myth is a 
substitute for a lie and indulges in such fabrication where a peculiarly redemptive 
value is felt.   
The Nazi radio broadcasts of the great Nuremberg Party rallies of the 
thirties involved vicarious participation that ignited the spirit of nationalism.  The 
“suspension of disbelief” became even more amenable when the new technology 
of radio removed the visual element, which by necessity was subliminally 
reconstructed by the imagination (Kris & Speier, p. 11). 
 McGee argues that we have long ignored a crucial component of 
symbolism.  We have viewed it as an alternative explanation of political 
consciousness instead of a supplemental description.  When “philosophy of 
myth” is used as an alternative to “ideology,” the Marxists become alarmed over 
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the state’s power and control of the proletariat.  However, the symbolists can look 
at those particular politics as “a wonderfully convenient formula which mistakes 
commitment for ‘historically scientific truth’ ” (p. 4). 
 McGee is in agreement with Marx that the problem found in 
consciousness is its concern for unfolding and assessing the legitimacy of public 
motives.  He believes that this consciousness is always false “because truth in 
politics, no matter how firmly we believe, is always an illusion.”  Ideological 
falsities are highly rhetorical since the mental manifestations of truth and falsity 
that come to the foreground in the act of making a commitment, are products of 
persuasion.  McGee sees discourse as a key ingredient: 
Since the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is 
through the discourse used to produce it, I will suggest that 
ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical 
documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public 
belief and behavior.  Further, the political language, which 
manifests ideology, seems characterized by slogans, a vocabulary 
of ‘ideographs’ easily mistaken for the technical terminology of 
political philosophy.  An analysis of ideographic usages in political 
rhetoric, I believe, reveals interpenetrating systems or “structures” 
of public motives.  (pp. 4-5)   
  McGee expands on the characteristics of the ideograph by analyzing his 
idea of social control, suggesting its essence as control over consciousness, 
which incidentally preoccupied the disciples of Goebbels.  Learned 
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predispositions exist as a priori influence on human agents, regardless of that 
particular person’s role as one of “power” or as “people” in a political 
communicative process (pp. 5-6). 
 Eric Hoffer in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements substantiates McGee’s “control over consciousness” claim by 
arguing the limitations of propaganda: 
The truth seems to be that propaganda on its own cannot force its 
way into unwilling minds; neither can it inculcate something wholly 
new; nor can it keep people persuaded once they have ceased to 
believe.  It penetrates only into minds already open, and rather than 
instill opinion it articulates and justifies opinions already present in 
the minds of its recipients.  The gifted propagandist brings to boil 
ideas and passions already simmering in the minds of his hearers.  
He echoes their innermost feelings.  Where opinion is not coerced, 
people can be made to believe only in what they already “know” (p. 
105). 
Feelings of anti-Semitism existed in German society before the emergence of the 
Nazi Party (Michael & Doerr, p. 1).  These “ideas and passions” found in the 
minds of the masses are thought of or articulated through a vocabulary of 
concepts that become the rationale for behavior and belief, narrowing the notion 
of McGee’s ideograph.  He argues that the state’s insistence of some type of 
conformity of behavior is a rhetoric of control, presumed effective on the whole of 
society.  A war rhetoric aims to instill war’s necessity, although negativity 
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expressed towards it (the rhetoric) is usually viewed as unpatriotic (McGee, p. 6).  
Words and phrases such as “liberty,” “freedom of speech,” and “rule of law” have 
what McGee refers to as conditioned meaning that becomes obvious as well as 
behaviorally directive and self-evident: 
They are the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of 
ideology.  Thus they may be thought of as “ideographs,” for, like 
Chinese symbols, they signify and “contain” a unique ideological 
commitment; further, they presumptuously suggest that each 
member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance 
in them…The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in 
real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of 
political consciousness (p. 7). 
It is in the social function of terminologies or vocabularies where ideographs are 
found, not the rational or ethical function.  The Nazis were fond of proclaiming 
themselves as the “New Order” and “National Socialists.”  Words or phrases that 
fall under the category of ideographs within the human social condition of one 
culture may take on a different meaning in another.  McGee cites the word 
“equality” as an example that takes on different meanings in different countries 
around the world.  Essentially, meanings found in ideographs are culture-bound 
and draw significance from their diachronic usages, not from their supposed idea 
content (pp. 8-10). 
Over time, ideographic meanings may expand or contract depending on 
the circumstances, but they always retain their formal, foundational meaning 
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found in history.  Contrast the Nazi use of the word Kampfzeit or time of struggle 
(Michael & Doerr, p. 235) in relation to the early years of the Party.  When used 
after Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933, it expanded and contracted depending 
upon Goebbel’s vision of the overall political situation.  When the picture was 
bleak, the German propagandists were fond of reveling in past efforts and 
triumphs.  
The element of time or the evolution of meaning makes the ideographic 
structuring vertical.  Significant records are found in our popular chronologic 
history.  These “records” include novels, books, plays, and music; however, 
McGee argues that the most influential historical record that one may have is that 
of grammar school, where our first contact with community was made (McGee, p. 
11). 
Vertical structuring of ideographs allows for a diachronic and etymological 
understanding but does not help our understanding of how ideographs function in 
the present.  McGee references Ortega’s work on language, to define key usages 
in real discourse and in public consciousness as forces.  Ortega is mindful of 
diachronism acting as the externality of language, but feels the need for an 
internal conception where meaningful operating forces are found (p. 12). 
If one considers ideographs as rhetorical forces, they appear to be 
ordered horizontally, conflicting with other ideographs and subsequently acquiring 
a meaning through the synchronic confrontation: 
Synchronic structural changes in the relative standing of an 
ideograph are “horizontal” because of the presumed consonance of 
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an ideology; that is, ideographs such as “rule of law” are meant to 
be taken together, as a working unit, with “public trust,” “freedom of 
speech,” “trial by jury,” and any other slogan characteristic of the 
collective life (p. 13). 
Despite new usages, ideographs themselves remain unchanged but their 
relationships with other ideographs will change when we make use of them in 
ideological arguments.  A political crisis may temporarily bring an ideograph to 
center-stage in the form of what Burke would call a “god-term.”  McGee also cites 
Hitler’s campaign against “decadent democracies” as an “alien force” frontally 
assailing an ideographic structure with the capacity to change the “present” 
ideology, “…in this sense, an ideology is dynamic and a force, always resilient, 
always keeping itself in some consonance and unity, but not always the same 
consonance and unity” (pp. 13-14). 
McGee’s argument theoretically uncovers two ideologies existing in a 
particular culture at any given moment.  The first is a diachronic grammar, 
historically defined with intensifying and constricting ideographic meanings 
beginning with the initiation of the society to the present.  The other ideology is a 
rhetoric with synchronic structures of ideographic clusters maintaining elemental 
consonance and unity.  These clusters are continually reorganizing to provide 
accommodation for specific situations inherent in the realm of political discourse 
(p. 14). 
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Illustrations of Nazi Ideographs 
  What was heard on the radio, seen in print, and eventually used by all 
Germans was a language that was intended to win support for a long-range Nazi 
worldview or ideology known as Weltanschauung.  The pillars of this overarching 
value system intended for the German people were race, character, and destiny 
(Michael & Doerr, p. 438).  The language became known as Nazi-Deutsch or Nazi 
German and clearly reflected the Party’s thought and action on levels of 
discourse that permeated even ordinary printed matter such as “dictionaries, 
grammar books, and common literature” (p. 28). 
  A Goebbels-inspired propaganda campaign, framed in ethnocentric world 
historical importance, centered upon Germany’s spread of its racial principles to 
the rest of humanity weltgeschichtliche Mission (p. 438).  The war being waged 
by the German Wehrmacht against racial enemies of the Reich was called 
Weltanschauug or ideological war (p. 438).  There was even a name given to an 
approved ideological education for students, weltanschauliche Schulung (p. 438).  
An inevitable destiny of the Aryan race and the ideological rationale for Nazi 
actions was enveloped in the word Schicksal or fate (p. 361).   
The superiority of the German race Herrenrasse was a dominant 
component of a freely structured Nazi ideology, which reflected a type of Social 
Darwinism.  This worldview system excluded anything that was considered non-
German or foreign--artfremd, a “counter-race”--Gegenrasse, or damaging to the 
German population--Volksschädling (p. 29).    
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  Another essential part of Hitler’s ideology dealt with living space or 
Lebensraum.  Expansionist views in Germany actually pre-dated World War I 
when the anxiety of overpopulation and lack of natural resources produced an 
urgent need for more territory and colonies (p. 260).  The Nazis looked to the 
East for the living space they so desired and launched “Operation Barbarossa” 
against the Soviets on June 22, 1941 (Steinert, 1977, p. 117).  
Months later, the topic of Lebensraum was addressed on the radio after 
the Fall of Singapore in February of 1942.  The Nazi and Japanese views of 
expansion were discussed and delineated along the lines of living space and 
world domination.  The radio program Political Review broadcast “Lebensraum or 
Imperialism” which prompted the following from the German commentator: 
On the occasion of the great Japanese victory celebrations for 
Singapore, Tojo announced yesterday that the conquest of the 
island fortress marked the birth of a New Asia, and a turning point 
in the history of the world.  In itself, this idea is not new to us, since 
it is expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact…Japan is a powerful spiritual 
motor driving the old East Asiatic people to a new fruition…Never 
before in its thousand-year old history has Japan led other nations.  
Only during the last few years Japan has entered victoriously into 
competition with other world powers, not only because Japan is 
technically the most developed nation in East Asia, but mainly 
because her own spiritual values combined modern technique and 
old Asiatic cultural tradition (Kris & Speier, p. 264). 
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The rhetorical implication averts a “domination” argument in favor of the 
Japanese taking their rightful place in history.  The language suggests the Axis 
mutual intent of international leadership through their “values” and “technology.”  
This “collective commitment” is supportive of McGee’s practical definition of 
ideology as a form of political language (McGee, p. 15). 
Nazi conceived anti-Semitic words and phrases are voluminous and 
represent an unmitigated racial policy with many of the words based on the 
centuries old derogatory Jude, or the more contemptuous version, Jud  (Michael 
& Doerr, p. 222).  The Nazi German word Verjudung can be translated 
“jewification” or “judiazation” (p. 31).  Those who favored Jews were considered 
to be anti-Nazi and referred to as Judenbegünstigung (p. 223).  
 After the radical and anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws of 1935 were passed, 
those wishing to choose a marriage partner were required to prove their Aryan 
descent, Ariernachweis.  If SS elite Nazis wished to marry, the state found a 
suitable marriage partner, provided a proof of ancestry pass Ahnenpaß was 
furnished (p. 29).  Applicants wishing to join the SS were required to trace their 
ancestry back to the year 1750 (Arendt, p. 356). 
 Newspaper bins of the Nazi weekly publication, Der Stürmer, contained 
the following hate slogan (Wer den) Juden nicht kennt, kennt den Teufel nicht”!  
“He who doesn’t know the Jew, doesn’t know the devil” (Michael & Doerr, p. 
225)!  This paper was published in Nuremberg between 1923 and 1945 and was 
considered Hitler’s favorite in terms of reading material (Michael & Doerr, p. 391). 
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  The National Socialists were fond of using words that represented a 
community as socialized and conditioned; (p. 28) consequently, many Nazi 
German words began with Volk, the people.  The spirit of the German people and 
their way of thinking and feeling became Volksgeist (p. 423).  Hitler’s idealized 
Germany was known as the Volksreich or people’s Reich (p. 426).  A central 
concept “which dominated all other beliefs, classes, parties, individuals, and 
group interests” was known as Volksgemeinschaft or people’s community.  This 
racially inspired concept of blood-race unity took on mythic proportions as the 
German people severed ties with the old Weimar Republic and the humiliation of 
defeat in World War I (p. 423).  As the fighting progressed and defeat drew 
nearer, Goebbel’s job became increasingly difficult.  Towards the war’s end a 
nickname developed for German radios in general, Volksverdummer or people’s 
brainwasher (p. 427). 
  
The Nazi Speaker and Intellectualism 
  According to Goebbels, the intellectual speaker was ineffective since he 
could only reach those who had the capacity to make sense of complex 
information, “We must speak the language which people understand.  Whoever 
wants to speak to the people must, as Luther says, pay heed to folk speech” 
(Scrase & Mieder, 1996, p. 94).  The Nazis assumed the outcome of intellectual 
speech to be strictly educational, lacking the ability to arouse people to action, 
mobilize them, and persuade them to accept danger or death for a cause.  In a 
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public address of January 9, 1928, Goebbels related the following to his audience 
on the convictions of one’s beliefs: 
…propaganda should not be intellectual, but popular.  It is not the 
task of propaganda to discover spiritual revelations…I do not go 
into the meeting hall to find intellectual revelations, but in order to 
transmit to others what I have realized to be right (Bosmajian, 1960, 
p. 368). 
Intellectuals were often viewed as functioning against the spirit and needs of the 
masses.  Nazi radio expert and Reichssendeleiter or national programming 
director, Eugene Hadamovsky, in his book on propaganda theory, also echoed 
the Party’s attitude on the need for simple faith as opposed to intellectual doubt: 
Political propaganda preaches faith; nothing else could be its 
nature.  Our people long for an inward grasp of political life, for a 
political philosophy, and they are ready to take it up eagerly.  But 
here in the midst of the people stands the German intellectual, the 
leaders of German intellectuality, and even today [1936] they are 
critically examining premises and counter-premises, the pros and 
the cons, without coming to any conclusion.  The German 
intellectual, however, will not be able to keep aloof much longer.  
He will have to place himself in the service of nationalization, at the 
vanguard of the masses, first and above all, in the service of the 
Faith. (Scanlan, 1949, p. 88) 
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By 1942, speakers were still being warned that they should avoid intellectual 
posturing.  The propaganda director of Gau, or district, Kassel was fine-tuned to 
the Party’s uneasiness on the subject: 
A great danger is to be observed, in so far as we have fallen into a 
bookish knowledge of National Socialism, in which the speaker 
believes that his task is to publicize some wisdom gained from 
reading (p. 88). 
Goebbels saw a distinct advantage in terms of the capabilities of the emotional 
speaker as opposed to the intellectual speaker: 
…clearness of expression, simplicity of arrangement, the guidance 
of instinct, poetic vision and grandeur of ideas, a knowledge of the 
innermost corners of the human soul, and power of delivery.  Hitler 
is the model (p. 89). 
The official monthly propaganda journal, Unser Willie und Weg or Our Will 
and Way (Michael & Doerr, p. 407), was first published in March of 1931 and was 
discontinued after a ten year run by the pressures of the war in June of 1941 
(Scanlan, 1950, p. 137).  This journal, intended as a guide for propagandists, 
helped the Propaganda Ministry maintain a sense of uniformity over the widely 
dispersed Nazi speaker system.  A.E. Frauenfeld, the Gauleiter or political head 
of the regional district of Berlin (Michael & Doerr, p. 176), outlines terms for 
audience acceptance of the speaker’s message in the journal’s September 
edition of 1937: 
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Especially noteworthy for the speaker is the undeniable fact that the 
listeners will test the correctness of his utterances, not according to 
logical and philosophical principles, but they will judge according to 
emotion, Leidenschaft, and emphasis, Eindringlichkeit, along with 
clearness and understandability (Scanlan, 1949, pp. 89-90). 
Convincing the German Volk that the Nazi worldview, Weltanschauung, 
was right for Germany was an important function of the speaker and would 
supposedly be accomplished by appealing to the good instincts of the people.  
An audience’s inner sense of conviction was sought by the speakers while 
transmitting enthusiasm and faith in Weltanschauung to them.  It was thought 
that this style of oratory would mold the masses into faithful National Socialists 
(Bosmajian, 1960, pp. 368-369).  
 Emil Dovifat’s instructional book, Rede und Redner, told Nazi speakers of 
their one goal, “to be a political power and to lead to action.”  The “action” or 
“deed” was the highest goal of the speech (p. 369).  After the speech was 
delivered, the degree of its effectiveness was measurable to the extent that the 
listener moved in the direction of the deed.  The means to this movement were 
seen as the communication of reassurance and the awakening of the faith within 
the audience.  Dovifat placed the following demands on the political speaker: 
(1) he has to recognize the fate of his people; (2) he has to stand 
always behind his word, ready for action; (3) he has to subject his 
own being and oratorical success to the welfare of the community 
(p. 369). 
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These demands were grounded in the historical example of Demosthenes who 
Dovifat categorized as having a “prophet-like” clear view of what was right for his 
people.  This orientation came from a “statesman-like sense of reality” (p. 369), 
far from the trappings of intellectualism, which was intent on examining all sides 
of every issue. 
  Speakers were to represent the movement at all times and remain the 
most active propagandists of the Idee or Idea by sacrificing time, wellbeing, vigor, 
and material values.  Simplification was privileged over long, drawn out 
discussion.  Furthermore, speakers were expected to unselfishly reassign 
personal success or accolades through oratory to the interests of the National 
Socialist movement and Germany (p. 369).  
 
 The Nazi Party Speaker System (Rednerwesen der NSDAP) 
 “It is safe to say that no political party in the world’s history ever had a 
more elaborate speaker system than that introduced into Germany by the Nazis” 
(Scanlan, 1950, p. 134).  The indifferences to oratory in previous periods of 
German culture and politics were seen as damaging and would never be 
repeated under the National Socialists; therefore, an organized system with at 
least three distinct divisions came into being in 1935 (p. 134).  
 The first division was formatted by geographic considerations.  One of the 
most prestigious was the Reichsredner or National Speaker of which only 60 
were certified as of 1936.  The Gau or province was the domain of the Gauredner 
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and the smaller component of the Gau or Kreis was reserved for the Kreisredner 
(p. 134). 
 Purpose and subject were the delineations of the next division.  Redner 
was used to signify those who spoke on  political matters and Fachredner was 
the name given to the speaker who professed knowledge in a specific area, for 
example agriculture or industry.  Hence, a political speaker could exist on three 
levels as well as a technical speaker, which brought the total to six categories.  A 
seventh was added to serve as an apprentice program, Stosstruppredner or 
“Shock-Troop Speakers” (p. 134). 
 The speaker system structure became problematic for Goebbels who 
insisted on thorough control of all propaganda matters.  Not only did the system 
of speakers grow into a bureaucracy, the lines of control became blurred by the 
interference originating with local political leaders who regarded all activity in 
their areas as falling under their authority.  Constant reminders were given 
concerning the relationship of political leaders within certain regions to 
propagandistic activity, in which it was clearly stated that propaganda is 
subordinate to political leadership only at the very highest levels of Party 
organization (p. 135).    
 The specifics of the Nazi Party structure and rules were outlined by Dr. 
Robert Ley in the publication of Organisationsbuch der NSDAP in 1936.  There 
would be a Main Office of the Speaker System, and two subordinate divisions-
The Office of Speaker Service, and The Office for Speaker Training where one 
would find the “Reich-Speaker School.”  These offices demanded the use of the 
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appropriate title earned by a speaker in all publicity announcements (pp. 135-
136).  
  Early on, speaker selection was based on skill and efficiency along with 
having attained a “veteran of the Kampfzeit” status.  This term referred to the 
early Nazi Party’s “time of struggle,” prior to Hitler taking office in January of 1933 
(p. 136).  The Kampfzeit-era speaker’s method was mainly an attack on the 
opposition.  He could explain Hitler’s doctrines in the broad, vague terminology 
that was invented to do so, yet the majority of his speeches centered on 
negativity directed at “misled movements” such as the KPD (German Communist 
Party) or the SPD (German Socialist Party).  Kampfzeit speakers were told by 
their propaganda chiefs that their weapon was the assault and that they should 
never have to defend themselves.  This directive extended to a literal sense 
when the early National Socialists made it clear that the “Party wanted a speaker 
who could handle his fists when he could not handle his audience” (p. 143). 
 Less than six months after the Nazis came to power, all political opposition 
was outlawed because of Hitler being granted extraordinary political authority by 
the Reichstag.  This period of Nazi history was known as Machtübernahme or 
taking power (Michael & Doerr, p. 269) and had an important impact on the 
speaker system that had been so accustomed to being on the offensive in 
predictable settings of antagonistic controversy.  The New York Times ran a 
front-page article on December 4, 1934 in which Germany had been declared a 
“public speaker’s paradise” as a result of an anti-heckling decree by Dr. Wilhelm 
Frick, Minister of the Interior, “Dr. Frick ordered that only non-controversial 
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questions could be asked after lectures.  Audiences, he said, would be expected 
to cease all interruptions that were provocative of controversy” (Bosmajian, 1960, 
p. 370).   
 Kampfzeit-era speakers could now look back nostalgically on the days 
when a well-behaved audience was far from guaranteed.  The following is from 
an article written by Eugene Wiesenborn for the October 1934 edition of the 
propaganda journal Unser Wille und Weg:  
It is glorious, indeed, it is a joy to live…To the battle-tested speaker 
it seems like a paradise.  Instead of enduring injury and insults, he 
is conducted into the auditorium by well-disciplined SA men and 
heartily welcomed by the political leader…no concert of whistles, no 
catcalls-peace and order over everything (Scanlan, 1950, p. 138).  
 New accomplishments were accompanied by new problems within the 
Reich’s speaker system.  The Machtübernahme opened the floodgates for the 
overflow of new Party members who became speakers without the “benefit” of 
oratorical struggle and experience from the early years.  These non-Kampfzeit 
era speakers caused concern among the propaganda directors, including Hugo 
Ringler, editor-in-chief of a publication designed for speakers, Rednerinformation 
(p. 136).  He expressed his trepidation over the emerging course of events in a 
June 1935 article in Unser Wille und Weg: 
In the majority of cases this new party comrade would be able to 
base his presentation only on an academic study of National 
Socialist doctrine.  Now, especially since it has become the doctrine 
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of the German people, the National Socialist philosophy is a fighting 
philosophy.  Only that party-comrade can speak in this fighting 
spirit, who himself has experienced the fight and won with it (pp. 
137-138). 
 Early in 1933, within weeks of taking office as the new Chancellor of 
Germany, Hitler ordered a propaganda campaign directed at the citizens of the 
Reich with the intent of shaking loose any signs of “political lethargy” and 
instilling assurance in his vision of the future (pp. 138-139).  Even though rival 
political parties were gone, the Nazis knew they had to put their philosophy on 
the market for the entire Volk.  The speakers were reminded of this point in 
another article from Ringler in Unser Wille und Weg in August 1934: 
But for him, as for all other units of the Party, this day of victory was 
not the end of the battle; the place won has turned into a point of 
departure for new battles and for new effort…In the hour of victory 
the National Socialist Speaker recognized his task, which the hour 
imposed upon him: to fight on, with redoubled effort, for the entire 
conversion of the German people to the National Socialist doctrine.  
In place of the fight with hostile political parties and their tactics 
came the fight for complete possession of the German soul (p. 
139). 
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Hans Krebs, Nazi Rhetorician 
 The holder of Nazi Party membership card 86, Hitler being number 7, was 
Hans Krebs.  Scanlan believes that Krebs was the true Nazi rhetorician when 
one examines what the he said about the education of the speaker (Scanlan, 
1951, p. 435).  In his book, Redner-Fibel, Krebs outlines the necessary topics 
that the aspiring speaker should study in building a solid background of 
Germanic knowledge.  Familiarization with the great German classics is deemed 
essential for acquiring a storehouse of useful forms of expression so beautifully 
used by the poets.  In the literary field, Krebs suggested the study of classic 
German writers such as Goethe, Schiller, and Grillparzer.  Philosophic ideas 
were to be found in the works of Fichte and Schleiermacher (p. 436).  The study 
of German history was also considered complementary to the Party speaker’s 
efforts. 
 There was a school of thought among experts of Nazi propaganda 
centered on a homemade type of psychology, Volksseele or boiling soul of the 
people. The term was used during the November 1938 Pogrom, 
Reichskristallnacht, or Night of Broken Glass, to justify attacks against the Jews 
as retaliation for the assassination of Party official, Ernst vom Rath (Michael & 
Doerr, p. 339).  Later in the war, the media seized the expression to convey the 
people’s outrage over Allied air bombings that had eventually reached western 
German cities (p. 426).  Volksseele was used since the Romantic period and 
communicated a concrete unity of mind and heart (Scanlan, 1951, p. 436). 
 126
Party speakers were instructed to concentrate on understanding this aspect of 
the German people, a comprehension that could not be gleaned from any book 
on social psychology.  Krebs elaborates on this theme in Redner-Fibel: 
The speaker’s effectiveness will depend basically on a knowledge 
of the Volksseele … Only the speaker who constantly studies the 
mind of the people will have that inner contact that is so necessary 
to effective speaking.  Only one who knows the sufferings and 
struggles of the people will know how to coin expressions that are 
right for the people.  The careful observer can get his clearest view 
into the soul of the people when a party campaign, a national 
upheaval, an election, a plebiscite, or some other significant 
movement in the development of the people is taking place…At 
every meeting the speaker should make note of especially effective 
expressions that he hears and should observe what arguments 
make the deepest impression on the audience.  At such meetings 
one must closely study the psychological reactions of the audience, 
if he is himself to achieve the greatest effect (Scanlan, 1951, p. 
437). 
 The speaker’s political indoctrination in the form of a “firm National 
Socialist philosophy” was found in the Krebs list of required reading: of course, 
the Nazi Bible, Mein Kampf, Alfred Rosenberg’s Nature, Principles and Purposes 
of the NSDAP, Blood and Honor, and his Structure of the [National Socialist] 
Concept; Fritsch’s Handbook of the Jewish Problem; Gregor Schwartz-
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Bostunitsch’s Jewish Imperialism; Dr. Robert Ley’s Germany has Become More 
Beautiful, and The Upsurge of Social Integrity; Dr. Goebbels’ Signs of the New 
Era, and issues of Der Angriff; Dr. Frick’s We Build the Third Reich; agronomist 
Richard Darré’s Peasantry as the Life Source of the Nordic Race; and various 
other volumes on Judaism, Catholicism, and Free-Masonry (p. 437). 
 Krebs also warned speakers to be wary of books written by “Pseudo-
National Socialists.”  As a precautionary measure, the Nazis organized “an 
official Party Testing Commission for the Integrity of National Socialist Literature.”  
If the publication was acceptable, the flyleaf displayed the notation 
Unbedenklichkeitsvermerk or no objection.  This same entry was used in 
documents for safe passage (Michael & Doerr, p. 406).  Krebs insisted that the 
speaker owned the above-mentioned books and had them available at all times. 
 An obvious knowledge of current political events was considered vital for a 
speaker’s success.  Therefore, the individual was required to read at least one of 
the many available Nazi newspapers on a daily basis.  Krebs strongly 
recommended collecting pertinent newspaper clippings and arranging them 
topically in color-coded folders.  Among the headings suggested were; “Winter 
Relief Work”; “Race Questions”; “Social Politics”; “Jewry”; “The German Labor 
Front” and “Marxism” (Scanlan,  1951, p. 438). 
 Krebs’ book not only looked at the education of the speaker but also at 
standard public speaking themes found in any textbook.  However, these themes 
were complicated by a certain Nazi slant.  His distinction of major speech forms 
were the descriptive and persuasive.  Exposition or Vortrag is explained as: 
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…the exclusively factual exposition of a carefully limited subject.  
Here the speaker must follow a closely constructed outline.  The 
speech must hold itself strictly to the subject in hand and be 
addressed primarily to the faculty of understanding.  The speaker 
will avoid large gestures and other forms of emotional excitation.  
The Vortrag is brief and to the point (p. 438). 
Persuasive speaking was dealt with in a more zealous manner.  Known as Rede, 
Krebs describes the approach: 
 It must be spontaneous, without manuscript.  At most, the speaker 
permits himself only a few notes, keywords…that indicate his main 
thoughts.  If the Rede is to achieve its purpose, it must be delivered 
in a stirring manner…it must reach beyond understanding to the 
feelings of the listeners (p. 438). 
 As for the components of the speech itself, the Nazi technique for the 
introduction  called for an appropriate salutation such as “Honored Assembly”, 
“Comrades of the People”, “German Men and Women”, or “Dear Labor 
Comrades.”  A proper introduction was said to gain a sense of absolute 
assurance as the speaker scanned the audience searching for visual cues.  It 
was forbidden under all circumstances to begin a speech with an apology of any 
type (pp. 438-439). 
 Evidence and support material, accessible through the speaker’s 
collection of newspaper clippings, were considered essential to the body of the 
speech.  The discreet use of statistical data was also stressed by Krebs.  The 
 129
attack stratagem against opponents of National Socialist ideology was to twist 
and apply their own statements against them.  Regardless of the purpose for the 
speech, the speaker was instructed to develop it so that “the most impressive 
part comes at the end” (p. 439). 
 “The conclusion is often the deciding part of the speech…it must aim not 
only at understanding but even more at the emotions…it must call up the will and 
action” (p. 439).  The Nazi formula called for a peroration and cites Hitler’s 
example of “an overwhelming conclusion” in a Munich courtroom at the end of his 
1924 trial after the failed beer hall putsch.  Krebs even expressed concern over a 
“serious and dignified” exit from the podium or stage, “the speaker should never 
respond to applause by bowing; rather he should turn away with his head erect 
and a firm step.  Inwardly and outwardly his behavior should be courteous, 
straightforward, upright, and manly” (p. 439). 
 On the subject of style, Krebs alluded to four distinct forms.  Even though 
Hitler and Goebbels expressed their distain for the intellectual approach, Krebs 
believed it highly effective via the power of logic and thought.  He added that this 
was the comportment of professors and scholars.  The splendor and loftiness of 
language in a style guided by the imagination was another effective speaking 
category.  This correlated the manner employed by clergymen and epidictic 
speakers.  The true Volksredner was said to have a style that was “ruled by the 
will and by a strong sense of urgency.”  According to Krebs, when the intellect, 
imagination, and emotions were combined the result was the Führer, a speaker 
of unmatched skill (p. 439).  
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 As Scanlan points out, Kreb’s book Redner-Fibel amounts to little more 
than practical advice and does not attempt the philosophical analysis of any 
specific discourse.  However, it is important due to the prestige of the author and 
its extensive use by Party speakers.  Above all, its approval by the National 
Socialists gives us a clearer picture of the unorthodox manner in which Nazi 
rhetoric was employed (p. 440). 
 
Transition: From Podium to Microphone 
 As mentioned earlier, Hitler’s first speech made from a broadcast facility 
caused him to avoid the radio booth as much as possible throughout the 
remainder of his dominance over the German people.  It did not take the 
resultant large quantity of mail for one to discern that he was the type of speaker 
who fed off the emotions and feedback provided by the visible audience.  He was 
not alone in this regard since the relatively new medium of radio offered 
challenges to the most accomplished public speakers.  
 One could openly make the logical connection that there were instances of 
the Nazi speaker, trained in public oratory, stepping behind the microphone of a 
broadcast studio to promote the cause of National Socialism.  The following 
examples of transitional difficulties and “finding one’s way” in the new 
communicative world of broadcasting are purposely discussed to gain a succinct 
historical perspective that parallels the period of the Nazi movement in Germany.   
 In 1922, H. V. Kaltenborn, an American news reporter, became one of the 
earliest radio reporters and commentators with his first radio experience 
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emanating from an experimental broadcast facility in Newark, New Jersey.  He 
began regular broadcasts on CBS in 1930 and traveled the world covering the 
major news events of the day (Kaltenborn, 1950, p. 109).  Incidentally, in 1932 
shortly before taking power Hitler met with Kaltenborn at Berchtesgaden in the 
Bavarian Alps near the Austrian border (interview details, pp. 186-188).  
  As was the case with Hitler, Kaltenborn also cited the lack of an audience 
as one of the toughest hurdles to overcome.  The unresponsive microphone and 
the indifference of the technicians on the other side of the window in the 
adjoining room were additional sources of self-consciousness.  After finishing a 
half hour extemporaneous talk, he was drenched with perspiration (p. 109).  In 
reference to preparation and notes, Kaltenborn used only brief written remarks at 
the podium.  He soon found that radio required an indescribable type of new 
mental concentration that far exceeded the attentiveness necessary before the 
live audiences that he had grown accustomed to in his early career (pp. 109-
110).  Even though immediate audience reaction, both good and bad, came in 
the form of the blinking telephone switchboard lights, Kaltenborn described a: 
 …panicky feeling that no one could be listening or that something 
had gone wrong with the mechanism.  Even when fan mail began 
coming in it was still hard to visualize that I was really talking to 
tens of thousands (p. 110). 
 Radio did not afford the luxury of the dramatic pause for effect or the 
recess of a few steps to think through a remark.  The broadcast equivalent was 
nothing but the silence of dead air.  For this reason, Kaltenborn delivered most 
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broadcasts standing up to avoid the temptation to relax while sitting in front of the 
microphone.  While standing and even gesticulating in the familiar speaking 
position native to a live audience, he was able to liberate emotion and tension, 
often to the amusement of fellow employees (p. 110). 
 Other issues associated with the transition to radio involved early 
inadequacies in microphone sensitivity.  Any slight turn of the head while 
speaking resulted in inaudible words.  Kaltenborn resorted to having his head 
placed in a brace, albeit for a short time, similar to those used by photographers 
to curtail movement.  Chalk marks on the floor indicated the boundaries of his 
foot movement.  Heavy curtains in the studio absorbed unwanted sound and 
likewise contributed to unbearable heat in the pre-air conditioned days of modern 
studios (pp. 110-111).  As time progressed, Kaltenborn realized that being 
natural on the air was much more important than “meticulous exactitude” (p. 
111). 
 An article on influential factors in radio speech from the April 1944 issue of 
the Quarterly Journal of Speech situates us in a similar historical moment.  A few 
generalizations include the avoidance of localisms in the speaker’s voice 
inflection or vocabulary so as not to alienate part of the listening audience.  
Clarity was stressed using repetition and “concrete illustrations” due to the 
assumption that the “listener’s mind is not acting as creatively as in the face-to-
face situation” (Townsend, 1944, p. 189).   
 Simplicity in radio speech was also highly regarded, with the successful 
fireside chats of Franklin Roosevelt used as the high profile example of the 
 133
period.  Concision was regarded as an effective tool of radio speaking since it 
was assumed that the audience, at least in the evening, was comfortably at 
home and tired from a long workday.  Brevity was apparently seen as the correct 
approach to a gradually diminishing attention span (p. 189). 
 As a substitute for the inability of the audience to see facial expressions 
and gestures, it was suggested that radio speakers build their repertoire of tonal 
variety and inflection.  The technique of the emotional appeal was associated 
with radio demagogues who had abandoned “traditional tricks of platform 
demagoguery” and invented new varieties of expressive pleas to accommodate 
the technology.  Overall, it was thought that radio speaking was turning toward 
an appeal to the logic of the audience, more so than popular oratory (p. 189). 
 Radio was cited at the time for a renewal in the interest of politics.  It was 
suggested that Herbert Hoover lost thousands of votes one fateful evening in 
1932 for going over his allotted airtime and talking through a popular program-
featuring comedian Ed Wynn.  Mothers faced with the consequences of the 
President’s action put their crying children to bed that night second guessing Mr. 
Hoover’s chances for re-election: 
The listener always tends to lose interest in long talks.  The 
optimum length of time for ordinary educational, political, factual, or 
news broadcasts is probably from ten to twenty minutes.  Even so 
popular and persuasive a radio speaker as President Roosevelt, 
chooses, probably wisely so, to confine his fireside chats on 
political topics to approximately twenty minutes (p. 189). 
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 According to A.L. Barnard of NBC, one of the most common mistakes in 
the move from public speaking to broadcasting was that of the radio novice 
imitating the style of the “old-fashioned and rather loud-mouthed politician.”  This 
forceful delivery, characterized by the attempt to “pound the message across,” 
was ample evidence of the beginner’s disregard for and ignorance of radio’s 
inherent intimacy between the speaker and the listener.  The suggestion was 
made to envision the audience as two or three people relaxing in a living room, in 
spite of the fact that this scene may be replicated hundreds or thousands of times 
over when an accurate account of the listening audience is revealed (p. 189). 
 For reasons of intimacy and invisibility, the radio speaker of the 1940’s 
was being told to speak more rapidly since a pause, if long enough, may give the 
listeners the impression that the station had gone off the air.  The personality of 
voice was seen as the key to stirring an audience member’s sense of 
participation.  Again, FDR was used as the example when he referred to his 
audience as “My friends,” along with Louisiana Senator Huey Long, who initially 
asked listeners to phone five people and invite them to “participate” by listening 
to his broadcast (p. 190). 
 At the time, Townsend believed that the U.S. was in need of the influence 
of radio as never before.  His belief was grounded in the functionality of political 
democracies and upon the interest and intelligence of the voting public coupled 
with their ability to connect with elected executives.  Those who would not leave 
home to attend a political rally might listen in to a broadcast of the same meeting 
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or similar talks on politics.  Townsend concludes his article with a 1944 
prescription for the future of effective radio: 
 We need to replace blatant commercial propaganda with 
propaganda of deeper value to the citizen and to the nation, 
educational propaganda, patriotic propaganda, better means of 
living propaganda, and we must learn how to present it in such a 
manner that the public will want it as a steady diet in addition to, if 
not in place of, light entertainment (p. 190). 
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Chapter 4-The Rhetorical Language of National Socialism 
 
 
Establishing the Necessity of Nazi-German 
 
 In order to determine why a new type of language was deemed necessary 
and subsequently cultivated by the National Socialists, it would be wise to 
discuss fundamental opinions that Hitler and the other Nazi elites had about 
those they wished to control.  It is evident that Hitler held a low opinion of the 
masses.  There are ample indications from Mein Kampf, including a passage in 
which he equates the human qualities of speed, toughness, and hardness to 
greyhounds, leather, and Krupp’s steel, respectively (pp. 493-494).  The Führer’s 
denigrating views on the mental strength of the populace are further illustrated in 
other revealing remarks, “The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so 
feminine in their nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are 
motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment” (p. 237).  
These personal judgments of society are among the factors not to be overlooked 
in considering the implementation of the Nazi German language.  
Nazi speeches and spectacles were constructed in an attempt to appeal to 
Hitler’s perceived public.  This prevailing, and consequently official, National 
Socialist attitude aligned itself with those who conceived the idea of a “crowd 
mentality.”  In the event that a “crowd mentality” was missing, efforts were made 
to construct one (Bosmajian, 1965, p. 68).  Evidently, Hitler’s assessment of the 
volk, the German listening audiences, coincided with Freud’s (1960), description 
of crowd behavior taken from Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego: 
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It might be said that the intense emotional ties which we observe in 
groups [crowds] are quite sufficient to explain one of their 
characteristics-the lack of independence and initiative in their 
members, the similarity in the reactions of all of them, their 
reduction, so to speak, to the level of group individuals.  But if we 
look at it as a whole, a group shows us more than this.  Some of its 
features-weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotional 
restraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay, the inclination to 
exceed every limit in the expression of emotion and to work it off 
completely in the form of action-these and similar features, which 
we find so impressively described by LeBon, show an unmistakable 
picture of a regression of mental activity to an earlier stage such as 
we are not surprised to find among savages or children.  (in 
Bosmajian, p. 69). 
Reduced to this analytical level, the Nazis thought the ideal candidate for 
indoctrination to National Socialism were those who were foreign to the concept 
of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions.  If we accept the fact 
that Hitler regarded domination as the sole purpose of politics, then we must 
agree that, “it is far easier to dominate the unreflecting and unreasoning person 
than the person given to thinking matters through for himself” (Young, 1991, p. 
67).  This view becomes further solidified when we make note of Hitler’s well-
known distrust of those on the other end of the spectrum, intellectuals: 
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The so-called ‘intelligentsia’ at any rate looks down with really 
infinite condescension on everyone who has not been pulled 
through the obligatory schools in order to have the necessary 
knowledge pumped into his brains.  Actually, the question is never, 
What can this man do, but what has he learned?  To these 
‘educated’ ones, the greatest empty-head, provided he is only 
wrapped in a sufficient number of certificates, is worth more than 
even the most clever boy who does not possess these priceless 
paper bags.” (Hitler, 1939, pp. 300-301) 
Intellectuals had opinions and were capable of “impressive argument” against the 
regime.  In a radio address of October 11, 1942, Goebbels described them as 
having “too much knowledge to allow of instinctive faith and too little knowledge 
to allow of faith by conviction” (Kris & Speier, p. 196). 
 With this peculiar delineation of the ordinary masses and the suspicious 
intellectuals in place, the Nazis set out on a course of action in which the concept 
of “blind obedience” would become the means to their ends of complete 
domination of the German people.  The descriptor “peculiar” is used here 
because apparently, the National Socialists seemed to lump the entire 
community either into the “crowd mentality” grouping or into the “so-called 
intelligentsia” camp.  The mass meetings were the settings for the elimination of 
thought “thus sealing the psychic gulf between intellectuals and workers and 
producing an undifferentiated and manipulatable crowd (Young, p. 68).  
Nevertheless, what if that “psychic gulf” contained sizable members of a mid-
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range, yet silent, partition in the perceived all-encompassing strata of awareness 
and intellect that the Nazis overlooked in their exercise of thought control?  Quite 
possibly it is this group that Steiner alludes to in his controversial essay, “The 
Hollow Miracle,” written some fourteen years after the war, “Millions of Germans 
began saying to themselves and to any foreigner gullible enough to listen that the 
past had somehow not happened, that the horrors had been grossly exaggerated 
by Allied propaganda and sensation-mongering journalists” (Steiner, pp. 106-
107). 
 If the short-term answer to restricting thought was possible through the 
mass meeting and the vicariousness of listening to major events by radio, the 
long-term answer had to permeate all aspects of the educational system of the 
Reich.  Party officials were quickly set up in the schools and universities to insure 
that, “indoctrination in national socialism replaced rational inquiry and openness 
to ideas in the classroom” (Young, p. 69).  By 1936, about 1,500 professors had 
been dismissed, mostly due to their racial background (Weinreich, 1999, p. 19).  
However, a small number were eliminated for political reasons and conceivably 
may have been sent to concentration camps wearing the “red” winkel or triangle, 
indicative of a political prisoner (Michael & Doerr, p. 466).  At the University of 
Freiburg, historian Gerhard Ritter formed the “Freiburg Circle” which took a 
middle stance against the Nazi character and teachings but felt they could not 
betray their country in a time of war.  No bona fide action was ever taken by 
these professors (Wires, 1985, p. 22). 
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Academic subjects were redefined and contorted to fit neatly packaged 
Nazi parameters.  Students were told of the advantage of pure “Aryan blood” and 
Teutonic superiority.  They struggled with courses of study like “German” 
mathematics and “Aryan” physics (Young, p. 69).  The following poem was found 
in the form of a prayer from a 1936 school primer for children: 
  Prayer 
  Protect, God, with your hand 
  Our dear fatherland. 
  Give strength and power to our Führer, 
  And help him in his difficult task. 
  Turn away our nation’s sorrow, 
  Give all of us work and bread this morrow. 
      H. Sommer, 1936 (Michael & Doerr, p. 475). 
A similar schoolbook example for children containing Hitler’s own axioms: 
  The Führer speaks: 
  Learn to make sacrifices for your fatherland. 
  All of us will have to die but Germany will live.   
  In your folk community lies your strength. 
  You must be faithful, you must be courageous, you must be heroic, 
  And you must create with each other one big 
  Glorious comradeship. 
    Adolf Hitler, 1936 (Michael & Doerr, pp. 475-476). 
 Plans were also being formulated as to the level of education that the 
conquered Slavs in the East would receive.  Hitler believed these “sub-humans” 
should be given training in recognizing pictured road signs but not be taught to 
read.  Therefore, books were out of the question and the radio would act as chief 
provider of sufficient information.  In short, they were to be a slave-class and not 
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trusted with any work requiring the slightest mental exertion (Young, p. 69).  
Similarly, Himmler’s SS-inspired plan for primary-level education, presented in a 
memorandum in May of 1940, was to teach children from “inferior” races to write 
their name and count to 500 adding, “that it is God’s command that he should be 
obedient to Germans, honourable, industrious and brave” (p. 69). 
In reality, the rhetoric was intended to produce an entire nation, and later 
the conquered territories, to remain focused on National Socialist thought and 
deed.  The Party literature pointed to the ideal Nazi as one who acted on instinct, 
blindly believing in the movement with no desire to search for the logic in Hitler’s 
decisions.  The principles the ideal Nazi adhered to included Aryan superiority, 
anti-Semitism, Lebensraum, and mystical references to “blood and soil” (p. 72).  
By assimilation into a collective body, the Nazis had individuals prepared for self-
sacrifice, the ideal situation in the quest for domination and power.   
The ordinary man or woman did not exist on German radio.  Broadcasters 
referred to “the German people” or simply “Germany.”  The individual was 
swallowed into the group and was expected to think, sense, and operate like 
every other constituent of his race: 
The propagandist hopes that the listener, plain Herr Schmidt, will 
believe what he is told about the ‘German people,’ and begin to 
think, feel, and behave as the propagandist says he does…If Herr 
Schmidt believed in it, he could be proud, and nobody would object, 
for he was then of no further trouble to Dr. Goebbels (Kris & Speier, 
pp. 163-164).   
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  The Party member considered himself nothing without the Party.  All joys 
and sorrows were found through association with the group and never through 
individual action.  Identification with the collective whole is essential to successful 
propaganda: 
Above all, he must never feel alone.  Though stranded on a desert 
island, he must still feel that he is under the eyes of the group.  To 
be cast out from the group should be the equivalent to being cut off 
from life…This is undoubtedly a primitive state of being, and its 
most perfect examples are found among primitive tribes.  Mass 
movements strive to approximate this primitive perfection, and we 
are not imagining things when the anti-individualist bias of 
contemporary mass movements strikes us as a throwback to the 
primitive (Hoffer, 1951, p. 63). 
The ideology marched past the people was overtly racial but also elastic to 
changing circumstances,  “Hitler modified the National Socialist ideology several 
times according to the requirements of propaganda” (Ellul, 1965, p. 96).  A sharp 
change in the radio propaganda line occurred during the Russian phase of the 
war, when the Germans were no longer fighting for the “New Order” or the “New 
Europe,” instead the fight became one for the old European culture, tradition, and 
civilization.  Conversely, the Russians were “subhuman” and “Asiatic,” while the 
English were geographically detached from the mainland.  On June 27, 1941, a 
German news broadcast proclaimed, “The whole of Europe has recognized that 
 143
Germany’s fight against Moscow is in the nature of a crusade of the European 
nations against Bolshevism” (Kris & Speier, p. 308). 
Nazi teachings were “more like vapor, evoking in men and women an 
emotional response but almost no reflection” (Young, p. 72).  However, there was 
no pretense to scholarship on the part of the Party.  There were no ideas, no 
thinking, nothing left to reason.  It seemed to be an “either-or” situation that one 
accepted through rhetorically influenced emotion or rejected on the basis of 
rationality: 
National Socialism cannot be grasped intellectually.  Whoever does 
not feel that the National Socialist idea is correct will never 
comprehend it.  But on the other hand, he who has become a 
National Socialist in his heart will also come to understand by 
himself in the course of time the intellectual basis of the National 
Socialist world of ideas, Gedankenwelt.  (p. 73) 
This naming of a group of ideas further demonstrates the inherent transparency 
and hollowness of a vague ideology, but the “either-or” presentation has great 
strength.  Its definiteness appeals to a crowd mentality, the target populace, by 
showing decision and action; there is no weakness or compromise.  The “either-
or” straightforward honesty and direction could easily be juxtaposed with the 
“double-talk” of the Jews and the “palaver” of the Parliamentarians (Bosmajian, 
1965, p. 74). 
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Marcuse on Nazi Language 
 Written in California in June of 1942, Herbert Marcuse produced a study 
on what was then perceived as “The New German Mentality” (Marcuse, 1998, p. 
141).  He had escaped with his family from Germany years earlier and was now 
working for the U.S. in the Office of War Information.  As a member of the 
Marxist-inspired “Frankfort School,” he continued his work in a tradition that was 
renowned for the development of Critical Theory.  “The New German Mentality” 
was part of an internal theoretical study to achieve a more insightful look at the 
German people and National Socialism’s effect upon them (p. 140). 
 He begins with the hypothesis that National Socialism has changed 
behavior and the thought process to a degree that renders usual counter-
propaganda and education useless.  Germans are possessed with different 
values, using a language not only foreign to Westerners but to their own former 
culture.  Marcuse describes a two-tiered mentality wherein the pragmatic layer 
contains the elements of matter-of-factness, efficiency and success, 
mechanization, and rationalization (p. 141).  This was demonstrated by a 
Goebbels broadcast on May 29, 1941, attempting a rationalized re-interpretation 
of the war against the Soviets: 
German peasant lads marched as soldiers through the Ukraine and 
on their way took up handfuls of black fertile soil-and at home there 
was no butter and not enough bread because too little rain had 
fallen in April…This is no war for throne and altar.  This is a war for 
grain and bread, a plentiful breakfast, lunch, and dinner table…a 
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war for raw materials, for rubber and oil, iron and ore (Kris & 
Speier, pp. 382-383). 
Marcuse next describes the German mythological layer of language that 
includes paganism, social naturalism, and racism (Marcuse, p. 141).  The 
following is a portion of the radio program Topics of the Day, broadcast days 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor.  On December 10, 1941, the Party propagandist 
used the notion of “racial purity” as a substitute for “Aryanism” which would have 
been impossible in linking Germany’s new Japanese partner in the war against 
the United States: 
In reality, Hawaii is Japanese by virtue of the fact that 40 per cent 
of the population of 420,000 are Japanese, who, by their unity and 
success dominate the remainder of the population, which is a 
mixture of the scum of the earth…Because the Japanese kept their 
race pure and did not permit America to absorb them, they were 
persecuted, and in the name of a pure American race!  This was 
impudence, as millions of Negroes and Jews, and other races were 
mixed in the American melting pot (Kris & Speier, p. 263). 
 German society was pervaded by Party politics in the public and private 
spheres as well as in work and leisure activities.  There was an absence of the 
conventional barriers between individual and society and between society and 
the government.  Marcuse likens the Nazi politicalization to a terroristic 
politicalization found in middle class revolutions in Western Europe where the 
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“bourgeois” became known as the citizen “whose life was business, and whose 
business is a political affair” (Marcuse, p. 142). 
 The German people are warned about ideological excesses presented 
without a factual basis.  The enemy uses these tricks as camouflage for the real 
dangers ahead.  The Nazi’s own philosophy could easily be interchangeable 
here, yet its ever-present cynicism had taken hold of those who are supposed to 
accept as true, what had been told to them by their leaders:  
The German people believe in the National Socialist philosophy 
insofar as this philosophy proves to be an efficient weapon for 
defense and aggression-but not farther…those who believe in the 
Nazi ideology are conscious of the fact that he believes in an 
ideology.  (p. 142) 
 In mobilizing the population for war, rationality had developed, that 
evaluated everything in terms of competence, achievement, and convenience.  
Marcuse speaks of a new German “pragmatist” whose support for the 
establishment is weighed against his own “immediate material advantage” while 
altering his thinking, approach, and behavior to a dangerous technological 
rationalization, “…the most formidable weapon of conquest.  He thinks in 
quantities: in terms of speed, skill, energy, organization, mass…This matter-of-
factness is the very center of the National Socialist mentality and the 
psychological ferment of the National Socialist system” (p. 143). 
 Marcuse also cites a revolt against the basic values found in Christian 
civilization, values last seen in the Weimar Republic and in the Labor movement. 
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The National Socialists fostered the belief that the Labor movement was part of 
the then current democratic culture due to its strong ties to principles of 
Christianity.  Once the democratic Weimar Republic collapsed, the Labor 
movement followed suite.  Opportunistically, the Nazis exploited the Weimar 
government’s unfulfilled promises by associating them with their high regard for 
“the supreme ideals of Christian civilization” (p. 143).  These anti-Christian 
sentiments were bubbling up in many citizens and had already become “deeply 
rooted” in other individuals.  Ellul explains the progression of propaganda from 
this point: 
Public opinion does not derive from individual opinions: here we are 
faced with two heterogeneous problems.  One cannot speak of a 
crystallization of individual opinions.  Rather, a vague, inconsistent, 
unformulated, latent opinion, which one might call ‘raw opinion’ is 
transformed by propaganda through a true process of crystallization 
into explicit opinion (Ellul, 1965, p. 204). 
The point of crystallization was timed to coincide with the German citizen’s latest 
disappointment in another failed government, therefore; the insurgency against 
Christian culture, manifested in “anti-Semitism, terrorism, social Darwinism, anti-
intellectualism, and naturalism” is attributable to the a new spirit of matter-of-
factness, an essential factor strongly pointed out by Marcuse.  It should also be 
noted that these types of revolts bear the seal of Germanic heritage, starting with 
Luther’s Protestantism up until Nietzsche, although the metaphysical component 
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of the rebellion under discussion was ruined by the National Socialists “and 
transformed into an instrument of totalitarian efficiency” (Marcuse, pp. 143-144). 
 Equal care was devoted to avoiding religious and anti-religious remarks on 
German radio.  Prior to the traditional Christian holidays, broadcasts referred to 
them in terms of the holiday’s Teutonic mythological meaning.  Comparisons 
were made between Teutonic and Christian interpretations, “When the Church 
introduced fasting for 40 days, it was destined to drive all the joy of living out of 
Shrovetide celebrations” (Kris & Speier, p. 79). 
 For the rebellion to be realized, the Party continued its assault on 
Christian civilization by relaxing some of their traditional taboos, both private and 
social.  Marcuse singles out sexuality, the family, and the moral code.  He also 
contends that a mere transfer occurred, not abolition, making the unrestraint 
illusionary.  In this manner, the taboos were fortified on other and better-
protected relations and institutions (Marcuse, p. 144).  Here is what Hitler had to 
say about the world’s oldest profession in Mein Kampf: 
Prostitution is a disgrace to mankind, but one cannot abolish it by 
moral lectures, pious intentions, etc., but its limitation and its final 
elimination warrant the abolition of quite a number of preliminary 
conditions.  But the first is and remains the creation of the 
possibility of early marriage, according to human nature, above all 
for the man; because the woman is here only the passive part, 
anyhow (p. 342). 
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 Marcuse explains that one of the strongest ties between the people and 
the Party is the fear of extermination or “catastrophic fatalism.”  The Germans 
sense that the capitulation of National Socialism will lead to the loss of the 
German state, their personal security, and a return to a lower standard of living 
than had been the case prior to the war (Marcuse, p. 144).     
Since fear, anxiety, and insecurity all contribute to sustaining the crowd 
mentality, the Nazis perpetuated or manufactured a crisis whenever it suited their 
needs because “a secure, individualistic citizenry was of no use to Hitler” 
(Bosmajian, 1965, p. 74).  The Nazis stirred fear, aroused indignation, and incited 
hate, all of which became emotionally charged ingredients of National Socialist 
rhetoric. 
The Party also knew when to avoid the introduction of bad news, 
especially military defeats, the first of which occurred in late 1940 during the 
“Battle of Britain” when the Germans lost 2,375 planes in three months (Kris & 
Speier, p. 389).  Large-scale setbacks, when not attributable to another entity, 
went largely unreported.  In this instance, the Nazi defeat was never admitted: 
…they never reported their losses and denied after the event that 
the Battle of Britain had ever taken place.  Finally, in the spring of 
1941, a special denial campaign was conducted by Fritzsche and 
other commentators in response to claims of the BBC.  
Counterpropaganda tried to ‘relegate the British drivel about the 
alleged German air battle over England into the realm of fantasies 
told by British firesides’ and declared that the story was invented by 
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the British in an attempt ‘to conceal the failure of the RAF from last 
autumn up till now’ (Kris & Speier, pp. 389-390). 
Hoffer elaborates on the active phases of mass movements and contends 
that Hitler’s objective of a “warrior state” had no automatic end.  The normal 
functioning of Nazi-dominated society called for unity and self-sacrifice in order 
for it to function.  With no end in sight, the everyday life of the people may be 
what Hoffer refers to as “religiofied,” where the common task becomes an 
exaggerated holy cause or quite simply, the everyday lives of the people become 
militarized (pp. 157-158).  In the case of the National Socialists, we can clearly 
find both outcomes. 
Marcuse asserts that the language and philosophy of the Party becomes 
perfectly rational when placed in the context of its policy and organization, 
otherwise one is faced with “nothing but illogical abstrusities.”  He corrects the 
critics of the day who identified two co-existing mentalities, logics and languages.  
The National Socialist philosophy, ideology, and propaganda were all illogical, 
but the language mentality of administration, organization, and everyday 
communication, of which radio played such as vital role, were all utterly rational 
and technical (Marcuse, p. 148).  The only way to understand this apparent 
contradiction was to view them as one mentality.  Marcuse claimed their different 
“forms of manifestation were determined, pervaded and unified by one and the 
same rationality” (p. 149). 
To understand the language, Marcuse looked at it as the means to the 
ends of “large scale imperialist expansion.”  German society heard a language 
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that told them private and social relationships came second to the standards of 
mechanized and rationalized war production.  No concepts or values impeding 
this effort would be tolerated.  Hence, the Nazi language is strictly technical with 
“pragmatic” or matter-of-fact goals while all aspects of society are absorbed in 
their operational function within the Party system.  This attitude was expressed 
by Goebbels on December 26, 1941 when discussing the unnecessary appeal 
for civilian sacrifice, since the volk are born into a race and linked to its destiny, 
“The word sacrifice must be reserved for the soldier” (Kris & Speier, p. 165).  
Likewise, the word “heroism” was not to be associated with the civilian 
population: 
In August 1941, Flannery, the American radio reporter, wanted to 
interview a heroine of the home front, but could not convince 
Goebbels’ office that the human interest story would make good 
propaganda.  ‘Calls on the women’s organization, Frauenschaft 
[Women’s League], were met…with the statement that it was the 
duty of the German people to be heroic and that they deserved no 
publicity for being so.’  (p. 165) 
At this point, Marcuse argues that language loses it’s “universality” and 
membership in civilization and succumbs to a singular, totalitarian content 
determined by utilization (Marcuse, p. 149).  Therefore, this technical structure of 
language inexorably enters the bureaucracy of National Socialism and cannot 
help but eventually situate itself in the everyday lives of its citizens.  This 
technical language, in order to extend itself and serve as “an all-embracing 
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medium of intersubjective understanding,” presupposes a “supra-technical” 
language community from which it draws strength and familiarity.  Marcuse 
categorizes this language community as one of “sentiment, emotion, subjective 
desires, and impulses” and furthermore identifies it in the previously mentioned 
mythological layer of German mentality (p. 149).  
 Within this layer, the Nazis tap into “the reservoir for the German protest 
against Christian civilization” but they purposely destroy the mythological and 
metaphysical contents, thus turning them into nothing more than parts of the 
technique of domination.  This critical accomplishment helps to foster the 
pragmatic goals of the Party and perpetuate totalitarian operational control.  
Marcuse identifies three areas where the completed process comes to life: in the 
syntactical from of the language, its vocabulary, and in a National Socialist 
pattern of “argumentation” (pp. 149-150). 
 Marcuse, through examining Nazi German’s syntactical form, is able to 
link selected features to make obvious an adaptation to technological rationality 
as outlined by Gerr (1942), (p. 150).  We see a prevalence of verbalizations of 
nouns, a shortening of synthetical sentence structures, and the conversion of the 
personal into the impersonal.  
 Alluding to the irrationality of ideas expressed in National Socialist 
language such as blood and soil, folk, race, and Reich, Marcuse explains that 
although they are in the form of universals, they exclude universality.  Therefore, 
folk, race, and blood are exclusively German and individualistic.  The words 
indicate “singular facts” wherein standards and values are found.  Furthermore, 
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the “facts,” which are designated by these words, are natural or “by nature.”  
Under this assumption, these “facts” transcend the “universal context of human 
civilization” and find residence in a higher order, “In this order, the ‘natural’ 
inequality of men is more than their ‘artificial’ equalization, the body more than 
the mind, health more than morality, force more than law, strong hatred more 
than feeble sympathy (p. 150).  Hoffer describes hatred as “the most accessible 
and comprehensive of all unifying agents” (p. 91). 
The psychological preparation of the German people for “imperialist world 
conquest,” which Marcuse sees as an ultimate goal, has an empirical basis upon 
which the entire mythology rests.  Universal laws and principles no longer apply 
to the people since these standards add up to a context of international 
civilization, not German.  In essence, Marcuse translates the irrationality of the 
National Socialist mythology as becoming very rational for the purposes of 
domination. The Nazis also realized that in order for the people to accept, 
subliminally of course, totalitarian rule and reject the already beleaguered idea of 
democracy, they had to improve on the conditions left behind by the Weimar 
Republic.  This was done through full employment, benefits from in the spoils of 
conquest in the form of Lebensraum, and the loosening of traditional taboos.  
The spirit of the Nazi mythology was an education to the cynical matter-of-
factness where “natural,” or tangible supersedes social or theoretical.  For 
instance, examine these word substitutions-folk for society, race for class, blood 
and soil for property rights, and Reich for state.  Words such as folk and race are 
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concrete facts; class, equality, and humanity are much more conceptual 
(Marcuse, p. 151).  
Finally, Marcuse somberly warns us not to look at the relationship of the 
people and the Nazi Party in simplistic terms such as totalitarian rule in exchange 
for material benefits found nowhere else.  It is much more complicated and 
involves the appeal to forces within the strongest traits of the German character: 
These forces have been released in the mobilization of the 
mythological layer.  They had been tamed and restrained by the 
process of Christian civilization, but they had continued to live 
under its cover, and their National Socialist emancipation 
constitutes the greatest threat to Western civilization (p. 152). 
 
Perspectives on the Rhetoric in Mein Kampf 
 Historically, what was intended to be the “Bible of National Socialism” was 
not well received by the buying public until Hitler assumed power in January of 
1933.  Total sales up until that time had amounted to 287,000 copies.  By 1939, 
the total reached close to 5.5 million and four years later the figure was 
approaching 10 million (Mieder, 1997, p. 14).  It should be noted that the book 
was “expected” to be on the bookshelf of everyone from civil servants to 
newlyweds who may have received a copy as a gift of the state.  As Mieder 
indicates, the book was, however, not necessarily read, “This is unfortunate 
indeed, for it contains in black and white what Hitler was planning for Germany 
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and Europe and in what brutal manner he intended to construct his Thousand 
Year Reich (p. 14). 
 Ordinarily, without a connection to its infamous author, the book would 
have been largely ignored as the rantings of a megalomaniac.  On the surface, 
those who have reviewed its contents for whatever reason have had great 
difficulty in maintaining their objectivity: 
If the reviewer but knocks off a few adverse attitudinizings and calls 
it a day, with a guaranty in advance that his article will have a 
favorable reception among the decent members of our population, 
he is contributing more to our gratification than to our enlightenment 
(Burke, 1973, p. 191). 
Yet, even those who have seriously studied Hitler’s work are prone to an “outer 
layer” or preliminary evaluation.  Young calls Mein Kampf “a rhetorical crazy quilt, 
it fuses biological terms, bureaucratese, pseudo-religious blather, bad grammar, 
and stupid bombast into an almost unreadable whole” (Young, p. 117).  Winston 
Churchill called it “turgid, verbose, shapeless” (McGuire, 1977, p. 1).  William 
Shirer, of Berlin Diary fame believed that it “would strike a normal mind of the 
twentieth century as a grotesque hodgepodge concocted by a half-baked, 
uneducated neurotic” (McGuire, p. 1).  Hitler’s biographer Konrad Heiden belittled 
the book but not the person, “Even Hitler’s best friends said:  Yes, he is an 
amazing speaker, probably a great leader, perhaps even a political genius-but it’s 
a pity he had to write this stupid book……Mein Kampf did little to establish 
Hitler’s intellectual authority in his party” (p. 1).   
 156
Critical methods that have been used against the book are what Burke 
has categorized as “vandalistic” and incomplete.  He also called the weighty 
book, “exasperating, even nauseating” (Burke, p. 191).  In spite of these common 
judgments, this “rhetorical crazy quilt” was an effective source of maintaining the 
consistent basis of propaganda construction that found a home in all German 
media of the day, especially radio.  With the origins of Nazi propaganda 
grounded in Mein Kampf, it is important to understand how the text functions 
persuasively.  
 As we have previously discovered, there was a certain mythological layer 
of German mentality which, according to Marcuse, the Nazis exploited as a 
means of control and domination.  It is within this mythological realm of language 
that much of the discourse in Mein Kampf is found, or better yet, scattered due to 
its incoherent structure and shape.  McGuire’s close textual analysis found a 
sense of rhythmic congruency among the mythic themes, which he grouped into 
four categories requiring chronologic ordering: Birth and re-birth, finding a 
mission in life and doing the will of the gods, stagnation and decay, and a 
metamorphosis of death to new birth (McGuire, p. 4).  For example, the first two 
sentences of the book mention Fate playing a hand in Hitler’s place of birth and 
its Fateful geographical location between two nations that must be reunited, 
Austria and Germany.  A mythic-tense is established as vaguely past, applicable 
to the present, and significant to the future (p. 4).  Next, Hitler laments on his five 
years of wretchedness in Vienna and that Providence and the Goddess of Misery 
forced an education on him that centered on the politics, economics, and habits 
 157
of the worker, a foundational learning experience for a future life of politics, 
especially when seeking the needed support of the masses.  The stagnation and 
decay enter as living in Vienna as a failed art student becomes unbearable and 
in the final phase; the Jews and Marxists are exposed as plotting against his 
German Austria (p. 4). 
 The pattern resumes throughout the book as we witness another birth 
years later in the form of the Nazis’ first mass meeting.  Hitler then finds his 
mission and takes over the Party’s arm of propaganda.  In phase three, there is 
decadent opposition in the form of riots instigated by the Jews and Marxists, and 
finally Hitler is imprisoned following the failed Putsch and afterward the Nazi 
Party is outlawed (p. 4). 
 Adding to this mythic structure orchestrated by Hitler, we find another 
stylistically strong characteristic seen in the presence of various gods: 
…although they are not personative gods…they provide revelations, 
assistance, and direction to Hitler.  He in turn relates to the audience 
of his myth as a divinely inspired prophet or oracle with answers to 
disturbing questions and solutions to difficult problems.  These 
features contribute to the rhetorical dimensions of all myths from all 
cultures (p. 13). 
Mein Kampf, when reconstructed by McGuire, presents personal events 
and conditions as contradictions of good and evil, or two opposing wills at work 
that represents the dialectical tension in Hitler’s myth (p. 7).  Although the 
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narrative form is significant, meaning is also created by “deliberately repeating 
mythic structures within the encyclopaedic form” (p. 13).   
Hitler liberally employed the use of metaphorical language from colloquial 
or folk speech in order to clarify or disguise his arguments.  Mieder points out the 
use of twin formulas whose “alliteration, rhyme, formulaic structure, and 
metaphors add expressive color and emotion to his otherwise tedious and 
lengthy sentences or paragraphs” (p. 15).  These twin formulas are shown within 
the following passages from Mein Kampf: 
Morally poisoned, physically undernourished, his poor little head full 
of lice, the young “citizen” goes off to public school.  After many fits 
and starts he may learn to read and write, but that’s about all 
(Hitler, 1943, p. 32).  Everywhere these organizations sprang up 
out of the ground, only to vanish unheralded and unsung (p. 218).  
Unfortunately, it was raining in the morning, and the fear seemed 
founded that under such circumstances many people would prefer 
to stay home, instead of hurrying through the rain and snow to a 
meeting at which there might possibly be mayhem and murder (p. 
499). I made it clear to the lads [the SA] that today probably for the 
first time they would have to show themselves loyal to the 
movement through thick and thin, and that not a man of us must 
leave the hall unless we were carried out dead (p. 504).  
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An aggressive style based on the same folk speech developed into a potent 
weapon used by Hitler in singling out the stupidity and folly of his opponents 
during the rise of National Socialism: 
The art of propaganda lies in understanding the emotional ideas of 
the great masses….The fact that our bright boys do not understand 
this merely shows how mentally lazy and conceited they are (Hitler, 
1943, p. 180).  For the cursing and “beefing” you could hear at the 
front [during World War I] were never an incitement to shirk duty or 
a glorification of the coward.  No!  The coward still passed as a 
coward and nothing else (p. 192).  Only a bourgeois simpleton is 
capable of imagining that Bolshevism has been exorcised (p. 661). 
The “stupidity” of those in political opposition to Hitler is further 
strengthened by the proverbial expression “not to have the faintest [foggiest] 
idea” which appears five times in the book (Mieder, p. 16).  Another expression 
“with one blow [stroke]” appears seven times, perhaps indicating Hitler’s bubbling 
explosiveness and future fits of temper (p. 17).  Appearing six times in Mein 
Kampf is the philosophical quote from Hamlet “to be or not to be” and was 
repeated in fatalistic speeches later in the war when the Third Reich’s eventual 
outcome was coming into focus (p. 19). 
 Proverbial expressions referring to parts of the body were an effective type 
of somatic rhetoric used in Mein Kampf, and helped accentuate Hitler’s 
aggressive traits and violent thought processes (p. 20): 
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When I recognized the Jew as the leader of the Social Democracy, 
the scales dropped from my eyes (Hitler, 1943, p. 60).  I, too, was 
determined to leap into this new world, with both feet, and fight my 
way through (p. 25).  Only the board fences around the brains of all 
so-called “experts” were preserved for posterity (p. 214).  You felt 
like dashing your head against the wall in despair over such people 
(p. 464)!  It [the state] must keep a sharp eye on the fingers of the 
press (p. 242).  Again and again, I begged them [certain politicians] 
to give free rein to fate, and give our movement an opportunity for a 
reckoning with Marxism; but I preached to deaf ears (p. 681). 
 In accordance with Hitler’s philosophy of keeping the message simple for 
the masses, he used many human to animal metaphors that clearly 
demonstrated his rhetorical intent: 
The sly fox knows perfectly well that this has nothing to do with 
religion (Hitler, 1943, p. 115).  By entrusting the fate of his war on 
the Marxists to the well wishing of bourgeois democracy, the Iron 
Chancellor set the wolf to mind the sheep (pp. 172-173).  The 
parliamentary rats leave the party ship (p. 104).  With the result that 
the previous speaker, even before I was finished, left the hall like a 
wet poodle (p. 219). 
 The didactic function of the proverb is rhetorically significant in Hitler’s 
message construction since they [proverbs], “contain the knowledge, experience, 
and observation of generations of people, and this distilled wisdom gives them 
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their generally valid character and claim of authority” (Mieder, p. 32).  However, 
Hitler’s method was to manipulate folk proverbs for his own purposes.  Such an 
adjustment occurs with the proverb “what people wish they hope for” to the 
Nazified version “what people want they hope for and believe.”  In this instance, 
“wish” is replaced by the more forceful “want.”  Together with the additional verb 
“believe,” the re-constructed proverb suggests Hitler’s fanatical pursuit of blind 
devotion and conformity from the masses.  By explaining to them what they 
ought to desire, they will consequently have faith in its operational undertaking 
(pp. 32-33). 
 Burke’s analysis of the rhetoric in Mein Kampf includes a centralization or 
“hub of ideas” reference in the form of a geographically situated area as the final 
destination for followers of National Socialism.  In the religious/cultural spirit of 
Mecca and Rome, Hitler chose the Bavarian city of Munich to give the movement 
its force and internal unanimity (Burke, pp. 192-193).  
 Also abundantly accessible in the pages of Mein Kampf are the 
demonizations of Jews and Marxists as a symbol of the common enemy.  Hitler 
wrote that the masses should be presented with centralized adversaries or 
devils, otherwise objectivity plays too large of a role in assessment (p. 193).  
Burke sees this as a unification device among those who can agree on nothing 
else, “…as unifying step No. 1, the international devil materialized, in the visible, 
point-to-able form of people with a certain kind of ‘blood,’ a burlesque of 
contemporary neo-positivism’s ideal of meaning, which insists upon a material 
reference” (p. 194). 
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 Burke also notes the abundance of sexual symbolism in Mein Kampf.  The 
“feminine masses” are to be led by Hitler, the dominating male who woos them, 
wins them, and commands them.  This is contrasted to the rival male, or the Jew 
who delights in “seducing” them and poisoning their blood by intermingling.  By 
an “associative connection of ideas,” the reader is led to vehement criticisms on 
syphilis, prostitution, and incest related to “blood poisoning” through racial 
mélange (p. 195). 
 In referring to the pre-war days spent in Vienna observing the chaotic 
environment of the Habsburg Empire’s Parliament, Burke equates this political 
organization as representative of everything from which Hitler chose to remove 
himself.  Parliament was a concoction of fragmented voices from many political 
entities characterized by separatist movements that were so alien to Hitler’s 
longing for a united German Austria: 
…by the method of associative mergers, using ideas as imagery, it 
became tied up, in Hitler rhetoric, with ‘Babylon,’ Vienna as the city 
of poverty, prostitution, immorality, coalitions, half-measures, 
incest, democracy (i.e., majority rule leading to ‘lack of personal 
responsibility’), death, internationalism, seduction, and anything 
else of thumbs-down sort the associative enterprise cared to add 
on this side of the balance (pp. 200-201). 
The important components, stressed by Burke that comprised Hitler’s 
unification device included an “inborn dignity,” yet the theories of race and nation 
manipulated these ideas innately privileging the “Aryan” over inferior races such 
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as Jews and Negroes.  Because of Germany’s defeat in the first war, espousing 
ideas of “inborn dignity” to a country in dire emotional need was a rhetoric of 
extreme value (p. 202).  Dignity had to come before economic stability.  Another 
unification measure in Mein Kampf was referred to by Burke as a “projection 
device” whereby the ills of society could be handed over to the Jewish 
scapegoat.  This “purification by dissociation” helped maintain the middle-class 
businessman’s normal way of thinking, while also serving as elimination of a 
“race” of competitive merchants (pp. 202-203).  A third unifier was the symbolic 
re-birth or change of lineage with Hitler as the group’s spiritualist leader: 
Here, above all, we see Hitler giving a malign twist to a benign 
aspect of Christian thought.  For whereas the Pope, in the familistic 
pattern of thought basic to the Church, stated that the Hebrew 
prophets were the spiritual ancestors of Christianity, Hitler uses this 
same mode of thinking in reverse.  He renounces this “ancestry” in 
a “materialistic” way by voting himself and the members of his 
lodge a different “blood stream” from that of the Jews (p. 203). 
Another unifier for Hitler was, according to Burke, a type of 
commercialization or selling of National Socialism to financiers in order to obtain 
backing for the movement.  Attacks on “Jewish finance” amounted to a sleight of 
hand to divert attention from the acquisition of necessary economic strength for 
modern conflict and the rebuilding of the German military.  Hence, Burke sees 
this as “a noneconomic interpretation of economic ills” (p. 204). 
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Why did Mein Kampf refuse to treat economics as a cause of the 
predicament of the post World War I German nation?  Again, Hitler sees the 
rhetorical opportunity to turn to reasons of blood and race associated with the 
German lack of self-preservation and moral decay that started years ago on the 
home front.  Germany’s military defeat is not undeserved, but attributable to the 
intermingling of races that weaken the national character.  Therefore, as Burke 
points out, all the evils besetting society, from poor housing to poor health, are 
again transferred to the Jewish scapegoat (pp. 204-205).   
In the chapter entitled the “Strong Man is Mightiest Alone,” Burke sees 
Hitler at his strongest in reference to demagogic effectiveness.  The chapter 
illustrates a “spontaneous identification between leader and people,” without an 
overt mention of Hitler, but instead, an implication that his leadership is normal 
and has already manifested itself: 
There is no “philosophy of the superman,” in Nietzchean cast.  
Instead, Hitler’s blandishments so integrate leader and people, 
commingling them so inextricably, that the politician does not even 
present himself as candidate.  Somehow, the battle is over already, 
the decision has been made.  “German democracy” has 
chosen…He says what he thought in terms of what parties did. (p. 
210) 
 Burke believes that Mein Kampf “to a very disturbing degree,” is an 
excellent example of the power of incessant repetition.  By example, at the 
bottom of each flyer or handbill announcing a Nazi mass meeting, were the 
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slogans “Jews not admitted” and “War victims free.”  It was these two 
“complementary” premises upon which Burke believed the substance of Nazi 
propaganda was built (p. 217).  
 Mein Kampf provided a worldview for those who had no basis for 
comparison.  What troubled Burke was Hitler’s reliance on: 
…a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought.  In 
this, if properly presented, there is no slight to religion.  There is 
nothing in religion proper that requires a fascist state.  There is 
much in religion, when misused, that does lead to a fascist state.  
There is a Latin proverb, Corruptio optimi pessima, “the corruption 
of the best is the worst.”  And it is the corruptors of religion who are 
a major menace to the world today, in giving the profound patterns 
of religious thought a crude and sinister distortion.  (p. 219) 
 
Sprachregelung: Language Regulation of the Media 
 In the ongoing struggle to reduce the consciousness of the masses, the 
Nazis took action that severely regulated public, and to an obvious lesser degree, 
private discourse within the German nation.  Ironically, the word pressefreiheit or 
freedom of the press, was banned from German dictionaries by 1942 (Young, p. 
112).  In limiting “the flow of certain words,” Goebbels and his associates in the 
Propaganda Ministry unintentionally produced undesirable results by handcuffing 
journalists to the language restrictions of the Party line.  His criticisms of the 
press included references to the abundance of clichés and “boring, flat phrases” 
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(p. 114).  With an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 directives (Townson, 1992, p. 
140) issued to the media on the subject of word usage, one can hardly imagine a 
different consequence of this ubiquitous Nazi censorship. 
 Officially, the term used by the National Socialists was Sprachregelung or 
language regulation.  Not only was it a usage guideline for government officials 
and the press, it also implied code language to disguise government action and 
German military operations (Michael & Doerr, p. 382).  These regulations were in 
place within six weeks of Hitler taking control of the government and within 
twenty-four hours of the selection of the new Minister of Propaganda: 
On 15 March 1933,…Goebbels appeared at the meeting of the 
Reichspressekonferenz [Reich press conference] in Berlin to inform 
the assembled journalists that ‘things were going to change’.  One 
of the ways in which they were going to change was that the 
Reichspressekonferenz was re-functioned so that it served not only 
as a forum for the exchange of information but also as an 
instrument for issuing detailed instructions to the press not only on 
which subjects or topics were to be treated, but also on the words 
and phrases to be used-or not to be used, as the case may be 
(Townson, p. 140). 
Every German newspaper was obligated to send a representative to these daily 
conferences chaired by Goebbels.  Deviations from these explicit directives 
resulted in “severe fines” levied against the newspaper in question (Michael & 
Doerr, p. 342). 
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 Townson’s study shows discernible categories relating to the guidelines of 
terminology use, the first of which involves protection of key terms highly 
regarded in Party ideology.  These terms were to be eliminated from rival or non-
ideological contexts.  An example is Sozialismus [Nazi-defined form of socialism] 
contrasted with Marxismus [Bolshevik version].  The term Rasse [race] or 
derivatives thereof were forbidden in newspaper advertisements beginning in 
1937.  Pimpfendivision [Kids Division], an implied derogatory term referring to the 
SS-Panzerdivision Hitler-Jugend was banned in 1944 (Townson, p. 141).   
 The second category was comprised of words reserved or copyrighted for 
the Party’s use.  Propaganda was a positive term in the Germany of 1937 and 
was not to be employed in descriptions of enemy efforts at persuasion.  Instead, 
the word Hetze [agitation] would apply to these circumstances (p. 141). 
 Townson’s next category deals with adaptation to changing perceptions of 
historical development where we find the term Angelsachsen [Anglo-Saxon].  
Apparently, at some time, the Nazis had unsuccessfully tried to remind the 
English of their Germanic roots, therefore; as the topic of six directives between 
1941 and 1943 prohibiting its application to British and Americans, Angelsachsen 
was no longer used (p. 142).  Another term in this category that had outlasted its 
effectiveness was Drittes Reich [Third Reich].  Starting in mid-1939, numerous 
instructions explained that Drittes Reich had served a “programmatic function” in 
bringing the Nazis to power.  It was “suggested” that Deutsches Reich [German 
Reich] or the expanded version, Großdeutsches Reich [Greater German Reich] 
be substituted, however; Großdeutsches Weltreich [Greater German World 
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Reich] was not to be used, “as its time had not yet come” (p. 142).  A related 
term, Anschluß [German-Austrian Union] was banned for promoting, or perhaps 
delaying, similar “expansionist” images to the world community (Young, p. 112). 
 A fourth category of regulation was relevant to the presentation of the 
enemy during the war.  Depending on the intent, words and phrases were 
carefully chosen, as was the case shortly after the invasion of Poland, when the 
media was instructed not to use the term tapfer [brave] in describing the Poles 
(Townson, p. 142).  “Red” was another word that could not be used in reference 
to the communists; it was first banned during the Spanish Civil War in 1937.  
“Bolshevik ruling power” was preferred over the “Red government in Valencia” 
(Young, p. 113).  In the ensuing battles against the Soviets a few years later, the 
reason for not using “red” assumed a political posture: 
In Mein Kampf, Hitler had stressed the importance of red as a color 
in propaganda posters, armbands, emblems, and flags.  The 
adoption of red by the Nazi Party not only infuriated leftists, Hitler 
wrote, but also symbolized “the social idea of the movement.”  But 
“the social idea” was lost in the purges of June 1934, if not earlier.  
In smashing the free trade unions, freezing worker’s wages, 
restricting their freedom of movement, establishing conscript labor, 
and liquidating much of the Strasser wing of the Party, the Nazis 
betrayed the revolutionary ideals and promises that had quickened 
so many of the Movement’s early adherents.  Given this legacy of 
suppression, the word “red” could only revive memories and 
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emotions that more cynical Nazis would as soon let sleep.  With 
good cause, therefore, did Goebbels attempt to banish it from the 
printed page.  (Young, p. 114) 
Another early war example of language manipulation was a directive to the press 
that the British Central Office of Information be referred to as Lüge-und Reklame-
Ministerium [Ministry of Lies and Advertising].  Late in 1941, instructions were 
issued stating that British pilots of the Royal Air Force were to no longer be 
accused of “cowardice” since “otherwise people might start asking why RAF 
pilots were still flying if they were so cowardly (and the German Air Force so 
good)” (Townson, p. 142). 
 Language regulations also took into account the relationship of Germany 
with her few allies or nations considered friendly.  In spite of the overtly racial 
policies of the Nazis, there was sensitivity to the term Anti-Semitsch [Anti-
Semitism] since certain Semitic groups of Arabs were considered prospective 
allies in a region of the world rich in a vital component of all military 
infrastructures, oil.  As a result, the press was told to narrow its descriptions to 
judenfeindlich [Jewish enemy] or Judengegnerschaft [opponent of Jews] (pp. 
142-143).  In light of Japan’s position in the war as an Axis power, derogatory 
terms such as Asiatisch [Asiatic] were banned.  Prior to this alliance, German 
propagandists suggested the likelihood of “Asiatic hordes” driving in on their 
country from the east.  Late in 1933, another related term that was to be avoided 
was Gelbe Gefahr [Yellow Peril] (Young, p. 112).  In addition, as various pseudo-
governments emerged during the Spanish Civil War, the press was told that the 
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term Regierung [head of state] was to be preserved in distinct acknowledgment 
of Generalissimo Franco (Townson, p. 143). 
 Townson’s next grouping involves words used in describing the progress 
of the war.  Certain terms were deemed dangerous to the people and it was from 
them that Goebbels said, “we should shrink as the devil does from Holy Water” 
(Young, p. 113).  On the first day of World War II, the word “war” itself was not to 
be utilized by the press, “In all news items, commentaries etc., the word ‘war’ 
must be avoided.  Germany is repelling a Polish attack.  That is the slogan” (p. 
113).  The Czech Press was issued the following directive on September 25, 
1939: 
The word ‘war’ must be used as sparingly as possible, especially in 
headlines; preferably the expression ‘state of war’ is to be used.  In 
relation to Poland, it is neither a ‘war’ nor a ‘state of war,’ but 
‘reprisals for Polish attacks and provocations’ (Kris & Speier, p. 33). 
When the German offensive against the Soviets was stopped in late 1942 at 
Stalingrad (another word that would disappear from the German media), 
newsmen were warned by Goebbels not to use the word “defensive” as a means 
of describing the resultant Sixth Army troop positions: 
The term, he pointed out, had a “defeatist ring,” was “reminiscent of 
1914,” and called to mind “dangerous parallels” with the Great War.  
In its place he proposed euphemistic substitutes, such as “we are 
digesting the conquered territories” (Young, p. 113). 
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Frontbegradigung [straightening the front line] was, of course, preferred over 
“retreat” (Townson, p. 143).  In March of 1940 and shortly before the fall of 
France, the word “peace” was banned in an effort to ward off public perceptions 
of the possibility of a quickly won war (Young, p. 113).  Evakuierte [evacuate] 
was replaced by the term Umquartierte [rehoused].  Air-raid “cellar” became air-
raid “shelter,” Luftschutzkeller to Luftschutzraum.  Goebbels also fought off the 
negative connotation associated with Katastrophe [catastrophe] by banning it 
early in 1944 as a descriptive word in reports on Allied air bombings of western 
cities (Townson, p. 143).  The substitute term was Großnotstand [major 
emergency] (Young, p. 113). 
 As the war’s end drew near, Townson saw an effort made to restrict the 
use of language invented by or regularly associated with the Allies.  This 
rationale rested on the belief that adopting the enemy’s language would lead to 
adaptation of their ideology.  Therefore, Alliierte [Allies] and Vereinigte Nationen 
[United Nations], both reminders of defeat in the prior war, were terms disallowed 
beginning in 1940 (Townson, p. 144).  The replacements were, “the more 
controllable and mind-contracting phrases ‘our enemies’ and ‘the enemy side,’ 
while ‘French Foreign Legion under British direction’ took the place of ‘Free 
French fighting forces’” (Young, p. 113).  “Positively loaded” terms such as RAF 
were withdrawn as well as menacing references to the enemy’s military 
hardware, “Flying Fortresses” and “Liberty Ships.”  The German media was also 
warned against mentioning the prophetic phrase “Battle for Berlin,” contained in 
Allied reports reaching the homeland in late 1943 (Townson, p. 144).  
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The Language of Defeat: The Rhetoric of Stalingrad 
 The ultimate test of the “Thousand Year Reich” was whether the National 
Socialist Party could successfully guide the German nation through the war that it 
had created and long prepared for prior to the invasion of Poland in 1939.  
Initially, the success of the military was indisputable.  Victories in the eastern and 
western theatres of operation provided the Nazi propagandists with a wealth of 
exploitable material that found its way to the welcoming public by way of the 
press and radio on a consistent basis, however, the charmed life that Goebbels 
seemed to be living was about to change.  Realistically, we can only assume that 
his preparations for a major military disaster were far from formulated during 
these triumphant moments in the brief history of the Third Reich.  In spite of its 
extreme utility, the military achievements nourishing the propaganda line would 
prove to be a brittle underpinning.  “In times of war, Nazi propaganda rests upon 
the success of Germany’s armed might.  While it is difficult for any propagandist 
to handle setbacks, Nazi propaganda faces an insuperable obstacle if the 
German soldier is defeated” (Kris & Speier, p. 50). 
 An accurate account of the reporting on Stalingrad is rightly capsulated by 
Bramsted (1965) as “A Saga instead of Truth” (p. 259).  A boastful Hitler 
complicated matters for Goebbels during a speech on September 30, 1942 by 
declaring, “The capture of Stalingrad will be completed, and you may be sure that 
no one will ever drive us out of this place again” (p. 259).  
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  In spite of the reality of the dire situation of the thousands of soldiers in 
the German Sixth Army, the boundaries of accuracy were once again utterly 
overstepped a few weeks later:  
Indeed, Hitler himself said on 8 November, “The fact is that we 
have got it.”  And on 16 November, Lieutenant General Dittmar 
added: “The real objective of our offensive from its very beginning 
was to gain this point [Stalingrad]; to have gained it-for it has been 
gained-crowned the operations of this summer and autumn (Kris & 
Speier, p. 113). 
 What caused Hitler to make such predictions and pre-mature statements 
about a major turning point in the war are of no concern here, but their effect on 
Goebbels’ course of propaganda cannot be ignored.  Among the complications, a 
re-definition of Hitler’s prediction was considered mandatory (p. 113).  It may be 
helpful to sketch some of the developments leading up to the crisis in order to 
focus on the propagandists’ language of defeat. 
 Hitler ordered General von Paulus’ Sixth Army to attack Stalingrad on 
August 19, 1942.  The minutes of Goebbels’ secret propaganda conference five 
days later indicate that a Russian pessimism is present but should not be used in 
the German press as of yet, and British comments on the importance of 
Stalingrad are being collected to be used against them once the city has fallen 
(Boelcke, p. 271). 
 In the period covering September 11-13, the discussions centered on the 
attitude of the home news reports as being too optimistic.  The toughness and 
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complexity of the fighting was to be stressed.  Again, Russian pessimism is 
downplayed.  Reports on the consequences of the Soviets losing Stalingrad were 
publishable, but “fixed-date” predictions, i.e. Stalingrad will fall in 48 hours, were 
not allowed (p. 275).  Goebbels also severely admonished a Berlin newspaper 
for references to heroic Russian defenders and the publishing of some 
nationalistic Bolshevik slogans.  Although no disciplinary action was taken, the 
article would be used as an example by the German Press Department in a 
subsequent press conference, to criticize and rebuke that type of reporting in fear 
of arousing sympathy for the enemy (p. 275). 
 On September 15, the Reichspressechef’s [Head of Reich Publication, 
Otto Dietrich] (Michael & Doerr, p. 342) Slogan of the Day, indicated a growing 
optimism on the eventual outcome of the battle: 
The struggle for Stalingrad is nearing its successful conclusion.  
Important announcements by the OKW [Armed Forces High 
Command] about the successes achieved so far are to be expected 
in the course of today or tomorrow.  The German Press will have to 
make preparations for featuring in the most effective way the 
victorious outcome of this vast struggle for Stalin’s city - if 
necessary by the publication of special editions (Boelcke, p. 278). 
In the days that followed, nothing of major importance came through from the 
OKW, leading to a Goebbels directive to the press on September 21 not to 
highlight Stalingrad as vigorously since keeping people in a state of high 
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expectation could not be maintained indefinitely (p. 279).  This elevated state of 
anticipation found in the German people was documented at the time: 
In short order Stalingrad took on an almost magical significance-
every subsequent SD [Security Service] report underlined this, and 
on September 28 one even stated that most listened “as if 
hypnotized” to reports of developments there; one is thus tempted 
to believe in a heightened consciousness which made Stalingrad a 
symbolic turning point in more than a military sense (Steinert, p. 
168). 
 The OKW did report on the 22nd that the terrain around Stalingrad was “ideally 
suited to defence” and the oncoming weather will cause operational supply 
problems.  Conversely, the report indicated Russian supplies were transportable 
across the Volga and up to their front on any scale desirable (Boelcke, p. 280).   
 Goebbels believed that victory was still a few days away on October 19, 
and alluded to staying within the guidelines of the OKW communiqué of two days 
earlier.  The Wehrmacht’s propaganda plans being finalized for the fall of 
Stalingrad included all bearers of the Knight’s Cross being brought back to Berlin 
for interviews in the press, on the radio, and on film newsreels (p. 288).  The 
inflated Russian reports of German casualties in the Stalingrad conflict were the 
topics of the propaganda conference on the 24th.  There were earlier 
unsuccessful attempts by Goebbels urging the repudiation of these figures by the 
OKW (p. 291).   
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 On November 19, the Russians commenced a counter-offensive that 
eventually encircled and sealed the fate of approximately 300,000 soldiers of 
General von Paulus’s Sixth Army.  A few days later, Hitler personally ordered 
them to hold hedgehog [a well-fortified military position] and wait for help from the 
outside (p. 301).  The propaganda meeting of the 23rd discussed an offensive 
news strategy to ignore enemy propaganda concerning recent forced 
advantages, “Now is the time to counter enemy propaganda with impertinent, 
overbearing, and sovereign unconcern” (p. 300).  Therefore, it was in this manner 
that Stalingrad seemed to simply disappear from the media: 
Throughout the next two months, or very nearly, the Wehrmacht 
communiqué edited by Hitler was an illustration of ‘the art of non-
information’.  In so much as the Wehrmacht communiqué 
mentioned the Stalingrad front at all, it was not until January 16, 
1943, that it was evident that a German army was encircled there 
and awaiting annihilation.  (p. 301) 
 A Goebbels personal diary entry on December 17, 1942 makes mention of 
about four to six hundred postcards arriving from Russia, intended for the 
families of German prisoners of war.  They were delivered with an ‘explanatory 
covering-letter’, but he wrote a repeat of the procedure should be banned for fear 
of opening “a gate for bolshevik propaganda to pour into Germany” (p. 310).  
Families seeking further information on the status of their loved ones serving at 
the Stalingrad front, illegally tuned to the German Service of the Soviet Radio 
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where the names and addresses of many of the estimated 90,000 prisoners of 
war were read over the air (Bramsted, p. 261). 
 The propaganda conference of December 22 cautioned against the use of 
the phrases “serious” or “critical situation,” since the foreign press would elevate 
the language to “catastrophical” (Boelcke, p. 310).  Incidentally, the planned 
evacuation of the Sixth Army from the Stalingrad sector, while still possible, was 
scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd but Hitler refused authorization (p. 311).  
 The German public was permitted to hear the Soviet claim of the re-
capture of Velikie Luki on January 1, 1943 but no additional news on the event 
was broadcast until the 13th when Front Report aired a story on a German 
garrison holding out against a Russian assault with a ten to one numerical 
superiority over the Wehrmacht soldiers.  The listeners were led to believe their 
troops were being re-supplied by air (Kris & Speier, pp. 429-430).  Velikie Luki 
was declared a loss by the OKW communiqué of January 17, or as it was 
phrased, “the garrison had fought its way through to the German relief force 
according to order” (p. 430).  General Dittmar’s talk the next day referenced the 
town, “‘One name in particular has become known to the German public: Velikie 
Luki.  This name already resounds like a song of heroes.’  And he added 
ominously, ‘The same applies to Stalingrad’” (p. 430).  On the 25th, the solemn 
tone of Dittmar’s broadcast was hinting at the gravity of the Russian counter-
offensive: 
We would not be doing the German people any favor if we were to 
dispute the fact that the situation has grown very serious for the 
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time being, and even today when we are giving you this interim 
statement it shows many troubling aspects.  (p. 430) 
A mythic rhetoric blossomed during the same broadcast when “the fighting men 
of Stalingrad” were compared to Leonidas at Thermopylae and the Nibelungen 
[Burgundian Kings] in King Etzel’s [actually Attila’s] burning banquet hall.  When 
Luftwaffe chief Goering repeated this heroic theme in a speech five days later, he 
swelled the rhetorical effect by adding that the Nibelungen “quenched their thirst 
by their own blood” (p. 430).  Defeat was finally acknowledged, though not 
publicly, in the minutes of the Goebbels’ propaganda meeting on January 27, 
1943: 
Reports from Stalingrad indicate that the heroic struggle of our 
soldiers is nearing its end.  This unique event in German military 
history…must be exploited psychologically for the strengthening of 
our people.  He [the Minister] urges the press to remember that 
every word about this heroic struggle will go down in history.  The 
OKW communiqué must be drafted that it will rank equal with 
Caesar’s address to his troops, Frederick the Great’s appeal to his 
generals before the Battle of Leuthen, and Napoleon’s appeals to 
his guards.  The few sentences about the heroic epic of Stalingrad 
must be simple, direct and modest, as if engraved in bronze.  
(Boelcke, p. 324) 
 The OKW communiqué on February 1, 1943 indicated von Paulus’ Sixth 
Army had been “overwhelmed in battle by the superiority of the enemy, after 
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more than two months of heroic defense.”  On the 2nd, the German people heard 
a radio report of how “during the heroic fighting every man, up to the General, 
fought in the most advanced line with fixed bayonets” (Kris & Speier, p. 431).  
Clearly, the situation dictated a propaganda line conveying a “heroic” last stand 
during the final days of Stalingrad, yet nothing was mentioned in the German 
media of the enormous casualties.  Goebbels had been warning the press about 
inflated figures coming from the Russians throughout the six months of the 
campaign.  Unofficial estimates from a Soviet communiqué of February 2, 
reported the total Axis troop loses at 503,650 (Boelcke, p. 328).   
 Reichspressechef Otto Dietrich’s office issued a lengthy, tone-setting 
Slogan of the Day on February 3 in an attempt to guide the media through this 
delicate and novel subject in the short military history of the Third Reich.  Defeat 
would somehow emerge as a positive, or at least meaningful, occurrence in the 
mind of the German public: 
The heroic fighting for Stalingrad has come to an end.  In several 
days of mourning the German people will remember its gallant sons 
who did their duty to their last breath and to their last round, and 
thereby broke the main force of the bolshevik onslaught against the 
Eastern Front.  The heroic struggle for Stalingrad will now become 
the greatest heroic epic of German history.  This faces the German 
press with one of its greatest tasks.  In line with and in the spirit of 
the OKW special announcement expected today, the German press 
must pay tribute to the moving event which outshines the greatest 
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feats of military heroism in world history; it must hold up this exalted 
example of supreme heroic bearing and ultimate self-sacrifice for 
the sake of victory as a sacred torch before the eyes of the German 
people.  From immortal heroism of the men of Stalingrad there will 
unfold within the German nation, more strongly than ever before, 
the spirit and the forces which will ensure the victory which is now 
more than ever fanatically determined to achieve.  (p. 328) 
 Taking their cue from this press directive, the radio news report of the 
Stalingrad defeat was issued to the public by way of the Special Announcement.  
The actual news itself was preceded “by slow marches and followed by muffled 
drum rolls and three stanzas of I Once Had a Comrade” (Kris & Speier p. 431).  
The international nature of the Axis coalition was respected by not only playing 
the German national anthem, but also those of Rumania and Croatia.  This was 
followed by three minutes of radio silence.  Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and 
solemn martial music was played before and after the announcement “that all 
theatres, cinemas, and variety halls in the Reich were to close for three days” 
(pp. 431-432).  The public reaction to the news in the capital city of Berlin was 
described on the radio, “…people in the street stopped awhile and listened, and 
their expressions became serious and determined.  In public restaurants they 
stood up and, their hands raised in the German salute, sang the National 
Anthem” (p. 432). 
 It was now time for the Goebbels propaganda machine to accelerate their 
efforts at deflecting the reality of the defeat.  Between February 3 and 6, talks on 
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Stalingrad were aired featuring Hans Fritzche, General Dittmar, and Goebbels.  
Perhaps due to the immense scale of casualties and subsequent changes in 
family structures, there was also a special talk devoted to women who 
conceivably found themselves newly widowed or victims of their husband’s 
prisoner of war status (p. 432).  On the evening of February 4, three wounded 
Stalingrad soldiers were featured in an interview report on the final days of 
combat.  The following night, a historical perspective described as the “Road of 
the Sixth Army” was presented through a series of Front Reports.  The fifty-
minute program chronicled their successful exploits in Poland, France, and pre-
Stalingrad Russia.  The presentation confidently concluded with the following, 
“The Sixth Army is not dead; long live the Sixth Army” (p. 432). 
 Further reports were imbued with stereotypical themes of victory emerging 
from defeat such as, “triumph of fortitude over bestiality…a condition imposed by 
fate…town of destiny…fighters in fact for western civilization and culture” (p. 
432). 
 It was apparent that the genius of Goebbels had triumphed once again.  In 
the face of a catastrophic defeat that eventually turned the tide of war against 
Germany, Hitler’s Propaganda Minister had “organized Germany’s mourning of 
the defeat at Stalingrad into a Wagnerian celebration, comparable only to the 
victory celebration of June 1940, hoping in this way to evade a realistic appraisal 
of the defeat” (p. 432). 
 In the next chapter, we will study the foremost American radio 
personalities who served Germany during the war as shortwave propagandists, 
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broadcasting the Nazi ideology to North America.  The English language 
broadcasting directed at Great Britain however, was immediately identifiable by 
the voice of the popular William Joyce, otherwise known as Lord Haw-Haw.  His 
“rhetorical flourish” on the battle for Stalingrad ended with the following: 
The lesson that Germany’s enemies will have to learn and shall 
learn is that if Germany was strong before, she will be doubly 
strong in the future, and as the shades of the heroes of Stalingrad 
march side by side with their living comrades, they will march to a 
glorious victory which will redeem their sacrifice and stamp upon 
the tablets of history the proud legend: Thanks to these men and 
their like Europe lives in freedom and in peace.  (Doherty, 2000, p.  
155) 
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Chapter 5-Rhetoric on the Shortwave: 
Nazi Broadcasts to America  
 
 
Germany’s International Broadcasting 
 
 There were attempts at interpreting the methods used and the intended 
audiences sought by German broadcasts around the world via shortwave.  
Strategies were studied in both America and Great Britain but an official Nazi 
version was supplied by the then head of the Broadcasting Division of the 
Propaganda Ministry, Hans Kriegler, “Our broadcasts are addressed to all people 
who believe in the German language and German culture wherever they may 
live” (Childs & Whitton, 1942, p. 63).  Nationalistic, Germanic themes were 
inherent in programs communicating with nationals living abroad.  Estimates at 
the time indicated a range of 10 to 12 million Germans living outside their country 
with 8.5 million in North America and 1 million in South America (p. 65).  Political, 
cultural, and spiritual ties were meant to be re-established with the fatherland, 
inviting vicarious participation in great events at home and overseas.  Goebbels 
wanted the shortwave broadcasts to reach a type of audience comprised of those 
who were somewhat sophisticated, possessing average intelligence, unlike the 
audience sought through the general rule of Nazi propaganda, those with the 
lowest intelligence levels, i.e. found in the masses (p. 66). 
 As Kriegler saw it, his “racial comrades” living abroad were an audience 
which the Nazis had to maintain, “Our broadcasters have always realized that 
they should adapt their programs to the spiritual needs of Germans abroad, thus 
assisting them in their fight for the maintenance of their national character by 
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furnishing them with spiritual weapons” (p. 63).  Of paramount concern was 
providing an understanding of the refreshing new revolutionary spirit brought to 
the fore by National Socialism and its ideology. 
 Kriegler was thankful that shortwave radio could be used as a counter-
measure against lies being maliciously spread about Germany and National 
Socialism by broadcast outlets in other countries.  He believed these slanderous 
stations were, “entirely under the influence of Free Masons, clergymen or 
Marxists” (p. 64).  Kriegler’s predecessor, Horst Dressler-Andress envisioned the 
shortwave radio transmissions as a means of communicating the achievements 
and the spirited determination of the National Socialist movement beyond the 
borders of the Reich by carrying: 
…a piece of the German soul and German thought to all those who 
follow their professions and duties outside of the boundaries of their 
homeland…The radio became the great awakener of the mother 
tongue, in addition to its use as a medium for news and the 
messenger of the political and cultural life of the homeland.  (p. 65) 
Radio commentator Hans Fritzsche asserted that the ideology of the Nazis was 
not an export item; it was not simply offered to other people.  In a sense, the 
radio acted as a public relations instrument offering a view of contrasting 
approaches to government: 
Our greatest political goal has always been to spread the truth 
about our fatherland and to make others see the difference: over 
there blissful Jewish democracy, desirous to burn people holding 
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different political views, alive with medieval intolerance and here a 
people who want nothing but to work and erect its house according 
to its own taste.  (p. 64) 
 The Nazis claimed the shortwave broadcasts began in the interests of 
peace and truth and of course, as a defense mechanism against lies that were 
being spread by the enemies of the Reich.  However, Fritzsche was quick to 
point out that this “semi-passive” stance did not lead to “impartiality” or political 
neutrality.  Some things could not be ignored: 
No one must complain that today we no longer go on telling the 
world merely about the work in our country but that we express 
frankly our opinion on political events.  Even now we refuse to send 
purely polemic broadcasts such as the English and French have 
adopted in their programs following the Communist pattern.  We do 
not want to produce explosions in foreign countries through 
shortwave broadcasts.  But we cannot miss the fact that there is 
plenty of explosive material in foreign countries.  And whenever we 
have to uncover a lie we no longer restrict ourselves to the simple 
statement of the truth but we try to tell the world who invented the 
lie, why he did it and whom the liar wanted to deceive besides us.  
(p. 64) 
 Despite the cultural and political agendas of the broadcasts, their 
foundational contents were of the entertainment variety with a full seventy per 
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cent of the programming schedule consisting of light music by 1939.  “Light 
music and entertainment serve as the bait of the political radio” (pp. 67-68). 
 
Shortwave Strategy for North America 
 The analysis of radio propaganda contains an element of evidence, which 
may become obvious as a commentator’s exacting procedure unveils itself 
through his or her own discourse.  An approach may also be uncovered by an 
opponent intent on exposing a rival’s rhetorical strategy.  These methods must 
be viewed critically and skeptically since they rely on additional sources of proof 
to attain a safe degree of validity (pp. 74-75). 
 Internal evidence is much clearer when the intention is shown prior to the 
announcer’s statement.  By expressing the obvious implications in a line of 
discourse, a desirable audience reaction is made possible.  “Usually, however, 
internal evidence appears in the relationship of a particular incident or theme to 
other themes which the propagandist is developing” (p. 75). 
 The strategy of German propaganda broadcast to North America was 
analyzed in a relational context.  Evidence was found in the relationship of the 
subject matter or argument to specific military or diplomatic episodes or to the 
personal views of the intended audience (p. 75).  An important caveat to be 
considered was reading more into a piece of evidence than it deserved.  Analysts 
were told to search for “broad lines of policy” and for those parts of an enemy 
broadcast not consciously planned with regard to that policy.  As is the case 
today, when programs are running short, a commentator is forced to ad-lib and 
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produce “filler” material.  It was an accepted practice among wartime 
broadcasters to use atrocity stories in filling the time void, although these types of 
stories were sensitive subjects in the mind of the German propagandist (p. 75).  
 After the outbreak of war in 1939, the Nazis main objective in shortwave 
broadcasts to North America was to keep the United States neutral and dissuade 
Americans from supplying aid in any form to the Allies already engaged in the 
fighting, namely Britain and Russia (p. 76).  Securing American support for 
Germany was deemed unrealistic and unnecessary by the National Socialists, 
yet efforts aimed at the neutrality issue seemed worthwhile for many reasons: 
The odds on the surface seemed to favor their campaign.  The 
deep-rooted isolationist tradition in the United States, reinforced by 
twenty years of disillusionment with Europe’s politics following the 
first World War, had found legal expression in the series of 
Neutrality Acts designed to keep the country out of another war.  
The seeds of skepticism, which still germinated regarding Allied 
appeasement policies at the beginning of the war, kept American 
public opinion definitely opposed to military and financial 
intervention.  (p. 76)     
 By 1939, the vast majority of the American public opposed the principles 
of National Socialism and hoped for an Allied victory.  The U.S. was clearly 
opposed to Hitler and all he stood for, even to the point of opposing an arms 
embargo provision in the Neutrality Act, which was considered a potentially 
explosive situation for the German propagandists (p. 76).  It was noted that 
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American support for the Allied effort was proportional to the ebb and flow of the 
perceived military situations, “Whenever the security of the Allies visibly 
deteriorated, Americans tended to throw over their commitment to neutrality” (p. 
77).   
 Therefore, prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, the Germans were 
faced with a unique problem in their shortwave strategy for North America.  Care 
had to be taken not to destabilize American perceptions of Allied success.  The 
Germans knew that doing so would seriously jeopardize the main objective of 
their shortwave efforts, that of perpetuating U.S. neutrality (p. 77).  However, the 
Nazis’ policy, of course, was also ultimately based on winning the war so the 
difficult broadcast mission became an integration of policy with American public 
opinion (p. 77).   
 
Patterns of Argument 
 From the beginning of the war until the summer of 1941, American efforts 
were made at monitoring, transcribing, translating, and analyzing shortwave 
propaganda.  This activity took place in an inconspicuous white frame house on a 
quiet street in Princeton, New Jersey (p. vii).  Linguists, scholars, engineers, and 
stenographers combined their unique abilities in comprising America’s systematic 
shortwave eavesdropping apparatus that became known as the Princeton 
Listening Center (p. vii).   
 It is from this body of research that five main patterns of argument were 
identified and found to remain consistent from the first stages of the war until the 
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Princeton group was disbanded.  The Nazis did not favor one particular category 
of argument, but instead choose to mix them in combinations that would suit the 
interests of the propagandist’s course of action being pursued at the moment (p. 
80). 
 In coordination with the main objective of maintaining the neutrality of the 
United States, the Nazis employed the argumentative blueprint of division on a 
consistent basis.  The view of a strictly European war was brought to bear on 
North American audiences.  The rogue nation was, of course, Great Britain who 
had started the war and was doing everything conceivable to prolong the misery 
caused by the conflict (pp. 80-81).  The British government was to blame for 
everything from violating the rights of neutrals to bombing civilian and non-
military targets: 
The language and arguments used differ according to the 
supposed cultural level of the listening audience, but the underlying 
strategy remains the same.  It consists broadly in vilifying every 
aspect of British policy and British institutions, while praising 
German policy and National Socialist way of life.  Britain is depicted 
as America’s “hereditary enemy,” Germany as America’s “oldest 
friend.”  (Rolo, 1940, p. 27) 
Listeners were told that Germany had not started the war, begun the blockade, 
interfered with American mail, plundered American commerce, or ignored 
American protests.  These antagonistic actions were taken by the British 
government (Graves, 1940, p. 604).  In order to justify the invasion of Poland, 
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Great Britain was blamed for inciting the Poles to commit atrocities against 
minority German civilians.  The following characterization was broadcast on April 
7, 1940: 
Unable to defeat Germany on land, on water or in the air, England 
has settled down to her old game of making war on those who can’t 
defend themselves, on helpless infants and mothers, on the old, 
infirm, the sick and the maimed.  (Childs & Whitton, p. 81) 
On July 11, 1940, the Nazis used a clever historical item from 1775 recalling how 
George Washington’s Virginia militia had been abandoned by the British and left 
to battle a French and Indian force single-handedly.  Projecting this into the 
future, the commentator told audiences of Britain’s plans to drag America into 
another conflict without guaranteed cooperation (Graves, 1940, p. 611).  
Americans were told on February 17, 1940 that the war aims of Britain were 
couched in the solidification of her imperial status throughout the world and her 
continuation of European dominance: 
While other countries have been satisfied with moderation, England 
methodically set about dominating the world.  When a nation in any 
part of the world became powerful and threatened to follow a 
course of action which did not conform to the interests of British 
imperialism, then England made war on that country.  (Childs & 
Whitton, p. 81) 
Other charges against the British centered upon their fight “for the well-being of 
her plutocracy” since the war was being waged because “a few plutocrats were 
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afraid to lose their power, and saw no other way out than to make war on the 
new idea” (pp. 81-82).  The National Socialists were quick to remind American 
audiences of these British plutocrats and their Jewish influences.  “The tycoons 
of British finance and journalism, who manipulate the strings of British politics, 
are almost all Jews” (p. 82).  Conversely, the dubious British politicians were 
categorized as expert double-crossers who had promised a “Jewish National 
Homeland” after the First World War that never came to pass (p. 82). 
 The divisive argument also called on Americans to realize differences of 
opinions leading to obvious conflicts of interest with the English.  An attempt to 
exploit this point was made in the series of talks entitled “British Disregard for 
American Neutral Rights” (p. 82).  The program chronicled the diplomatic 
differences between the two nations from 1784 until the First World War.  Any 
trace of evidence was manipulated to fit the argumentative paradigm of 
“disaffection in the United States from the Allied cause”   (p. 82). 
 The second pattern of argumentation noted by the Princeton Listening 
Center was that of Berlin’s reassurance to the United States of nothing but 
honorable intentions as a participant in the current global conflict.  Germany was 
framed as “upright, heroic, and progressive” country intent on ridding Europe of 
its social and political ills.  Americans were told that the German nation had done 
much in the past and with National Socialist leadership, had much to offer for the 
future: 
At every opportunity, Germany’s cultural heritage was recalled, its 
industrial and scientific achievements, its glorious natural scenery, 
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the health, vigor and honesty of its people.  National Socialism had 
rescued this fine country from the same kind of greedy, plutocratic 
oppression under which Britain had suffered and established in its 
place the reign of social justice, releasing the full creative energy of 
the German people (p. 82). 
 Berlin commentators pointed out the indifferences of the German 
government in American affairs, both political and military.  Listeners were 
reminded of Germany’s respect for the defensive posture of the Monroe Doctrine 
of 1823.  From a shortwave broadcast of March 28, 1940: “You have proclaimed 
your Monroe Doctrine, so Germany declares itself against potentially hostile 
alliances within Central Europe” (p. 84).  In a further effort to allay U.S. fears of 
German aggression directed at the North American continent, remarks such as 
the following were heard on June 17, 1940, “a German attack against the United 
States is just about as feasible as an attack from Mars” (p. 84).  A few weeks 
later on July 29, Air Marshall Göring was quoted by an American journalist: 
…if anyone in Europe-Germany in the least- thinks or dreams of a 
possible invasion of North or South America, he was certainly 
suffering from strange hallucinations.  Mind you, Germany intends 
to cultivate political and economic relations with the United States 
(Graves, 1940, p. 612).   
 Americans were also placated through invitations to share in the spoils of 
war.  By appealing to the American sense of materialism and capitalism, 
broadcasters explained that after a German victory, it would be wise to be on 
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friendly terms with the dominant power as an inroad to profiting from the 
available commercial opportunities in post-war Europe (Childs & Whitton, p. 84). 
 Reassurance even appeared in the form of flattery on January 26, 1940 
over America’s tradition of neutrality, “President Washington’s advice that 
Americans should steer clear of all entangling alliances was the law of Real-
politik for America and it was a good law.”  On March 7, 1940: “We cannot help 
congratulating the American people on their steadfast, neutral attitude”   (p. 85). 
 Another argumentative pattern detected by the researchers at Princeton 
was that of convincing Americans of the sheer futility found in the military efforts 
of England and her Allies.  Britain was characterized as “desperately weak and 
thoroughly demoralized” (p. 86).  Allusions were made to the lack of air power 
found in the arsenals of France and Britain.  Their aircraft were of inferior quality 
to the technically superb German machinery.  Even Britain’s acknowledged 
superiority in naval power was discounted due to the demonstrated tactical 
advantages of the airplane (p. 86).  Aside from these military matters, Berlin told 
of the vulnerable geography of the British homeland especially after the German 
conquest of Denmark and the Low Countries.  From these positions, Luftwaffe air 
bases were within reach of important industrial targets forcing British reliance on 
“extracontinental sources for both war materials and food” (p. 86). 
 Shortwave radio propaganda looked at the British army as hopelessly 
engaged in repeated “glorious retreats” while the British navy could do no more 
than attempt a blockade against a “self-sufficient Germany” while Nazi submarine 
warfare took a dramatic toll on Allied shipping  (p. 86).  The pilots of the Royal Air 
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Force were incapable of hitting military targets and could do nothing against the 
powerful onslaught of the Luftwaffe while their planes pounded British 
communications and industrial production (pp. 86-87). 
 Americans were also told of a critical morale problem among the people of 
England.  Relentless attacks were having a devastating effect on the material lot 
of the average British citizen.  The situation was described on July 15, 1940 as 
one of “depression and despair…unrest and ill-concealed panic” (p. 87).  Adding 
to the misery were inept military and political leaders who, according to a 
broadcast on August 26, 1940, “have always believed and even now believe that 
the stoutest weapon in the world is bluff” (p. 87).  Audiences in North America 
were asked why any nation would want to support such a lost cause.  Berlin 
cautioned the Americans to beware of British propaganda putting forth the 
“illusion of victory” as a means of clinging to any hope of American support, be it 
commercial or military (p. 87). 
 Life in Germany, according to the shortwave, was unhindered by the 
meager British war effort.  Food, industrial production, raw materials, trade, and 
home front morale were all in good order (p. 87).  From a transmission monitored 
on October 13, 1940, it was said the German people were “thoroughly convinced 
that under the present leadership they will bring this war to a successful end and 
that Germany will acquire that place to which she is entitled” (p. 87).  In regard to 
other countries closely associated with German war aims, the “strength and 
cordiality” of Italy was highlighted as well as the short lived non-aggression pact 
that was in effect, at that time, with the Russians.  The implication for the U.S. 
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concerning the Nazi-Soviet alliance was the removal of a second front possibility 
and a subsequent repeat of the hunger blockade of the First World War, both of 
which would have a devastating effect on the survival of the National Socialist 
government (pp. 87-88). 
 A fourth pattern of argument uncovered through the work of the Princeton 
Listening Center was the intentional stirring of dissension among the ranks of 
isolationists and interventionists.  Those of the pro-war persuasion were said to 
be “tools of London,” forcing the U.S. into a European war to foster an Anglo-
Saxon-type of world domination while dangerously whipping “the American public 
into a war hysteria” (p. 88).  On April 7, 1940, American Ambassadors Kennedy 
(Great Britain) and Bullitt (France) were said to have reassured and promised the 
Allies that the U.S. “would soon join in” and on June 22 and 23, 1940, Americans 
heard several “interventionist” political leaders mentioned by name, Senators 
Pepper (Florida) and Pittman (Nevada) and two members of Roosevelt’s cabinet, 
Secretaries Knox and Stimson (p. 88).  Also mentioned by Berlin radio on 
September 4, 1940, were “the war-mongering William Allen White Committee” 
and “that German-hating Amazon…that queen of wishful thinkers, Dorothy 
Thompson” (p. 88).  An argument was made on September 20, 1940, that invited 
the comparison of Poland and Germany to that of England and the United States: 
Willing, apparently, to attempt an appeal even to those whose 
sympathies were completely identified with the Allies, the Nazis 
ingeniously argued that interventionist leaders were actually 
scheming, cold-blooded imperialists who realized that the 
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exhaustion of Britain and Germany in a long war would pave the 
road for American world domination.  England was ‘the Poland of 
United States interventionism.”  (p. 88) 
 As one might expect, the Nazi propagandists could not refrain from 
exploiting a biased position of the Jewish population in the U.S.  The arguments 
were the same as those directed against the Jews in Europe, including secret 
plotting behind the scenes to take over control of various organizations such as 
the press (p. 89).  Americans were stoutly reminded that Jewish-controlled 
newspapers drew them into war in 1917 and that history could very easily repeat 
itself, “Class against class, race against race, isolationist against interventionist, 
and everyone against the press-this was Berlin’s pattern of dissension within the 
United States” (p. 90).  The Propaganda Ministry’s North American service 
borrowed “Sinister Sam” from his announcing duties usually directed at British 
audiences, to talk about Jews and their American agenda on September 22, 
1940: 
Maybe you think that Jews do not aspire to political rule…Read 
their books and those publications which are meant for their own 
race, and in which they speak freely.  You would be astonished and 
probably alarmed about their dreams of world power.  (Graves, 
1940, p. 616) 
 Only as a last alternative did the German broadcasters resort to the use of 
intimidation.  Even when this was the case, the threats did not take on the 
“unadulterated terror tactics adopted in many of the broadcasts to Britain and 
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hostile European countries” (Childs & Whitton p. 90).  Instead of being overtly 
presented, the warnings were somewhat implied.  Americans were reminded that 
war was not an agreeable state of affairs and that “baiting the German war 
machine” would result in similar devastation bestowed upon Poland and 
Rotterdam (p. 90).  A shortwave broadcast from May 18, 1940 stated that 
Germany “was using new and terrible weapons, the nature of which you 
(America) cannot know, which revolutionize the conditions of warfare” (pp. 90-
91). 
 As the Nazis looked into the future, they reminded the United States about 
the economic post-war world where “friendly contact with the important nations” 
may not materialize due to America’s continued belligerence against Germany.  
Eventual economic sanctions were threatened unless the U.S. decided on “a 
more cordial attitude towards the powers to be in Europe” (p. 91). 
 German propagandists noticed that elements of the American national 
defense program were easily identifiable with totalitarian systems of government 
and used an alleged letter from a shortwave listener in Dallas, Texas during an 
August 29, 1940 broadcast: 
…the joker in the defense bill permits the government to take over 
industries and plants, lock, stock and barrel, even in 
peacetime…our government, with the approval of the legislators, if 
not of the people, enacts laws that are identical, if not more 
dictatorial, than those of dictator nations.  (p. 91) 
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One day later, Americans were warned that all political opposition might become 
illegal in their country due to the interpretation of a statement made by 
Roosevelt’s Attorney General Jackson.  His alleged remarks defined “criticism of 
a nation’s leaders as a type of fifth columnist activity” (p. 90). 
 The intimidation method of persuasion took on a different dimension when 
a new program entitled “Hot Shots from the Front” was instituted a few weeks 
before the German-Italian-Japanese pact was signed.  On October 13, 1940, a 
German air raid was conducted against the English port city of Hull.  The 
following description was broadcast by a German radio announcer who put 
himself in the place of the bomber pilot participating in the air raid: 
A hail of a hundred bombs-of thousands of incendiary bombs of all 
sizes-goes down carrying disaster and destruction.  Then from the 
harbor of Hull, an inferno of flames shoots up.  Fires flicker in the 
night…Yellow and red, it is burning down there.  Greenish-blue 
flames lick between the piers…A gigantic, apparently growing 
conflagration rolls on far below us…The whole suggests a 
disturbed ant-hill…The claws of the German eagle are sharp.  
(Graves, 1940, p. 616) 
 All of the persuasive methods examined here were meant to keep the 
Americans neutral during World War II.  However, as we know, this was not the 
case in spite of Goebbels best efforts.  In the next section, we will delve into the 
world of the American broadcasters in service to the Third Reich and explore the 
motivations and rhetoric employed by these atypical radio commentators. 
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American Voices of Nazi Propaganda 
 In July of 1943, a Federal grand jury indicted nine American citizens in 
absentia for broadcasting Nazi and Fascist propaganda from Berlin and Rome.  
These announcers, in the words of the indictment, did “knowingly, intentionally, 
feloniously, traitorously and treasonably adhere to the enemies of the United 
States…giving to the said enemies aid and comfort” by repeated broadcasts of 
propaganda designed to “persuade citizens of the United States to decline to 
support the United States in the conduct of war”  (Shirer, 1943, p. 397).  
The lone broadcaster from Rome was the American writer/poet, Ezra 
Pound whose anti- Roosevelt and anti-American rhetoric made him well known 
before and during the war.  His lack of comfortability with the German language 
kept him in Italy, although he would have fit the mold of those broadcasting from 
Berlin (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 76).  He was found “insane and mentally unfit for 
trial” in 1946 and was sentenced to a mental institution for the criminally insane 
outside of Washington DC where he remained for the next twelve years (p. 78).  
Pound once remarked to a fellow writer, “An insane asylum is the only place I 
could bear to live in, in this country” (p. 78)! 
 
Fred Kaltenbach
As the American forerunner of all the Berlin broadcasters, Kaltenbach was on the 
air to North America before the start of the war.  There was no doubting his 
loyalty as evidenced by the following from Shirer’s Berlin Diary, “Most Nazis find 
him a bit ‘too American’ for their taste, but Kaltenbach would die for Nazism” (p. 
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529).  He was born in Dubuque, Iowa and was the son of a German immigrant 
butcher.  In spite of being arrested on suspicion of spying for America on his first 
visit to Germany in 1914, Kaltenbach recalled the experience twenty-five years 
later for his Nazi superiors: 
I was swept by a powerful emotion and something inside of me said, 
“I am going home.”  That was back in 1914 when I visited the land of 
my forefathers as a young high school student.  Ever since then I 
have done what I could to further the relations between the land of 
my fathers, Germany, and my native land, America.  I love them 
both (Edwards 1991, p.8). 
He remained in Berlin after earning his Ph.D. and began regular broadcasts to 
America in 1939, all the while claiming dual patriotism and describing America as 
his ‘sweetheart’ (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 47).  Kaltenbach utilized his Midwestern 
drawl in his rhetorical “Weekly Letter” to the folks back in Iowa.  The following 
example is from the second letter in his running series: 
All well in Berlin, American films showing, plenty of food, foreign 
culture appreciated (e.g. presentation of play by Hungarian); no 
enmity to French, present conflict senseless, Germany no 
aggressive design in West, only looks East, Germany broken ring 
around her and retains only peaceful reconstruction to do.  Why 
does England want to continue war?  She can’t beat Germany by 
blockade.  On the contrary Germany will increase use of submarine 
against English shipping.  (p. 47) 
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 Kaltenbach would later begin to personalize his letters by addressing them 
to an old schoolmate Harry Hagemann, “by that time a practicing lawyer, no 
doubt made increasingly uncomfortable by this embarrassing and one-sided 
relationship” (p. 47).  Here is a portion of a “Dear Harry” letter broadcast by 
shortwave on January 2, 1940: 
The American people should not be astonished at the enormous 
popularity enjoyed by Hitler in Germany.  Hitler gives life and time 
for his people: his selflessness has earned him popularity.  
Christmas holidays given up to be with his soldiers at the front.  
Where did Chamberlain, Daladier spend Christmas?  Hitler was the 
first soldier of the Reich among soldiers, not Commander-in-Chief.  
(Edwards, p. 10). 
 The British, who could sometimes dial into Kaltenbach’s talks, decided 
that he was deserving of an name similar to that bestowed upon “an Oxford-
accented Nazi broadcaster who had become internationally famous,” Lord Haw-
Haw whose real name was William Joyce (p. 10).  Therefore, Lord Hee-Haw, 
took full advantage of the opportunity presented to him by the British recognition 
in a broadcast of February 13, 1940: 
Lord Haw-Haw has joined the distinguished ranks of soldiers, 
statesmen and American Heiresses who have achieved British 
titles.  And now the “Daily Telegraph” of 27th January calls me the 
American Lord Haw-Haw.  I’ll try to live up to that honor.  Perhaps 
later I will get the C.B. but never quite a K.G. as even the Lord High 
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Pretender to the throne of Neptune, Winston Churchill, hasn’t got 
that yet.  The “Daily Telegraph” wants to give me a cap and bells, 
but what’s to stop a jester telling the truth?  Anyhow, I’ll do my best 
to make Americans give English pretensions in this war, the big 
Hee-Haw. England is fighting for the freedom of the seas—Hee-
Haw.  England is fighting for the rights of small nations, including 
India and Ireland—Hee-Haw.  English methods, including the 
hunger blockade and incitement of Russia against Germany are 
humane—Hee-Haw.  England thought the Germans would revolt—
Hee-Haw.  England thought Germany would attack the Maginot 
Line—Hee-Haw.  Churchill thought he could tackle submarines and 
magnetic mines—Hee-Haw.  England thinks she can starve 
Germany and hang up her washing on the Siegfried Line—Hee-
Haw.  (pp. 10-11) 
 Lord Hee-Haw also had a series of regular slots on the air including that of 
the author of the Saturday night “Military Review” and the series “British 
Disregard for American Rights” (Rolo, 1940, p. 28).  His informal, Midwestern 
style was apparent in the role of “Mr. Reader” who announced several of the 
evening’s current topics.  In the series “Jim and Johnny” Kaltenbach plays Jim, 
the know-it-all Canadian milkman who educates his friend on world politics.  In 
“Friendly Quarrel” Kaltenbach is the honest American, Fred, whose views are 
“demolished with compelling arguments spiced with heavy-handed wisecracks” 
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by the astute German, Fritz, played by former American professor turned Nazi 
propagandist, Otto Koischwitz.  (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 47-48). 
 Kaltenbach liked jingles, puns, gag-lines, and referring to a fictitious 
country called “Monrovia” which behaved as Hitler would have America behave 
towards Britain, “News flash: Monrovia seizes British gold deposited in 
Monrovian banks as security for debt payments…The Government of Monrovia 
sends cruisers to protect Monrovian mails to Europe” (Rolo, 1940, p. 28).  His 
acronym for the BBC was “Bullitt-Biddle Corporation – Atrocity Manufacturers 
Unlimited” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 49). 
 After three years of German military defeats and worsening conditions in 
Berlin, Kaltenbach’s lightheartedness began to wane.  On July 30, 1943, he 
replied on the air to his indictment for treason against the United States: 
Technically I suppose I am guilty of treason-of treason to Roosevelt 
and his warmongers, but not to the American people.  If I took 
service with the German radio as a free lance commentator in the 
autumn of 1939, two years before the U.S. officially entered the 
war, it was done out of a genuine desire to promote good relations 
between Germany, the land of my fathers, and America, the land of 
my birth.  It was clear to me from the start that the war in Europe 
was not an ideological war, but a fight for the future of the German 
people.  Since that time, it has become a fight for the existence of 
the German people...If I am engaged in treasonable activity against 
my native land, I am doing so under the conviction that this war has 
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never for a moment been America’s war.  This war began on the 
European continent, in settlement of primarily European problems 
and affairs.  Germany never had the slightest intention of carrying 
the war across the ocean…If Germany declared war on the U.S.A. 
on 8 December 1941; it was only a formality, because Roosevelt 
had for more than a year before that date been making undeclared 
war against Germany.  I am not an enemy of the American people, 
but I shall remain the implacable enemy of those forces in America 
who wish to deny Germany her rightful place in the European sun.  
If that be treason, make the most of it.  (Edwards, pp. 13-14) 
After the fall of Berlin, Kaltenbach was captured by the Soviets on July 14, 
1945.  He was incarcerated at detention camp “xyz” near Frankfurt on the Oder.  
When U.S. military intelligence learned of his situation, they offered the Russians 
two captured Nazi SS guards as a prisoner exchange (p. 15).  At this point, the 
Soviet secret police denied holding Kaltenbach, which ended all attempts at 
returning him to the States to stand trial.  He died of supposed natural causes in 
October 1945 at the age of fifty (p. 15). 
 
Constance Drexel
 Discussing the cultural achievements of Germany and introduced to her 
audiences as a “famous American journalist” and as a “Philadelphia socialite and 
heiress,” neither of which were true, Constance Drexel began broadcasting for 
the National Socialists in 1940 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54).  She was actually born 
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in Germany but was naturalized and grew up in Roslindale, Massachusetts.  She 
frequently crisscrossed the Atlantic and spent time attending four different 
schools, studying journalism in Europe.  Her education was completed in Paris at 
the Sorbonne in time to witness the outbreak of World War I and volunteer as 
one of the first American Red Cross nurses (Edwards, p.16).    
 She reported for the Chicago Tribune while covering the Paris Peace 
Conference and eventually became an advocate of women’s rights and the 
suffrage movement.  Drexel also has the distinction of being the first woman 
political correspondent on Capitol Hill (p. 17).  She was a supporter and activist 
for many causes including the League of Nations, and international reform 
movements; in fact, elements of Adolf Hitler’s restructuring movement in National 
Socialist Germany were similar to her own, “… such as the greater role of 
German women in the new Reich, the eradication of a parasitic social elite, 
welfare legislation for minors, and social hygiene regulatory laws all impressed 
her” (p.19).  Her association with the Nazis began in the mid-thirties while on 
working holidays to Germany.  Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry would assign her 
to write fitting articles for them (p.19). 
 Drexel’s efforts at establishing herself back home as a foreign affairs 
columnist went largely unnoticed, however; a pro-Nazi bias was undeniable in 
her writings.  She abruptly quit a position with the McClure Syndicate’s papers in 
1939 and left for Germany to visit her ailing mother in Wiesbaden (p.19).  The 
ulterior motive was uncovered when she was introduced to the Berlin press corps 
tens days after the German invasion of Poland (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 53). 
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 Initially, Drexel covered the social activities of what was known as the 
American colony in Berlin.  Rolo describes her as one speaking in an eastern 
American accent with occasional “Germanisms” surfacing due to long years 
spent in the fatherland (Rolo, 1940, p. 30).  As she became more acclimated to 
the political situation, Drexel based her interest in Nazi culture on “aesthetic 
principles handed down from Ancient Greece, that is, truth and beauty” 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54).  While attending a Wagnerian Festival in the town of 
Bayreuth, she reportedly said to Richard Wagner’s daughter-in-law, Winifred, 
“Oh, you are the girlfriend of Adolph Hitler…”  (p. 54)! 
 Categorizing her as “a sort of forlorn person and a rather shabby 
journalist” (Edwards, p. 20), William Shirer seemed to be annoyed by Drexel’s 
repeated advances toward him for favors and the possibility of employment.  
Apparently, she was not taken seriously by her American colleagues: 
Constance Drexel, an insignificant, mixed-up, and ailing woman of 
forty-six who always had a bad cold, used to tell me during the first 
winter of the war in Berlin that she needed money-and wouldn’t I 
hire her as a broadcaster?  But she went over to the service of Dr. 
Goebbels mainly because she had always been pro-German and 
pan-German and since 1933 had been bitten by the Nazi bug.  The 
money the Germans paid her no doubt was welcome, but she 
would have taken mine (which had an anti-Nazi taint) had I been 
fool enough to hire her.  (Shirer, 1943, p. 397) 
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Her descriptions of life in Germany centered on social and cultural aspects 
in a rhetorical effort to convince her audiences in America that the pressures 
associated with the war were not an issue for the German people (Edwards, p. 
19).  When her talks strayed a bit and took on a political character, her Nazi 
employers were rather embarrassed.  On August 25, 1940, she broadcast the 
following after the U.S. sent the ocean liner American Legion to Europe in an 
effort to round up citizens who had become, due to the war, stranded on the 
Continent, “It is possible the government deliberately sent the ship through the 
war zone in the hope that it might create an international incident which would 
arouse American public opinion to the point of entering the war” (Bergmeier & 
Lotz, p. 54).  In 1942, the German government supposedly found documents 
indicating that American diplomats had encouraged the British to declare war 
against Germany.  To this revelation Drexel added, “I was among those who saw 
the documents and had no doubt that they were the genuine article” (Edwards, p. 
20).  Drexel confided to a fellow journalist, Joseph C. Harsch that the Nazis were 
now writing her scripts and she had no editorial control.  Harsch believed that she 
actually had no idea that she was being used while working for the National 
Socialists (p. 20). 
Constance Drexel was arrested in Austria by American G.I.s in August of 
1945 after naively divulging her identity to a Stars and Stripes reporter 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54).  She spent time in internment camps and prisons until 
being send back to the U.S. in 1946 to face her treason indictment.  She had 
always maintained her innocence:  
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I was only interested in culture, in Beethoven and music and things 
like that…They said I was giving aid and comfort to the enemy.  I 
was always against the war.  I thought that I was following 
President Roosevelt’s line—you know, harmonizing things 
(Edwards, pp. 20-21). 
U.S. attorneys investigating the case in Germany were unable to justify further 
prosecution.  Therefore, a federal judge dismissed the treason indictment in 
1948, due to lack of evidence.  She died eight years later at a cousin’s home in 
Waterbury, Connecticut (p. 21). 
 
Edward Leopold Delaney 
 Delaney took a rather circuitous route to his position behind the Berlin 
microphone not long after the start of the war.  He was born in Illinois in 1885 and 
had worked as an actor, film distributor, stage producer, author, press agent, and 
marketing manager for MGM (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 50).  After the Stock Market 
crash of 1929, Delaney was in and out of the U.S. quite frequently.  Roosevelt’s 
re-election irritated the future broadcaster due to the President’s pro-Soviet 
recognition policies (Edwards, p. 23).   
 His unswerving anti-Roosevelt criticisms were noticed by the German 
Embassy in Washington and resulted in an invitation to Berlin.  He was 
welcomed by Dr. Hans Schirmer, chief of the Reich Foreign Office’s Radio 
Department (p. 23).  They discussed a job opening for Delaney that involved 
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writing and broadcasting human-interest material with complete editorial freedom 
and no travel restrictions: 
The Nazis paid him the standard traitor’s salary of 1,000 marks a 
month ($400 at the official rate of exchange) and threw in a 
comfortable apartment off the Kurfuerstendamm out of which some 
unfortunate Jew had been thrown.  But he probably could have 
done just as well at home—except the flat—since in terms of prices 
1,000 marks really amounted to only $250.  With a little luck, no 
doubt, he could have earned $62.50 a week right here.  (Shirer, 
1943, pp. 397-398) 
 Using the name “E.D. Ward,” Delaney began his broadcasting career 
claiming to be “an American correspondent and observer.”  He made it a point to 
distance himself from the National Socialist doctrine and maintain his 
independence (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 51).  On August 30, 1940, Delaney told his 
audience, “I am allowed to say on this totalitarian station that…I am not an 
advocate of their [Nazi] political philosophy” (Graves, 1940, p. 604).  Delaney felt 
that he was now being afforded the chance to neutralize what he regarded as 
Allied propaganda with his “objective slant to central European affairs” (Edwards, 
p. 24). 
 When American correspondents characterized wartime Berlin as gloomy 
and depressing, Delaney was ready with his reply, “Naturally things are not the 
same as in peacetime, but the surprising thing is that they are not worse.  That 
they are not is due to the amazing organization of economic genius” (Bergmeier 
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& Lotz, p. 51).  He also warned listeners of German U-boat commanders who 
might fall for Roosevelt’s trap of sending convoys straight into their periscope 
crosshairs.  Ex-President Hoover’s call for neutrality was praised during the 1940 
Republican convention (p. 51) as was Henry Ford’s refusal to manufacture 
aircraft engines for Britain (Edwards, p. 29).  A favorite practice of Delaney’s was 
that of confirming his own perception of war hysteria in America by interviewing 
returning Europeans from the States.  He also took special delight in ridiculing 
gossip of an Axis-led invasion of North America: 
I present my newly discovered plan for the invasion of 
America…The new air bases which Germany will use for this 
invasion will be on submarines.  The newest U-boats will have 
quarter-decks, after-decks, shelter-decks; all filled with planes 
which will take off and land at speed.  These semi-porpoises can 
deliver their bombers as far inland as St. Louis or 
Pittsburgh…Similar airplane carriers, submarines of course, then 
go up other rivers as far as Minnesota.  All are designed to take 
diesel engines and fuel will be made from the by-products of corn.  
German chemists will see that two crops of corn are raised each 
year, which will give us more fuel than planes.  Other airplane 
carriers will go up the St. Lawrence and it is said they can navigate 
the Niagara Falls, so they can reach Chicago.  This airplane-and-
submarine carrier is secretly known as the Sixth Column.  I could 
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tell you more of this stupendous scheme but it might be censored.  
(Edwards, p.29) 
 Delaney characterized growing British-American war cooperation as His 
Majesty’s attempt re-write history and re-colonize North America.  This was 
considered his “scoop” of the war: 
Why was the Duke of Windsor sent to the Bahamas?  The Duke is 
to be the First Viceroy of Britain in Washington when the two 
nations are melted into one.  It’s not so fantastic as it sounds.  
Having an American born wife he would be well received into the 
post of Governor General—sort of assistant to the President.  Or 
would the President be subordinated to him?  Who knows?  Not I. 
least of all the people of America.  They’ll be told about it when 
details are all worked out, and only then.  Just now you’re being 
informed in advance by E. D. Ward in Berlin.  Good night.  
(Edwards, p. 27) 
 As America’s entry into World War II became more apparent, Delaney 
continued to tow the Nazi Party line of rhetoric designed to keep the U.S. neutral.  
He criticized Roosevelt’s belligerent politics and made this statement shortly 
before Pearl Harbor: 
The declaration of war will be catastrophic for the United States.  
Not only in men and materials, in blood and tears, but in the loss of 
our priceless heritage of independence and principles.  The 
meaningless and deceptive slogans about salvaging democracy 
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and upholding the principles of Christian civilization will prove to be 
but shibboleths that lead to shambles.  This war is for control of 
European politics and the economic life of Europe’s many nations, 
regardless of the phrases used to camouflage it.  (Bergmeier & 
Lotz, pp. 51-52) 
A few weeks after the Japanese attack, Delaney told his American audience that 
Roosevelt had invited the assault in order to gain a superior leadership role in the 
world conflict.  He then continued that FDR offered up Pearl Harbor commanding 
officers Admiral Kimmel and General Short as scapegoats in an effort to hide the 
“sinister scheme” (Edwards, p. 33). 
 Delaney become bitter and angrier as the war progressed.  The CBS 
correspondent in Berlin, Edwin Hartrich said that, “after a while he became rather 
a tragic figure.  He couldn’t find an audience to listen to his line of preaching.  
Even the Nazis avoided him” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52).  To William Shirer, 
Delaney by then was simply “bored and boring” (p. 52).  Leaving Berlin in 1943, 
Delaney went to Slovakia and was present two years later for the Soviet 
occupation of the city.  He confided to a couple of reporters from Stars and 
Stripes magazine that he was the E.D. Ward who had made broadcasts for the 
Nazis.  The reporters promptly turned him in to Czech authorities (Edwards, p. 
35) and thus began a series of internments until his repatriation in 1947 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52).  His trial defense centered upon his assertion that he 
was being prosecuted for writing anti-Soviet literature.  The jury agreed and the 
indictment for treason was dismissed.  Subsequently, his new persona found him 
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on the lecture circuit, speaking as a fervent anti-Communist.  His publicity poster 
slogan read “Delaney Was Behind the Iron Curtain When It Fell: He Tells All!!”  
(Edwards, p.36)  Edward Leopold Delaney, a.k.a. E.D. Ward, lived to the age of 
86 before he was struck and killed by an automobile at his home in Glendale, 
California in 1972 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52).  
 
Otto Koischwitz
 Like Drexel, Koischwitz was a native German born in 1902.  After 
graduating from Berlin University, he was unable to find work in the post-war 
economic climate.  He emigrated to the U.S. in 1925 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 55).  
Upon arrival in New York City, Dr. Koischwitz found temporary teaching positions 
at Columbia and New York Universities.  In a 1943 broadcast, he recalled one of 
his first memories of Columbia that he paralleled with recent Allies bombings in 
Cologne: 
In 1925, after completing my course at Berlin University, and 
imbued with ideals of international understanding and brotherly 
love, I visited the U.S.A.  I saw over the main entrance of the 
Columbia University School of Mining the symbol of the miners 
chiseled in stone—two crossed hammers and over them a big white 
blob.  A professor told me that the greeting of the German miners, 
“Gluck auf,” meaning “Good luck,” was inscribed there, but in 1917, 
these two words had been erased.  His revelation shook my faith in 
international goodwill…If that stone on Columbia’s Mining School 
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poisoned my mind seven years after the end of the last conflict, 
how much hurt will the damage done by the Cologne Cathedral 
inflict upon those who caused it, and upon their children and 
children’s children.  (Edwards, p. 65) 
 In 1928, Koischwitz gained an assistant professorship at Hunter College 
as a member of the German faculty where his ensuing, extensive, publication 
record seemed to go unnoticed.  His lectures were controversial and centered on 
contrasts between decadent Western culture and the ideals of Teutonic 
civilization (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 55).  Koischwitz spoke of the great courage of 
Siegfried and the brilliance of Hitler’s favorite composer, Richard Wagner.  “He 
openly attacked ‘the frauds committed by Jewish writers,’ asserting that people 
‘think with their blood, not with their intellect’ and sneering at ‘degenerate western 
literature’” (p. 55).  
 In 1938, in spite of his newly acquired U.S. citizenship and impressive 
academic record, Hunter College tenured him at the rank of assistant professor, 
insulting, what he felt were his conscience and nationality (Edwards, p. 70).  The 
last straw came one year later when the American Council Against Nazi 
Propaganda reported his classroom politics to the department of education 
resulting in a leave of absence without pay (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56).  After 
resigning his position, he returned to Europe within weeks after the start of the 
war.  With his family first settling in Denmark, Koischwitz would later answer “the 
call of the blood” by moving them to Berlin where he joined the Nazi Foreign 
Ministry’s new broadcasting division (p. 56).  
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 Playing the role of “Fritz” opposite Kaltenbach in the “Friendly Quarrelers” 
series, Koischwitz, complete with his natural German accent, first used the term 
“Britality” to explain Britain’s self-righteous assertions of monopolistic civility 
(Edwards, p. 74).  Cited as an example of “Britality” was the English mockery of 
their native language usage by the Americans, which the ordinary British citizen 
referred to as “slanguage” (p. 74).  Koischwitz and Kaltenbach also aired “Jim 
and Johnny” about a politically wise milkman and “his unemployed, non-paying 
Canadian customer” (Graves, 1940, p. 603).  Contributing to the Nazi’s official 
American neutrality policy, he said on July 16, 1940, “there is a far greater 
similarity between American democracy and German National Socialism than 
there is between old-fashioned English class distinction and Americanism” (p. 
612). 
 Koischwitz also created a new program called “Dr. Anders and Little 
Margaret.”  While Margaret, an American, was visiting her grandmother in 
Germany, Dr. Anders, one of his many stage names, would read letters from the 
girl’s school mates back home in the States (Edwards, p. 74).  By answering her 
friends over the shortwave, Margaret would describe the wonderful, idyllic life she 
was experiencing such as her daily routines, delicious meals, favorite German 
songs, and her pleasant bedtime customs (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56).  
 June of 1940 saw the debut of Dr. Anders as host of the “College Hour” 
where one could listen to such lectures as “The Law of Historical Evolution,” 
“Typology”, “Surrealism,” and “The Problem of Freedom” (p. 56).  In the 
September 24 issue of The New York Post, this show as described as “cultured, 
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gentle, intelligent and charming” but soon the programs became more Nazified.  
Topics shifted early in 1941 to “Numerology,” “James Joyce,” and “The Name of 
Germany” (p. 56). Koischwitz looked at war in a Darwinian sense as an agent 
of “predetermined evolution” and warned the Americans not to interfere in this 
natural process: 
There are certain things you cannot escape.  For instance, you 
cannot escape symptoms of old age, even if you dye your hair.  
Suddenly you look much older than you would look without those 
experiments.  Likewise, mankind cannot escape a new age when it 
has matured…England went to war to destroy what it called 
Dictatorship.  Now, the British are forced by circumstance…to 
establish the most rigid Dictatorship imaginable in their own 
country…The establishment in Germany of an authoritarian 
government on the basis of leadership was the result of slow and 
natural evolution, and an expression of the will of the people.  
Churchill, on the other hand, lacks the support of the masses.  
England, which wanted to escape dictatorship at any price, ran into 
it.  (Edwards, p. 75) 
 Koischwitz grudgingly dismissed the idea that America had forced Britain 
to declare war and surmised that after Britain and Germany had fought to their 
respective material depletions, the way would be clear for American world 
domination.  His rhetoric was clearly focused on American neutrality as the best 
option for the English (Graves, 1940, p. 614). 
 217
 
 “O.K. Speaking” was another program where Koischwitz became “The 
Man Who Knows.”  Mr. Okay would begin sentences with the word 
“confidentially” and claimed to have insight penetrating the inner circle of the 
Roosevelt Administration (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56), and knew of the methods 
whereby Americans were being “duped” by their so-called leaders, “There are 
certain facts…that Washington officialdom is concealing from the public.”  He 
was also heard to remark on this program, “…alien elements are administering 
American policy and diplomacy” (Rolo, 1940, p. 30).  After it was announced that 
the Americans would be sending equipment to the Soviet Union, Mr. Okay hinted 
at Roosevelt’s interest in providing Russian soldiers with boots because of FDR’s 
shares of stock in the shoe industry (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56).  
 Once the U.S. had entered the war, the strategy employed by Koischwitz 
changed to a type of cynical scare tactic.  As Americans at home were sitting 
down to their first wartime Thanksgiving dinner in 1942, they heard this holiday 
message on his program: 
Today is Thanksgiving Day.  Be thankful for having reaped some of 
the glory of Britain’s defeats in the Far East; for the disaster of 
Pearl Harbor, for the heavy losses of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 
for the losses of U.S. merchant ships in the Caribbean and Atlantic, 
the Artic.  Be thankful for rising prices, higher taxes, and a lower 
standard of living; for increased working hours, oil restrictions, 
limitations of individual freedom, the muzzling of American liberty.  
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Be thankful for U.S. cooperation with Bolshevism.  Be thankful that 
American boys sit in Iceland, or Northern Ireland, or die 1,000 miles 
away from home in every corner of the world.  Don’t forget the main 
thing: be thankful that between you and Stalin stands the German 
Army!  (Edwards, p. 87)   
 Immediately prior to the Normandy landings, Koischwitz wrote a radio play 
titled “Vision of Invasion” (partial script available in Edwards, pp. 94-95).  Heard 
on May 11, 1944, this “doomsday drama” created a sobering image of the 
impending battle (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 58).  Mildred Gillars, a.k.a.  Axis Sally 
who had collaborated with Koischwitz on interview visits to P.O.W. camps, 
played the part of an American mother, “Everybody says the invasion is suicide.  
The simplest person knows that.  Between seventy and ninety percent of the 
boys will be killed, or crippled for the rest of their lives” (p. 58). 
 Within a week after the landings, Koischwitz was in France attempting to 
deflect the long-feared, and now the reality of Germans fighting on a second 
front.  He broadcast the following on June 15, 1944, “War profiteers on the 
London and New York exchanges go wild with joy, whilst tens of thousands of 
bodies litter the beaches of north-western France, waiting in vain for a decent 
grave” (p. 58).  Actually, the total Allied casualties on D-Day were estimated at 
10,000, including 2500 dead (D-Day Museum, 2004). 
 William Shirer, writing for a New York City newspaper, elaborated on 
Koischwitz role as a “roving” correspondent: 
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Otto Koischwitz…long ago discontinued his breezy broadcasts 
under the name of O.K.  Goebbels, for some reason, sent the 
professor to the firing line as a “front-line reporter.”  His specialty 
was broadcasting eyewitness accounts from the various battle 
fronts on which the Americans were facing Germans.  Since 
General [Omar] Bradley’s Americans began their race through 
France, I have not been able to catch any more broadcasts by him.  
Presumably he began moving too fast to allow for a pause at the 
microphone (Edwards, pp. 96-97). 
The former Hunter College professor’s last broadcast came from Paris on 
July 26 as he hammered away at the theme of deteriorating Franco-American 
relations, “They [Frenchmen] are becoming better Europeans, realizing that 
Bolshevism would be the sole beneficiary of an Allied victory” (p. 97).  Otto 
Koischwitz died shortly thereafter on August 31, 1944 in a Berlin hospital of heart 
failure and tuberculosis (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59).  
 
Jane Anderson 
 Born in 1893 in Atlanta, Anderson earned her reputation as a legitimate 
journalist while working for the London Daily Mail and the Daily Express during 
the first war.  Her bold style provided dispatches from front line positions that 
included interviews with soldiers on both sides of the conflict (Edwards, p. 43). 
 By 1917, the strikingly beautiful redhead was moving in influential political 
and diplomatic circles in Paris.  A 1942 FBI file elaborated on the Parisian 
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episode in her life, “… Jane Anderson had no reputation of promiscuity, but was 
not a woman of entirely rigid virtue” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 63).  She returned to 
New York after the war, went back to Paris in the early 1930’s, and eventually 
married a wealthy Spanish aristocrat, the Marquis Alvarez de Cienfuegos (p. 63). 
 Historical fate put her in position to witness the Spanish civil war while 
rekindling her passion for journalism.  She became the Daily Mail’s war 
correspondent after a positive response from a cable sent to London asking for 
the assignment (Edwards, p. 49).  Reverting to her old style of reporting from the 
front with the troops, this time Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces, she again 
endured the hardships of war with the troops and reported on the many atrocities 
committed by anti-Franco, Loyalist forces, “…seeing defenseless prisoners 
brutally slaughtered, of rapes and crucifixions, and of unspeakable excesses 
against the church” (p. 49).  These experiences undoubtedly led to her later anti-
Communist sentiments that attracted the interest of the Nazi propagandists a few 
years later. 
 Anderson was captured late in September of 1936 and was charged with 
spying for Franco.  During the next six weeks of confinement in Madrid, she was 
tried and found guilty on charges of espionage and subsequently sentenced to 
death (Edwards, pp. 49-50).  She successfully smuggled a message from her 
prison cell to the U.S. embassy and was released on the condition that she 
immediately left the country (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64). 
 Back in America, her adventures and her anti-Communist rhetoric paid 
dividends on the lecture circuit.  Catholic Digest declared Jane Anderson “the 
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world’s greatest woman orator in the fight against Communism” and Time 
magazine quoted Monsignor Fulton Sheen who regarded her as a “living martyr” 
(Edwards, p. 64).  In a later Berlin broadcast, Anderson expressed her outrage at 
the blatant American disregard for Spain in that country’s time of crisis: 
I had not been twenty-four hours upon American soil before I had 
confirmed…that from the pulpits of the land of the Star-Spangled 
Banner, no word of the God-fearing had been lifted against the 
hordes from Moscow which had descended upon Madrid to unleash 
upon a Christian land rivers of blood as the first stride forward in 
world revolution.  (Shirer, 1943, p. 402) 
 Anderson and her husband returned to a safer, Franco-controlled Spain in 
November of 1938.  One year later, she was in Berlin at the outbreak of the war, 
where her reputation as a staunch anti-Communist speaker appealed to the 
Propaganda Ministry (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64).  She joined the shortwave 
broadcasting staff but did not begin her work until April 14, 1941 when she was 
introduced to American audiences as “the world-famous Catholic, twice 
condemned to death by the firing squad in Spain, whose lectures in the United 
States were endorsed by the Archbishop of Washington” (p. 64).  She included 
the following remarks in her first broadcast, “Germany gives the Church the 
strength of her sword, the weight of her wealth, and the protection of her law” (p. 
64).  She later told her listeners of the “dynamic life of the Reich” and 
unashamedly compared Hitler to Moses, “He had reached to the stars, and the 
Lord’s will would prevail” (p. 64).  Goebbels personally discussed policy with 
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Anderson on May 10th, when she was told, “We must grab America by the horns 
now.  There is no point in treading gently any more”   (Edwards, p. 52).   
 The following month marked the debut of her own show Voice of Europe 
with its strange opening and closing line, “Always remember, progressive 
Americans eat Kellogg’s Corn Flakes and listen to both sides of the story.”  The 
background music was a recording of the Benny Goodman orchestra’s 
nonsensical hit Scatterbrain (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64). 
 The invasion of Russia in June of 1941 marked the end of refraining from 
anti-Soviet remarks that were agreed upon in the non-aggression pact with 
Moscow.  Afterwards, Anderson was observed by Sington & Weidenfeld, authors 
of The Goebbels Experiment:  
Since the invasion of Russia an Englishwoman [sic] named Jane 
Anderson has moved into the foreground of German broadcast 
propaganda to North America.  This somewhat hysterical woman, 
who claims to be an ardent Roman Catholic, used to broadcast 
accounts of toleration shown in the Third Reich for the Roman 
Church.  She reverts continually to the subject of ‘maltreatment’ by 
the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War.  Her talks, which 
nearly always contain highly coloured accounts of atrocities 
committed by the ‘Reds’ during the Spanish war, occasionally 
border on the pornographic.  (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 64-65) 
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An American monitor had noticed a similar tone in Anderson’s rantings, “If her 
microphone hysteria is any clue to her personality, she is probably mentally 
unhinged” (p. 65). 
 The end of her broadcast career came innocently enough on March 6, 
1942 when she attempted to counteract enemy propaganda concerning reports 
of food shortages in the Reich: 
Last night my gentleman friend and I went to the bar at the Hotel 
Adlon.  There, on silver platters, were sweets and cookies galore.  I 
ate Turkish cookies, a delicacy I happen to be very fond of.  My 
friend ordered great goblets of champagne for the two of us, and 
into the champagne he put liberal shots of cognac to make it more 
lively.  Sweets and cookies and champagne, not bad!  (p. 66). 
American monitors realized an opportunity to use these statements against the 
ration-conscious German people.  The plan worked to perfection as Anderson’s 
remarks were translated and re-broadcast to the fatherland where she was 
promptly taken off the air (p. 66). 
 Jane Anderson and her aristocrat husband were arrested in Innsbruck in 
April of 1947.  In light of her Spanish nationality through marriage, the U.S. 
Department of Justice openly decided not to prosecute the treason indictment of 
four years earlier (p. 66). 
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Robert Best 
 To understand the rhetoric of Best, it is important to consider his South 
Carolina roots.  He was the son of a Methodist minister whose ministries were 
spread out over twelve congregations in twenty-five years (Edwards, 1982, p. 
73).  Best divided his school years between private and public institutions and 
entered Wofford College at sixteen, finishing his coursework in 1916, graduating 
in half the required time (p. 73). 
 World War I produced “Lieutenant Robert Best” who served in the coastal 
artillery and balloon corps.  He stayed in the Army for a short time after the war 
and resigned his commission to enter the School of Journalism at Columbia 
University.  It was his strong, personal narrative style more than talent that 
helped his efforts at the time (p. 74).  
 After graduating from Columbia in 1922, he received a Traveling Pulitzer 
Scholarship that allowed him to study and travel abroad for approximately ten 
months.  Initially, he covered the activities of the League of Nations in Geneva for 
a few noteworthy publications but failed at establishing a European-American 
student exchange program that was to be financed with German war reparation 
money coming from the British (p. 74). 
 Best was becoming caught up in the lifestyle and political intrigue of 
Europe and decided to stay in spite of his expired scholarship and meager funds.  
He eventually settled in Vienna and found work in 1923 as a stringer for the 
Berlin office of United Press International (p. 75).  It was not the professional 
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status he had hoped for, but it enabled Best to continue the lifestyle he had 
grown fond of during his early, impressionable years.   
 His unofficial office was actually a reserved table in the Café Louvre, 
which also became a meeting place for some of the world’s leading political 
journalists: Dorothy Thompson, Sinclair Lewis, H.R. Knickerbocker, John 
Gunther, Eric Gedye, M.W. Fodor, Edgar Mowrer, Whit Burnett, George Seldes, 
Edwin L. James, Walter Duranty, Jim Mills, and Vincent Sheean (Shirer, 1943, p. 
398).  Best would never match his guests’ formidable writing talents, but instead 
won their respect through his news brokerage service that built up a massive 
force of political informants (Edwards, p. 75).  
Best was quite the ostentatious character at his Café Louvre table, and 
became the inspiration for two fictional books based on his life story, William L. 
Shirer’s The Traitor (1941) and John Gunther’s The Lost City (1964) (p. 75).  
Shirer noticed the “inbred charms of a dyed in the wool Southerner” manifested 
in Best’s folksiness and story telling abilities.  Dorothy Thompson described him 
as an inexperienced youth devoid of significant associates.  By the early 1930’s, 
Best’s reputation was that of an eccentric (p. 75). 
The Nazi side of Austrian politics began to interest Best as early as 1932 
when Gunther’s The Lost City had him moving in Nazi circles.  In spite of this, 
Best had a genuine concern for some of his Jewish associates, especially on the 
night of the Anschluss in March of 1938 (p. 77).  Shirer felt that Best started 
going Nazi after Hitler came to power (p. 78).  Best’s UPI boss, Hugh Baillie had 
persistent suspicions about his employee’s loyalties confirmed in no uncertain 
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terms, “…One night at dinner he gave us the full treatment, enthusiastically 
explaining the Nazi idea of brotherhood.  From others we heard about his liaison 
with […] the most extreme local Nazis.”  (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 68)  UPI colleague 
Joseph W. Grigg had a similar response to Best’s political views: 
He talked as a convinced Nazi and I quickly came to the conclusion 
there was no point in arguing with him about politics.  I will say, 
however, that he was sufficiently professional so that this strong 
pro-Nazi bias did not appear to color his news coverage.  
(Edwards, p. 78) 
However, it was Dorothy Thompson, “on behalf” of the American press corps, 
who delivered a contemptuous critique of Best in 1942, the year he began 
broadcasting from Berlin to North American audiences:   
Bill Shirer says…it’s [Best’s defection] because you stayed too long 
in Europe and went European.  With all due respect to Bill, I think 
that is hooey.  You went Nazi and going Nazi isn’t going European.  
Nazism is as anti-European as it is anti-American.  Lots of 
American correspondents lived for years on end in Europe and 
became much more “Europeanized” than you ever did, Bob Best.  
Why, you never even properly learned the German language.  They 
did, and read European history and philosophy, sociology and 
psychology, and entered deeply into European culture…No, Bob, 
that doesn’t explain you.  The truth is that you remained after 20 
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years as intellectually lazy and just about as ignorant as you were 
when you arrived.  (pp. 78-79) 
 Best remained in Vienna despite the exodus of most fellow journalists 
following the Anschluss.  He was aware of the difficulties being faced by other 
correspondents in their readjustment to American life and began to associate 
with the feelings of those low-paid, middle class workers in Europe that were ripe 
for the offerings of Fascism (Shirer, 1943, p. 399).  After fifteen years of service, 
he was now the bureau chief of a non-existent office having advanced little in 
status and salary (Edwards, p. 79).  His bosses viewed him as a low-level liaison 
with street tipsters and stringers.  This professional mid-life crisis stole his 
enthusiasm for work and contributed to his growing anti-Semitism considering 
himself a victim of Jewish interests (p. 79).  Best summed up his lot in life as 
Europe stood once again at the brink of war: 
Over the past years there has been an increase in the number of 
non-Jewish correspondents who […] chose to covet favor of the 
Jews as a certain road towards notoriety and, therefore, towards a 
small fortune.  They chose to do this instead of telling you the truth.  
In my 19 years as a journalist in Europe […] I chose, I am proud to 
say, an uncompromising stand, and I remained, in consequence, 
comparatively unknown to the wider public in America and Britain.  
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 67) 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany’s subsequent 
declaration of war on the United States found Robert Best in the unenviable 
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position of enemy alien.  He was arrested by the Gestapo and spent ten days in 
prison before reporting to a resort spa that was serving as a detention center 
near Bad Nauheim.  He was detained there with 144 other American journalists 
and diplomatic personnel with whom he had slight contact (Edwards, p. 80).  
Within two months Best had petitioned the Reich Propaganda Ministry for 
permission to remain in occupied Europe.  Citing his desire to mend “the broken 
ties” between his country and Germany and accepting the explanation of his self-
exile from America as a distain for Jewish dominance over U.S. society, the 
German Foreign Office granted his request.  He left for Berlin on March 2, 1942 
(p. 81). 
 After his arrival, Best was directed to Werner Plack, chief of the radio 
division for the Nazi Foreign Office.  Plack was familiar with Best’s short stint as a 
broadcaster with Radio Vienna and recruited him for similar work in Berlin by 
convincing the American that Germany could offer him the electronic forum of 
addressing his fellow countrymen on the dreadful condition of society and politics 
in the U.S. (p. 81).  Best accepted and offered his services as a means of uniting 
the two countries in the struggle against Bolshevism and international Jewry.  His 
Radio Berlin debut on April 10, 1942 included the following remarks: 
Who are you anyway?  This is one of the many questions which 
many would like to put to me at this moment.  But unfortunately, I 
must remain for you merely ‘Mr. Guess Who,’ your self-appointed 
correspondent for the New World Order.  (p. 81) 
 229
Thus, “Mr. Guess Who” began his eighteen months on the shortwave.  He 
taunted Roosevelt as “funny Frankie,” the slave of America’s Jewish interests, 
spoke angrily against Semitic control of Masonic lodges in the U.S. (Best was a 
32nd degree Mason), and told American audiences of Soviet cannibalism on the 
Eastern Front (p. 82).  These types of unstructured and unrelated rantings 
resulted in an eventual rift with his Nazi superiors in the newsroom.  As a result, 
Best personally wrote to Goebbels to complain about “petty opposition to his 
work” (p. 82).  On May 21, 1942, on-air references were made by Best 
concerning a new found mastery being afforded him by his new situation:  
My pleasure is increased…by the fresh hope which the scope of my 
activity gives me for the future of America, for Britain, and the 
world.  Of the most divine sanctity of my crusade for the overthrow 
of kike rule in America and Britain I have no doubt whatever.  
(Shirer, 1943, p. 400) 
 In October of 1942, he began a farcical campaign for Congress urging 
listeners to elect him as their protest candidate, “I shall do my best to bring about 
peace before America has fallen into a state of complete chaos and Jewish 
slavery.”  He called himself “the alarm clock of America’s sleeping conscience.”  
(Edwards, p. 82)  Through his series, “Best’s Berlin Broadcasts,” or as he 
preferred to call them, “Berlin’s Best” and “Best’s Little Life-Savers” (Bergmeier & 
Lotz, p. 68), he spoke of BBB clubs being prepared in the U.S. to support his 
entry into the 1944 Presidential race (Edwards, p. 82).  As Roosevelt’s 
successor, Best told audiences he would summon American arms from Europe 
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and execute “one Jewish gangster” for every American killed in combat.  He 
characterized his indictment for treason in July of 1943 was as a “smear tactic” 
by Roosevelt aimed at discrediting his U.S. candidacy for President (p. 83).  It 
was apparent that Best had convinced Goebbels, whose ignorance of America 
was enormous, that his candidacy was actually throwing a wrench into the U.S. 
elections; otherwise, valuable airtime would have been devoted to other topics 
(Shirer, 1943, p. 400).  
 After the “impregnable Atlantic Wall” rhetoric was vaporized on D-Day, 
Best reverted to talks on secret weapons like the psychologically intimidating V.1 
buzz bombs and actually aired a tour of the factories where the rockets were 
being manufactured (Edwards, p. 84).  In October of 1944, the Allied airborne 
disaster at Arnheim was one of the last references to the progress of the war 
made by Best (p. 84).  When Warsaw fell to the Soviets in January of 1945, Best 
pleaded with America to allow “Europe” to follow its own fate while praising Hitler 
as “a valuable partner to the U.S. A. in the fruitful exchange of cultural and 
material values.”  (p. 85) 
 Best eluded capture after the war until February of 1946 when British 
security police found him living on his wife’s farm in Austria (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 
69).  He was turned over to American authorities and interned for ten months 
near Salzburg before his flight to America with fellow broadcasting collaborator, 
Douglas Chandler, to face their treason indictments (p. 69).  On his fifty-second 
birthday, April 16, 1948, Best was found guilty.  Six weeks later, he was fined 
$10,000 and sentenced to life imprisonment (Edwards, p. 86).  He suffered a 
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cerebral hemorrhage in 1951 and died in a Federal prison hospital in Missouri on 
December 16, 1952.  Robert Best was buried in Pacolet, South Carolina, his 
hometown (p. 86). 
 
Douglas Chandler 
 With piccolos playing “Yankee Doodle” and coconut husks mimicking the 
sound of horse hooves, Douglas Chandler took to the air on Berlin Radio as 
Revolutionary war hero “Paul Revere” in April of 1941 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59). 
Raised in Boston and Baltimore, Chandler served for a short time with the 
U.S. Navy during World War I.  He was unpopular with others due to his air of 
superiority and continuous talk of poetry, art, and music (Edwards, 1991, p. 116).  
In 1924, while working as a freelance columnist, he married Laura Jay Wurtz, 
great granddaughter of the first chief justice of the U.S., John Jay, and the 
daughter of wealthy Westinghouse inventor and Carnegie Tech professor from 
Pittsburgh, Alexander Jay Wurtz (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59).  The Wall Street 
crash of 1929 shifted Chandler from his self-proclaimed specialty in financial 
matters to an assistant editor’s job with the Baltimore Sunday American 
authoring a weekly news summary column entitled “This and That” (Edwards, p. 
116). 
He became disenchanted with his career, blaming his misfortune on some 
type of Jewish conspiracy that should not have been allowed to happen in 
America (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59).  His decision to live in Europe was described 
as “the sloughing off of inhibited provincialism” (Edwards, p. 117).  This 
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pronouncement set in motion a series of moves and chain of events that 
eventually put Chandler behind the Nazi microphone, broadcasting to America 
from Berlin. 
Chandler and his heiress wife and two children left for Europe in 
September of 1931 and stayed on the French Riviera.  In 1933, they moved to 
Starnberger See, close to Munich and met two Nazi members of the foreign 
press department, Ernst Hanfstaengl and Rolf Hoffman (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 
59).  They went out of their way to make sure their American guests saw the best 
side of the Reich’s welfare organizations and introduced the Chandlers to many 
British and American journalists in Munich at the time (Edwards, p. 117).  Austria 
was the next stop during the winter of 1933-34 and when spring arrived, the 
Chandlers began a tour of the Balkans.  That summer they were living in 
northern Yugoslavia while making many trips to both Greece and the island of 
Corfu (p. 118).  After several months in Innsbruck, the family settled in 
Freudenstadt in the Black Forest where the children were sent off to boarding 
school.  At this point, Hoffman re-appeared and invited Chandler to one of the 
great Nazi party rallies at Nuremberg and later to an anti-Comintern convention: 
The effect of this detailed and personal presentation of the havoc 
wrought by Soviet Bolshevik aggression on my mind was deep and 
lasting and undoubtedly contributed much to the decision which I 
made six years later…I formed a few real friendships among these 
men with two or three of whom I corresponded for several years.  
(p. 119) 
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Chandler used his new German Ikon camera on a trip to North Africa in 
1936 and had several of his photos accepted by the National Geographic 
Magazine.  He became a contributing correspondent for the next three years and 
did a special layout on Berlin in 1937 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 60).  The Chandlers 
were in Göttingen in late 1936 and met the future chairman of the Foreign 
Ministry’s expert committee on propaganda for America, Dr. Ernst Ulrich von 
Bülow and his American heiress wife, Ida Thomas of Michigan (p. 60).  
Approximately one year later, Chandler would once again attend a Nazi 
party rally in Nuremberg as the guest of Rolf Hoffman.  This time, Chandler met 
with linguist Charles Sarolea, a retired chair of French Literature at Edinburgh 
University.  He invited Chandler to lecture on Anglo-German relations and Hitler’s 
practical vision of a “new order” (p. 60).  After Edinburgh, the Chandlers were 
guests of British Nazi sympathizers, Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, and his German 
born wife, Alexandrina.  Domvile’s periodical, The Link, was populated with many 
articles written by those in favor of appeasement (p. 60).  
The next episode in Chandler’s life would highly influence his future 
broadcast rhetoric.  While on assignment for the National Geographic in 
Yugoslavia, he became acquainted with the Dalmatian coast and the island of 
Korcula (Edwards, p. 124).  He brought the family there and settled until August 
1940 when their residence permit was abruptly rescinded.  Chandler believed 
that this action was taken by the Jews living on Korcula, who regarded him as a 
Nazi due to his many trips to Germany and his supposed ties to Italian Fascists 
(p. 125).   
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After another move, this time to Florence, Chandler learned from the 
American community that they were upset with Roosevelt’s meddling in 
European affairs.  He claimed that he was urged from all sides to employ his 
talent and name in some beneficiary manner, however; his offer to broadcast for 
Italian radio was coolly received (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 60). 
Undaunted, Chandler contacted his former acquaintance Dr. von Bülow, 
who arranged a meeting with Dr. Hans Schirmer, head of the German Foreign 
Ministry’s broadcasting division (Edwards, p. 126).  Unbeknownst to Chandler, 
Dr. Goebbels at the time was searching for an American personality of the same 
radio ilk as the wildly popular Lord Haw-Haw.  The intention was to build a vast 
U.S. listening audience, if only by being amusing (Shirer, 1943, p. 402).   
Chandler offered to work with the status of an uncompensated freelance 
radio commentator.  Dr. Schirmer’s reply indicated that the proposal was 
unworkable; the American had to accept payment for his services.  Further 
negotiations fixed Chandler’s salary at 1,800 marks with an initial six-month 
contract, “I was overjoyed because America is my home and I love it” (Bergmeier 
& Lotz, p. 60).  Laura wrote in her diary, “Thank God Douglas has this wonderful 
opportunity to serve the U.S.A.”  (Edwards, p. 127) 
Chandler’s schedule consisted of delivering fifteen-minute broadcasts six 
times per week.  He cast aside the “Paul Revere” pseudonym in order to connect 
the audience with his other journalistic endeavors (Bergmeier & Lotz p. 60).  He 
initiated his broadcasts with the same salutation, “Misinformed, misgoverned 
friends and compatriots” (Shirer, 1943, p. 402).  On the air, he repeatedly berated 
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America’s partnership with Great Britain.  The following is from his first 
broadcast: 
Tonight I, an American observer, come galloping on the radio.  With 
bloodshed and agony we freed ourselves from England.  Are we 
going to enslave ourselves today?  ...Among the melting pot 
medley of American people are untold thousands of descendents of 
the minute men whom Paul Revere electrified into action.  But the 
word “minute” is undergoing a change in pronunciation.  Today 
these descendants are apparently “minute” men because of their 
impotence in deciding national issues.  (Edwards, p. 128)  
 Predictably, Chandler had many issues with his new employer including 
no office or secretary as promised.  His workspace was one of “chattering 
colleagues and clattering typewriters” that contributed to an exceedingly 
uncooperative attitude within his new Berlin environment (Bergmeier & Lotz p. 
61).  This was compounded by a lack of interest in helping his family with living 
accommodations and a salary that was often months behind.  Actual physical 
discomfort came as a result of Chandler having to read news scripts and interject 
propaganda-supplied material into his own programs: 
I would be seized by violent paroxysm which centered in my solar 
plexus and caused me during my time of writing a violent diarrhea 
each day.  I was suffering from acute headaches and experienced 
great difficulty with my eyes.  (p. 61) 
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 At the conclusion of his first six months, Chandler departed on a leave of 
absence, warning that he might not return.  However, by December of 1941 he 
was back in Berlin re-negotiating his contract, which included “full official support 
in matters of daily existence” (p. 61).  Other improvements included half of the 
original on-air workload, regular meetings with Karl Schotte, head of the North 
America zone, and an increase in pay to 2,500 marks per month making him one 
of the highest compensated employees on the short wave radio staff (p. 61).   
 These improvements did not make Chandler any easier to work with as 
his behavior became unpredictable and increasingly peculiar.  A U.S. flag was 
painted on the doors of his maroon Mercedes that was confiscated by the 
Gestapo after Pearl Harbor (Edwards, p. 131).  He wore a swastika set against 
crossed Axis flags on a lapel pin in the studio.  After his wife Laura died in the 
summer of 1942, he fell into a depression that included the excessive use of 
alcohol and the need for sleeping pills (Bergmeier & Lotz p. 61).    
 His anti-Roosevelt rhetoric intensified behind the microphone as he 
zeroed in on Washington in an effort to make the most of any perceived 
American opposition to F.D.R. who was being manipulated by his Jewish 
advisers: 
The terrible fate of Atlantis compares favorably with the fate 
prepared for America by Jewry: the ruthless Bolshevisation of the 
American continent.  Roosevelt, himself an offspring of Spanish 
Jews, is a mere tool of the Jewish conspiracy against all Nordic 
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Aryans…Only through the letting of Jewish blood can America be 
set free.  (Edwards, p. 134)  
  For the implementation of “Jewish plans for world domination,” Roosevelt 
was nominated for a so-called “Meddle Medal.”  Chandler went so far as to agree 
that revenge was in order for Pearl Harbor, not against the Japanese who were 
forced into the conflict, but against the real instigators of the war, the Jews 
(Bergmeier & Lotz p. 61).  The story of his expulsion from Korcula Island 
surfaced again, this time he blamed “international Jewry” for destroying his 
writing career (p. 61).   
 Late in 1943, he married Maria “Mia” Moorgat from the Lower Rhineland.  
The couple was transferred to Vienna where Chandler’s programs could be 
recorded and forwarded to Berlin (p. 61).  From February 1944 until the end of 
the war, he hosted a series on American poetry, “Poets and musicians were the 
ultimate peacemakers, for in troubled times they provided mankind with that 
central ingredient to international understanding—love of beauty” (Edwards, p. 
144).  The Allied landings in Normandy forced Chandler to further moderation, a 
fact that he admitted during his trial a few years later.  In October, the Chandlers 
moved to Bavaria where he was arrested and released in May of 1945 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 62).  He was later re-arrested in February 1946 by the FBI 
and held in a U.S. Army detention center until boarding a December flight back to 
America with fellow broadcaster Robert Best to face treason charges (Edwards, 
p. 145).   
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 Chandler faced the same fate as Best, a guilty verdict, a $10,000 fine, and 
a life prison sentence.  In January of 1962, the Attorney General’s office decided 
to release the seventy-four-year old convicted Nazi propagandist if he returned to 
Germany under the care of a daughter from his marriage to Laura Jay Wurtz 
(Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 62-63).  In spite of the fine having never been paid and 
the Bonn Foreign Ministry’s refusal to allow Chandler back into what had become 
West Germany, daughter Sylvia petitioned President Kennedy to commute the 
sentence.  He did so on August 5, 1962 and Douglas Chandler left America for 
Tenerife in the Canary Islands (p. 63).  
 
Donald Day 
 He was one of the last recruits of the Nazi propagandists.  Day had been a 
newspaper reporter for many years in Europe and became well known for his 
anti-Soviet rhetoric in articles written for the Chicago Tribune (Bergmeier & Lotz, 
p. 70). 
 He was born in Brooklyn, NY in 1895 into a newspaper family.  His 
younger sister, Dorothy Day, would gain notoriety working as a Catholic lay 
activist (Edwards, 1991, p. 150).  After gaining experience from a few newspaper 
jobs in the U.S., Day became fascinated with the developments in Russia 
following the October Revolution of 1917 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 70).  In view of 
the fact that western journalists were barred from the country, Day accepted a 
challenge from none other than William Randolph Hearst to find a way into the 
Soviet Union and report on internal activities for the Hearst newspapers in 
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America.  If Day was successful, he would be placed on the payroll at $100 a 
week, if not, he would be fired (pp. 70-71).  
To aid in his scheme, he married Etta Fox who was employed by a New 
York-based Soviet bureau created by a revolutionary figure who had fought 
against the Czar, Professor Ludwig K. Martens (Edwards, p. 154).  An anti-
radical hysteria was sweeping the U.S. at the time and the entire 46-member 
group, including Mr. and Mrs. Donald Day, were deported to the Soviet Union in 
January 1921 (p. 154).  However, at the Latvian-Russian border, Day was 
“singled out as a member of the capitalist press” and was forced to return to Riga 
where he would subsequently cover developments in the Soviet Union for Robert 
McCormick’s Chicago Tribune as a regular correspondent (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 
71). 
Day’s anti-Semitism became apparent at the outbreak of World War II 
when he blamed Germany’s bad press on “international Jewry.”  His contention 
was that Britain should appreciate Hitler’s “new order” and the “terrific vitality” of 
National Socialism (p. 71).  Day was forced from Riga to Helsinki when Soviet 
troops moved into Latvia in June 1940.  After predicting a quick German victory 
following their invasion of Russia, Day was escorted to the front at Leningrad and 
filed this somber dispatch in September 1941: 
Towards midnight there was a lull.  Leningrad’s burning factories 
and buildings cast their glow up into the sky…less than 30 miles to 
the east about 2,000,000 women and children were starving in a 
besieged city without hope of rescue or reinforcements…There is 
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no merriment [in the Finnish lines].  All were watching the 
southeastern sky in the direction of Leningrad.  (Edwards, pp. 178-
179)  
 As Soviet resistance improved and the German offensive campaign 
stalled, Day wrote that the Russians were taking a direction in the war that would 
not benefit their American and British allies: 
There were persistent rumours in Stockholm about negotiations 
between the Soviet and German governments which may lead to a 
truce on the eastern front.  […]  There is a mutual respect 
developed by eight months of ferocious fighting.  The Soviet 
government was the first to make the advances now said to be 
under discussion.  The chief reason for Moscow’s proposals was to 
pressure the Allies into opening up a second front on the continent 
of Europe.  (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 71) 
Reaction in the U.S. characterized Day as a traitor as evidenced in the March 18, 
1942 edition of P.M., a New York City daily: 
What is the purpose of Tribune publisher Robert McCormick and 
his associates in printing such stuff as that dispatch from 
Stockholm?  […]  If he doesn’t know that the above story is a 
message which Berlin—Tokyo—Rome is trying to dump on us; if he 
doesn’t yet know that the Axis’ divide and conquer strategy is 
designed to split England, Russia, and the United States […] his 
paper should be suppressed for the duration.  […]  Neither freedom 
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of speech nor freedom of press permits McCormick or any other 
political Quislingist to drive a wedge between the United States and 
its Allies.  He, and his Tribune, and ‘his allies’ have gone too far this 
time.  (pp. 71-72) 
The U.S. State Department agreed and had Day’s passport impounded in 
Stockholm.  The Tribune then fired him after their Baltic correspondent asked for 
a leave of absence to enlist in the Finnish army.  This potential “unfriendly act,” 
as characterized by the U.S. ambassador to Finland, steered Day to Helsinki and 
into a position of language translator for the Finnish government (p. 72). 
 As the Soviets pushed further into Finland in the summer of 1944, Day 
realized that a weakened Germany could no longer “guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Finland” (Edwards, p. 181).  He therefore decided to seek shelter 
inside Germany and left for the relative safety of Berlin where the German 
Foreign Ministry saw his potential as a broadcaster, even at such a late date in 
the war (p. 181). 
 Day’s short career began on August 31, 1944 when Berlin radio 
announced their latest edition as a “20-year-veteran correspondent for the 
Chicago Herald Tribune [sic]” (p. 182).  Day told his audience that he had 
become a victim of political maneuvering, “…Just consider me as a veteran U.S. 
newspaper correspondent whom Mr. Roosevelt and his friends have placed, 
through their intrigues, on the other side of the fence” (p. 182).  On October 7, 
Day denied the existence of a black market in Berlin “because money could not 
corrupt justice in Germany as it did in the democracies” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 
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72).  One of Day’s more incredulous broadcasts occurred in mid-January 1945.  
The subject of discussion was American P.O.W.s and how they had been lied to 
by Roosevelt concerning the horrors of Nazi tyranny: 
Did you know that Roosevelt is using Jewish-Bolshevik-Communist 
terrorist methods to intimidate U.S. P.O.W.s; that political 
commissars of the U.S. Army land in Germany by parachute to be 
captured and placed in P.O.W. camps, so they can terrorize U.S. 
soldiers there?  The prisoners are threatened with courtmartial after 
the war just because they complain of the Bolshevik regime in 
Russia or the imperialistic British.  (Edwards, p. 183) 
After the Dresden air raid of February 17, 1945, Day bestowed the “Order 
of the White Feather” on U.S. Army Air Corps General Spaatz “…for acts of 
exceptional cowardice in bombing German cities filled with pitiful refugees” 
(Bergmeier & Lotz p. 72).  One week later, American audiences heard Day 
describe heroic subsistence inside Berlin: 
 Owing to the Red Army’s advance into Upper Silesia, Berlin Hotels 
and private homes are without heat and hot water.  Eight weeks’ 
food coupons must last for nine weeks, and we must make up with 
un-couponed vegetables.  The horrors of life are enhanced by the 
air raids, and need to dress in a cold room at every alert…I thought 
so little of Berlin had been left to bomb that these large-scale raids 
would cease; but I was mistaken…Sleeping in a room with no 
windows in freezing weather is not pleasant.  Life would be 
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unendurable, but for the unostentatious heroism of everyone.  
(Edwards, p. 182)  
With the end in sight for Germany, Day bemoaned the fact that his own country 
had so much to do with the downfall of the Nazi government.  This grim 
statement was broadcast to America on March 29, 1945: 
It is hard to believe that a Christian people should gang with a 
barbaric nation to try to exterminate another Christian nation, solely 
because the victim of this conspiracy expelled the Jews from its 
country…The Jews will not return to Europe because no European 
country wants them.  That is why the Jews are determined Europe 
shall be destroyed.  (p. 183) 
 In June 1945, Day turned himself in to the U.S. military in Bavaria.  He 
was interrogated for four days and released.  However, he was re-arrested in 
May 1946 and held for nine months at the Intelligence Service Interrogation 
Center near Frankfurt (p. 183).  Due to the nature of his broadcasts and the 
relatively short time spent behind the microphone, Day was informed on 
December 23, 1946 that the Department of Justice was “no longer interested in 
his case,” although entry to the U.S. was being denied (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 73). 
 Day and his wife chose to live in Bavaria where he wrote articles for the 
Daily Press in Ashland, Wisconsin and Fria Ord in Stockholm.  Permission to 
return to Finland was granted in 1953.  After cancer surgery in 1962, Day was 
granted a new U.S. passport and reinstated by the Chicago Tribune as stringer 
based in Helsinki.  A heart attack claimed his life on September 30, 1966 (p. 73).
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Chapter Six- Epilogue 
Organization  
One of the chief reasons for the early success of Nazi-dominated radio 
was that they plainly saw its potential as a propaganda weapon; the previous 
Weimar government did not.  Goebbels spoke often of the “spirituality” of modern 
radio as the means of a “transformation in the worldview of our entire society” 
(Goebbels, 1933).  This spirituality was linked to what the National Socialists saw 
as their modern political movement.  The Reich Propaganda Minister further 
believed that the work of the National Socialist revolution would have been 
impossible without the radio, therefore; the preparation and central organization 
of the new medium was imperative. 
Goebbels indicated that the bureaucracies associated with the Weimar 
organization of radio failed to take into account the “spiritual and political 
responsibilities” (Goebbels, 1933) of radio that the Nazis believed in to a much 
greater degree than their predecessors.  The spiritual energy and flexibility 
needed to reach the masses was not in the best interests of committees, boards, 
and commissioners.  The organizational call to “Spartan simplicity and economy” 
(Goebbels, 1933) was intended as a building block for the immediate and long 
range radio plans of the Reich.  An increase in productivity was seen as a 
potential result. 
With all radio activities under central leadership, spiritual tasks were 
placed before technical tasks, and a leadership model was introduced “to provide 
a clear worldview and to present this worldview in flexible ways” (Goebbels, 
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1933).  This organizational structure and accompanying rhetoric would 
necessarily be altered to fit the changing kismet of war. 
By theoretically defining rhetoric organizationally within the context of 
radio propaganda in Nazi Germany, we find all of Crable’s necessary elements 
present within the Propaganda Ministry bureaucracy giving us a model that 
points towards his notion of a “fourth great system of rhetoric,” where the 
organization itself is the real “rhetor.”  
 Representation takes on a dual meaning as described by Toulmin using 
Kant’s terminology.  The organization processes a private image, the realm of 
inner experience, or a “vorstellung” (Crable, p. 195).  This image is of the 
organizational “self” and of the organization’s “publics.”  The organizational “self” 
of the Propaganda Ministry’s broadcasting division was that of an infallible 
gatekeeper of Nazi ideology.  Meanwhile, the Ministry’s “private image” of the 
public is well documented in a shared disdain for the masses by Hitler and 
Goebbels.  Individuals and publics also create private images of themselves and 
the organizations in their environments.  As time progressed in the twelve-year 
rule of the Party, German citizens were less enchanted with those controlling the 
new medium of radio and were driven to engage in forbidden “black listening” to 
foreign broadcasts. 
Displaying the public manner in which something operates is the creation 
of a “darstellung.”  Toulmin explains this as showing something “in the sense of 
setting it forth, or exhibiting it, so as to show in an entirely public manner what it 
comprises, or how it operates” (p. 195).  Goebbels was quick to point out the 
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advantages of a nationalistic, community experience available through radio.  
The broadcasting organization within the Ministry had the capability of welcoming 
all Germans into the fold as one great nation.  From this participation, one’s own 
private image could be summoned through involved vicarious listening. 
 Crable adds another dimension to representation using the metaphor of a 
“magic act” and its accompanying elements of “sleight of hand” and 
“misdirection.”  As an audience member, we are directed or prompted and 
accordingly see what we have been told to see.  This was as close to “the facts” 
as the German people were allowed.  In the representation, we are enthralled as 
things “appear” and “disappear” but this is not the “magic.”  The failure to see 
what is really occurring is the “magic” and is a highly rhetorical process (p. 123).  
This ability embodied the pure and evil genius of the societal manipulation 
conceived and carried out by Dr. Goebbels with the aid of the newly created 
propaganda instrument of radio. 
 
Programming  
 With messages wearing the mask of nationalism for the home audiences 
and veiled propaganda to others, radio became the perfect instrument for 
spreading the Nazi doctrine to millions around the world.  The lack of attention 
paid to propaganda in the First World War was seen by the new regime in 1933 
as a crucial mistake by Kaiser Wilhelm and later by the Weimar Republic 
government.  There was a grudging admiration on the part of the National 
Socialists for the successful efforts of their World War I enemies, especially the 
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British.  With Hitler and Goebbels witnessing propaganda’s earlier effect on their 
own compatriots, they became strong advocates of its subsequent use in gaining 
power and control.  Therefore, they specifically proceeded to sell the German 
people on the wonders of vicarious participation in major events and the cultural 
continuity achievable through the new medium of radio.  
 Under the guise of restoring national pride through participation, the 
German people in the innocent act of listening to the radio, were squarely 
situated in a rhetorical situation.  By applying the elements of constraints, 
audience, and exigence, in Bitzer’s formula for the rhetorical situation, we see 
that the Nazis were concentrating a considerable amount of effort in the 
modification of exigencies within German society and other countries in the 
world, using propaganda-laden discourse.  As Rolo explains, these strategies of 
exigence modification can take many different routes based on the ebb and flow 
of political situations.  The modification was accomplished early in the war but 
became increasingly difficult as German military defeats continued to wreck 
havoc on the all-important image of the Third Reich. 
 These politically tough times led to uncharacteristic, at least in the Nazi-
sense, changes in programming that contributed to the radio remaining “the good 
companion” for the German soldier and civilian (Goebbels, 1942).  Goebbels 
admitted that the National Socialists’ control over programming had to be much 
more flexible, “Our extensive interest in the radio…after the seizure of power has 
taught us that radio programming is a matter of practice, not of theory, and that 
there is no program that satisfies everyone” (Goebbels, 1942).  The Propaganda 
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Minister’s rare display of honesty in 1942 was a prelude to a relaxation of the 
constant bombardment of political messages.  He reminded the German people 
that the major events were inevitable from now on and that they need not “be 
reminded of them all the time” (Goebbels, 1942).  Everyday life in the Reich was 
becoming more uncertain as the war progressed and radio programmers did their 
best to adapt to these changes.  In this contributory manner, the success of Nazi 
broadcasting on the home front was discernible by avoiding an overtly, 
propagandistic, outer shell when this habitual approach became impossible.  
People were made to feel that radio was to be their constant comrade throughout 
the war, “…it should raise the hearts and touch the conscience” (Goebbels, 
1942). 
 Therefore, to please those worried about cultural decline, serious classical 
music continued to be offered as well as lighter music and entertainment for 
those seeking a source of relaxation from the demands exerted on them by the 
war.  Since music programming outnumbered political commentary by about 
seven hours to one, the Nazis knew that their selection of composers and music 
had to coincide with their overarching ideology.  Racial, ethnic, and inspirational 
considerations were used as guiding mechanisms for inclusion or rejection of 
selections being considered.  With minor image modifications, most of the great 
German Masters were given preference since their music had the ability to affect 
the masses emotionally, in much the same manner as the uniquely selected 
public speakers trained by the Nazi Speaker System.  The Nazis did not want 
people to think; they wanted desirable and robotic responses to their messages. 
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Speakers and Ideology 
 The spoken word enjoyed considerable political success in contemporary 
Germany with Hitler as the role model for all Nazi speakers.  Even as a stage 
manager, Hitler left nothing to chance.  The ingredients for mob hysteria were 
routinely present, “expectancy, strained attention, appeals to the emotion with 
consequent loss of critical thinking, compact seating arrangement, group activity, 
ritual, uniforms, flags, and group insignia” (Lambertson, p. 125). 
 This mob mentality was perceived as the best sounding board for Hitler’s 
ideas.  Primitive, emotional reactions were attainable by this method as Hitler 
pounded the audience with simple, non-intellectual ideas.  While this took place, 
the master orator would exert “a strange magnetism on the susceptible which 
compels obedience” (p. 130), resulting in comparisons to the technique of 
hypnotism.   
 Hitler’s audience analysis was thought to be highly intuitive “…which 
infallibly diagnoses the ills from which the audience is suffering” (pp. 126-127).  
By capitalizing on pre-conceived notions, he merely had to fan the flames instead 
of having to light the fire.  Ideological pillars of Nazism, such as notions of anti-
Semitism, were already present in the souls of the German people long before 
the National Socialist movement.  This convenient arrangement was exploited to 
the fullest by the extensive training provided to those participating in the Nazi 
Speaker System.   
 The ability of the spoken word to move the masses to action is clearly 
expressed through the writings in Mein Kampf.  Stressing simplicity and 
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repetition, this indoctrination technique was customized to fit Hitler’s personal 
views, “The ‘great masses’ receptive ability is only very limited and their 
understanding is small, but their forgetfulness is great” (Hitler, p. 234).  The Nazis 
also understood that their country’s disregard for the use of propaganda in the 
First War was an error that was consequently magnified by the successful 
propaganda efforts of the Americans and British. 
 In linking the Nazi speaker’s rhetoric to the ideological ideals of the Party, 
McGee’s theory of the “Ideograph” becomes a useful tool.  Existing in real 
discourse, these words function as agents of political consciousness (McGee, p. 
7).  A distinctive ideographic example is the Nazi conception of an all-
encompassing worldview, Weltanschauung.  Much of this invented terminology 
eventually found a home in the mainstream language of German society. 
 Hitler’s insistence on the simplicity of message theme was incorporated 
into the training provided for those wishing to become Party speakers in the 
Reich.  There was no patience for the methods of interpretation exercised by 
intellectuals.  Blind faith, unquestionable obedience, and strict adherence to Nazi 
policies were sought after virtues in speaker selection.  Those aspiring to 
become speakers without the benefit of “coming up through the ranks” during the 
Kampfzeit, were aided by the publication of Redner-Fibel, a practical guide 
endorsed by the Party as a channel to effective political speaking.  Written by 
Nazi theorist Hans Krebs, this textbook of sorts followed normal and acceptable 
public speaking guidelines.  However, the instruction was accented with the 
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means to present a favorable impression of the goals germane to the National 
Socialist movement. 
 By demonstrating the inherent difficulties experienced in a speaker’s move 
from the public stage to the radio microphone, we raise a reasonable possibility 
that such occurrences did indeed take place and could have been mandatory for 
some speakers in the twelve-year reign of the Nazis.  Radio dictated major 
adjustments in delivery technique and required a speaker to cope with the 
absence of a visual audience.  The German broadcasters and their enemy 
counterparts in the U.S. had somewhat similar approaches to the new medium if 
one is objective enough to disregard political content.  However, National 
Socialist ideology produced the necessity for the Third Reich announcers to 
employ a rhetorically charged new type of language whose purpose was to serve 
the Party’s goals by infiltrating everyday speech; it was called Nazi German. 
 
Language  
 Ellul has identified two serious dissociations caused by propaganda.  The 
transformation of words in propaganda is characterized by one’s language, an 
instrument of the mind, taking the form of a “pure sound,” such as symbols that 
automatically evoke feelings and reflexes (Ellul, p. 180).  This is a direct result of 
the devaluation of thought, anxiously coveted by Hitler and Goebbels.   
 The second dissociation is the action of the propagandist in forcing us to 
live in his or her verbal world, which he or she has created.  In this type of 
existence, one becomes insulated from reality and conscience is destroyed (Ellul, 
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pp. 180-181), making the implementation of subversive political action a much 
easier undertaking.  When language censorship was extended into the mass 
media, the Nazi-controlled radio acted as an agent between the National 
Socialist government and the German people.  These episodes of language 
regulation were actually grounded in a flood of daily directives issued to 
members of the media by the Propaganda Ministry while being successfully 
screened from public perception. 
 Marcuse saw the new German language of the Nazis as a derivative of 
the practical and mythological layers of culture, accented with an anti-Christian 
attitude linked to failures of the past.  The Party understood the post World War I 
political and economic frustrations of the people and fed the appetite for 
economic development, nationalism, racism, and national respect that the 
German nation demanded of the world.  Marcuse noticed the German people 
falling into a “technological rationalization” that he translated as a most 
formidable weapon of conquest. 
The entire basis for Nazi propaganda was easily found in the pages of 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf.  The language used correlates his belief in simple message 
construction, therefore we see a profusion of folk proverbs and metaphors 
intermingled with messages of racial hatred and political plans for the seizure of 
power and expansion.  McGuire’s close textual analysis of Mein Kampf 
convincingly presents the dialectical tension in Hitler’s myth where meaning is 
created by deliberately repeating mythic structures.  Themes of birth, death, and 
renewal are followed within the narrative structure of the “Nazi Bible.”  Kenneth 
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Burke notes the many unification devices used by Hitler and some interesting 
sexual symbolism in Mein Kampf.  Of particular note is Burke’s distain for the 
Nazi “bastardization” of religious thought found in the book.  He warns that this 
type of misuse can easily lead to the establishment of similar fascist states. 
 Language regulation of the press and radio became an essential 
ingredient in maintaining the “crowd mentality” control that the Nazis practiced.  
Language suited to the National Socialist ideology was stressed.  Certain words 
were actually reserved exclusively for Party use as were words used in 
describing the enemy and the historical development of the movement, i.e. 
Kampfzeit, meaning early time of struggle (Michael & Doerr, p. 235).  Other 
language areas identified by Townson and closely monitored by the 
propagandists were word usage associated with the German progress of the war, 
references to terms used by the British, Americans, or Soviets, and language 
used in describing Germany’s relationship with her few allies.  
 The totalitarian nature of the National Socialists found valuable utility in 
the language regulation of the German people.  Hitler and Goebbels stressed a 
simplistic message that featured abundant repetition as a means of reaching the 
masses.  The collective whole of a “crowd mentality” was targeted and was 
attainable through radio; Germany was more important than the individual 
German.  The ghost-like ideology of the Nazis was loosely structured to fit the 
emotion of the occasion.  
 Censorship of the media and educational venues began almost 
immediately upon Hitler’s taking office.  Media censorship was the source of 
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major problems in attempts to accurately report on the reversals encountered in 
the Russian offensive.  The military defeat at Stalingrad posed new challenges 
for the Nazi propagandist who was faced with choosing an unfamiliar strategy.  
They decided on the glorification of the event with the language of mythic rhetoric 
and symbolism as key ingredients.  While press directives stressed the “heroic” 
nature of the struggle, Goebbels succeeded in turning the military catastrophe 
into a “Wagnerian celebration.”   
 
Shortwave  
 It was successful propaganda strategies such as the media’s orchestrated 
reaction to the defeat at Stalingrad that Goebbels tried to implement and export 
on shortwave radio to American audiences.  The Nazi strategy was forced to 
walk a delicate line between not antagonizing the American audiences’ 
confidence in an Allied victory, which might put U.S. neutrality at risk, and the 
Third Reich’s matter-of-fact policy of winning the ongoing “European” war.  This 
dilemma would badger the German radio’s North American Service until the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, when U.S. neutrality became a moot point. 
 The Princeton Listening Center, through the monitoring of these 
shortwave broadcasts, identified early Nazi radio strategies that ran the gamut 
from driving a political wedge between the U.S.--British alliance, to outright 
intimidation based on visions of an economically and politically unfavorable 
American way of life resulting from German-dominated world leadership (Childs 
& Whitton, 1972, p. 80). 
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 The eight Americans indicted for treason as Nazi broadcasters had their 
rhetorical roots fertilized by exceedingly brittle emotional attachments to their 
native America.  Kaltenbach could not wait to return even after being accused of 
spying while visiting Germany during the First World War as a teen.  Delaney had 
no immediate family and made trips to the U.S. before the war in support of 
business ventures.  While some like Best and Chandler left the U.S. for what they 
believed would be forever, others returned only after the war had ended.  Drexel 
was planning to return to Europe when she died in 1956 (Edwards, 1991, p. 187).  
In searching for a motive, couched in at least a cultural expression, 
Edwards looks at sociologist Robert E. Park’s marginal man concept for a useful, 
yet, partial explanation: 
The marginal man…lives on the margin of two cultures—that of the 
country of his parents and that of the country of his adoption, in 
neither of which he is quite at home.  We know…that this so-called 
marginal man is likely to be smart, i.e. a superior though sometimes 
a superficial intellectual type…The Christian convert in Asia or 
Africa exhibits many, if not most of the characteristics of the 
‘marginal man’—the same spiritual instability, intensified self-
consciousness, restlessness, and malaise.  (p.187) 
 Most of the future Nazi propagandists had unsettled childhoods or had 
become world citizens at an early age.  It is fair to say that expatriation may have 
resulted in a search for some type of kinship; a missing sense of belonging was 
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coveted.  However, as most discovered, the Nazis were not amenable to their 
respective situations. 
 Their broadcast rhetoric was born out of disrespect for individual freedoms 
that interfered with Hitler’s visions.  Perhaps these American turned Nazi 
propagandists believed that the rigid, hierarchical organization found in Frederick 
Taylor’s scientific management principles and exhibited by Hitler’s bureaucratic 
government, were the answers to a kaleidoscope of political and economical 
experiments that had strangled European progress since the First World War (p. 
188). 
 As products of nineteenth century experience and thought, the radio 
traitors “grew up in a society that had institutionalized regionalism, racism, social 
stratification…and the confining tenets of white Anglo-Saxon Protestantism,” (pp. 
188-189)  but Goebbels expected them to interpret the revolutionary nature of 
National Socialism.  They were ill equipped to wrestle with the complexities of a 
twentieth century government’s attempt to control mass society (p. 189).  Let us 
also not lose sight of the relative immaturity of the medium of radio. 
 Edwards contends that the eight indicted for treason were a serious 
detriment to Germany’s propaganda efforts.  There can be no doubt in the Nazi’s 
passionate belief in the power of the spoken word -- the model being Adolf Hitler 
as orator.  However, these neophyte broadcasters were not in front of a visible 
live audience and were certainly not in Hitler’s league as speakers.  Most were 
legitimate newspaper correspondents whose experience with radio was woefully 
inadequate to have an impact since political content was privileged over on-air 
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technique.  A writer’s copy was written to be read, not spoken, and the radio’s 
intimate quality germane to a Rooseveltian “fireside chat” became blatantly 
absent to U.S. shortwave audiences.  The Nazis were only interested in finding 
Americans who would tow the party line at the microphone.  Those 
communicators in possession of a much needed “radio personality” such as the 
popular British expatriate William Joyce, a.k.a. Lord Haw-Haw, were an 
extremely rare find. 
 U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle claimed to have never listened to 
these short wave broadcasts and even suggested that if Americans were 
becoming angry over what they heard, the government ought not to take action 
since it was probably good for the war effort (Edwards, pp. 190-191).  The 
decision to prosecute the infamous eight was based on the military’s insistence 
that the traitors were a threat to national security and subsequently worked 
towards their convictions (p. 191).  Perhaps the treasonous broadcast rhetoric 
did affect an inconspicuous, influential, few in positions of authority in 
Washington.  
The Audiences 
 However, what can be said of the masses?  Did the Nazi inspired radio 
propaganda and accompanying rhetoric have its desired effects?  For the first 
nine or ten months of the war, the German people had a favorable reaction to 
domestic radio broadcasting (Herzstein, p. 404).  When it became apparent that 
the quick initial victories in Poland, France, and the Low Countries were only part 
of much longer than anticipated drawn-out war, the evasions and repetitions of 
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Nazi programming began to wear thin on the public as witnessed by William 
Shirer in October 1940: 
 Radio news is no better and of late I have noticed more than one 
German shut off a news broadcast after the first couple of minutes 
with that expressive Berlin exclamation: ‘Oh Quatsch!’ which is 
stronger than ‘Oh, nonsense!’  ‘Rubbish’ is probably a better 
translation.  (Shirer, 1941, pp. 541-542)  
Illegal “black listening” in different regions of the Reich had grown to 
alarming proportions by 1942 in spite of the severe punishment if one were to be 
discovered.  Goebbels misread this phenomenon as “ingratitude, contemptible, 
low,” but most Germans simply wanted more military news.  It was not 
necessarily the Nazi direction they rejected, only its policy on news censorship 
(Herzstein, p. 405).  
 Nazi short wave broadcasts were characterized as a potential, rather than 
actual, danger in America.  The Princeton Listening Center concluded that 
Americans who listened to short wave broadcasts on a regular basis amounted 
to not more than one percent of the population (Childs & Whitton, p. 305).  They 
also warned Washington about the temptation to skirt the unpopular issues in 
much the same way as the “guilty” German broadcasters:    
Such broadcasts [short wave] have not in any sense been a threat 
to our national morale.  Nor will they constitute such a threat 
provided the integrity of our domestic news services is preserved, 
and provided further that government agencies in the United States 
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refrain from taking any actions which impair essentially the quality 
and comprehensiveness of the information supplied by our 
domestic communication agencies.  If, however, during the stress 
and strain of war the people of the United States lose confidence in 
their press and radio; if, because of censorship and misleading 
propaganda, American citizens believe they can no longer rely 
upon these agencies for an adequate picture of the world outside, 
then, and only then, will they turn in large numbers to external 
sources of information such as foreign short-wave broadcasts.  (p. 
305) 
What we find in the above caveat is a moralistic and ethical blueprint for a free 
society, as it relates to the construction and dissemination of news in both good 
times and bad.  Why do some audiences fall victim to propaganda while others 
do not?  The answer lies in the following from Kris & Speier: 
In no society can the persuasiveness of the propagandist eliminate 
the impact of facts; all he can do is to re-interpret them.  But in 
some situations propaganda finds a more fertile ground than in 
others.  The strong and the free care little for propaganda and can 
rely upon traditional values when in distress.  Anxious and 
uncertain people are more likely to be influenced and may search 
for the guidance that propaganda pretends to offer. (p. 477) 
 Critical thinking on the part of the citizenry is an essential component to 
any democratic form of government.  Without the ability to question, judge, and 
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decide, the governed run the risk of becoming subjected to the “lunatic fringe” of 
their own population where demagogues may emerge by means of various 
rhetorical strategies.  When public speakers or the media deprive audiences of 
the ability to reflect critically on important issues that will ultimately affect the 
whole of society, the very nature of the democratic form of government is 
severely threatened.  “In a democracy one of the gravest dangers is that the 
average citizen shall not think…Cooperative problem-solving is the hope of our 
nation, not the dogmatic utterances of a dictator” (Lambertson, 1942, p. 130). 
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